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Extended Abstract 
 
Recent decades witnessed extensive theoretical and empirical efforts that have been 
directed at understanding the dynamics surrounding the financing decisions of firms although 
there has not been either a universal theory or an empirical consensus. Based on a critical 
assessment and analysis of the literature, the thesis argued not only that there is a substantial 
dynamic component in the financing decisions of firms but also that those decisions are a 
function of firm, industry, institutional and macroeconomic factors. Although the literature, 
lately, has taken a fast leap to assess the nexus between industrial, institutional and 
macroeconomic factors, on the one hand, and financing decisions of a firm, on the other, we 
are yet to witness similar endeavours within the African setting. Conducting a study of this 
nature is important because there are profound differences between the institutional and 
macroeconomic milieu of African countries and those of the advanced economies where such 
a research is abundant. And, these institutional and macroeconomic differences have 
important policy implications. 
Using comprehensive model specifications consisting of firm, industrial, 
macroeconomic and institutional variables and both static and dynamic econometric 
procedures, the thesis examines the relationship between “conventional” firm, industrial, 
institutional and macroeconomic factors, on the one hand, and financing decisions of a firm, 
on the other. Financial statement data over a period of 10-years (1999-2008), extracted from 
OSIRIS database, pertaining to 986 non-financial firms drawn from nine African countries - 
Botswana, Egypt, Ghana, Kenya, Mauritius, Morocco, Nigeria, South Africa and Tunisia - 
were analysed. The financial statement data were used to capture “conventional” firm-
specific characteristics that were known to effect on financing decisions of a firm. The 
sample firms were classified into 10 industries using the US SIC (4-digits) following Song 
and Philippatos (2004). Institutional and macroeconomic data necessary for the analyses were 
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obtained from secondary sources such as the World Development Indicators, Financial 
Structure Database of the World Bank, the personal website of Andrei Shelifer (a Harvard 
Economics Professor), Kaufmann, Kraay and Mastruzzi (2009) and Berkowitz, Pistor and 
Richard (2003). 
Consistent with theory and empirical literature, a battery of estimation procedures 
point out that basic capital structure of sample a firm is significantly associated with a set of 
“conventional” firm-specific factors including firm size, profitability, dividend payout, 
tangibility and non-debt-related tax shield. This suggests that costs of agency, transaction and 
financial distress, information asymmetry and adverse selection and tax issues are important 
consideration in basic capital structure decisions of sample firms. The evidence also shows 
that short-term and total leverage of firms in the Wholesale and Retail and Chemical and 
Construction industries are significantly higher than those of firms in the Manufacturing 
industry while long-term leverage of firms in Regulated industries tends to be higher than is 
the case for firms in the Manufacturing industries. Furthermore, the thesis documents that 
leverage is affected not only by firm-specific factors but also by a host of institutional (i.e., 
shareholder rights protection, creditor rights protection, rule of law, size of banking sector 
and development of stock market) and macroeconomic (i.e., GDP per capita, Growth rate of 
real GDP per capita, inflation) factors in a statistically significant manner. In addition to the 
direct influences, macroeconomic conditions exert indirect influences on basic capital 
structure by enhancing or mitigating the effect of firm-specific factors on leverage. 
In an effort to further extend the debate on capital structure in the African setting, the 
thesis developed a dynamic partial adjustment model (DPAM) which made the joint 
estimation of adjustment speed of basic capital structure and its determinants possible. The 
results from system-GMM dynamic panel data estimation procedure showed that firms in 
Africa not only adjust their basic capital structure to a target but also face varying degrees of 
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adjustment costs and/or benefits in doing so. Furthermore, the evidence indicates that the 
extent of costs and/or benefits that firms in Africa face in adjusting their basic capital 
structure is determined, inter alia, by firm-specific factors such as firm profitability, size, 
growth opportunities, and the gap between observed and target capital structure. This 
evidence signifies the role that transaction costs, financial flexibility and access to external 
finance play in adjustment speed decisions of firms in our sample. Also, the research found 
that firms in riskier industries adjust their basic capital structure faster than those in less risky 
ones implying that probability of bankruptcy has important place in determining adjustment 
costs and/or benefits of firms in our sample. The findings also showed that institutional (i.e., 
legal origin, shareholder and creditor rights protection, rule of law, size of banking sector and 
stock market development) and macroeconomic (i.e., GDP per capita, marginal corporate tax 
rate and inflation) factors are significantly associated with the costs and/or benefits of 
adjustment suggesting that agency costs, access to external finance and tax issues may well 
play a role in the optimal financing choices of firms in our sample.  
The thesis also extends the debate on debt maturity structure front by examining its 
determinants within the context of firms in Africa. Although Gwatidzo (2009:149-222) dealt 
with debt structure, his focus was on the mix of the sources of debt. This thesis, on the other 
hand, focuses on debt maturity structure and to that extent it is new in the African setting. 
Based on a range of econometric procedures, our evidence confirms that debt maturity 
structure of firms in the sample is influenced by “conventional” firm-specific characteristics 
such as earnings volatility, asset maturity, profitability and dividend payout ratio. The thesis 
also indicates that firms in Oil and Gas, Regulated and Service industries incline to have 
longer debt maturities while those in Durables, Chemical and Construction, Business 
equipment, Wholesale and Retail and Health industries incline to have shorter debt 
maturities. The study also documents that macroeconomic variables (i.e., income groups of a 
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country, GDP per capita, growth rate of real GDP per capita and marginal corporate tax rate) 
effect on debt maturity structure of firms in our sample. Also, the evidence establishes that 
there is a nexus between institutional variables (i.e., stock market development, size of 
banking sector, shareholder and creditor rights protection) and debt maturity structure of 
sample firms. In addition to the direct effects, the findings show that broadly defined 
macroeconomic and institutional variables had indirect effects on debt maturity structure by 
either mitigating or enhancing the influence of firm-specific factors. The fact that some 
commonality between the determinants of basic capital structure and debt maturity was 
observed reinforces the view that the two financing decisions are highly intertwined and, 
perhaps, jointly determined. 
Despite the close attention that determinants of adjustment speed of basic capital 
structure have received in the extant literature, we are yet to see similar studies on the 
adjustment speed of debt maturity structure both in the developed and developing world. To 
this extent, the evidence documented in this thesis is new. System-GMM estimation results 
indicate clear evidence that there is a substantial dynamic component in the debt maturity 
structure of our sample firms and also that the dynamism is dependent on firm, industry and 
country level factors. Specifically, the study shows that the extent of adjustment costs and/or 
benefits of firms in our sample are inversely related to firm size, growth opportunities and the 
distance between observed and target debt maturity structure. This suggests that agency, 
transaction and financial distress costs are important determinants of the costs and/or benefits 
of straying away from the equilibrium debt maturity structure. Also, the thesis documents that 
firms in the Service industry move towards their target debt maturity structure relatively 
rapidly than is the case in other industries. In contrast, firms within the Durables and Oil and 
Gas industries adjust their debt maturity structure relatively slowly towards their optimum. 
The implication of this particular finding is that cost of debt, cost of agency and liquidity 
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pressure have a role to play in the determination of the adjustment speed of debt maturity 
structure of firms in our sample. Finally, the thesis proffers evidence that institutional (i.e., 
legal origin, shareholder and creditor rights and rule of law) and macroeconomic (i.e., GDP 
per capita and growth rate of real GDP per capita) factors have a statistically significant 
influence on the costs and/or benefits of adjustment to a target debt maturity structure.  
Overall, the evidence documented in this study signify the prevalence of problems 
related to agency and enforceability of contracts, investor protection, information asymmetry, 
adverse selection and moral hazard, access to finance and financial flexibility, transaction 
costs and tax regimes in the sample countries. The current study proposes policy 
interventions that governments and policymakers of developing/emerging economies in 
general and the sample countries in particular may find useful. 
This study contributes to the capital and debt maturity structure literature in several 
ways. First, it extends the work of Gwatidzo and Ojah (2009) by directly examining the 
influence of industrial, institutional and macroeconomic variables, in addition to the 
“conventional” firm-specific factors, on basic capital structure decisions of firms within the 
African context. It also introduced new variables (at firm, industry and country levels) and 
used bigger samples (both in terms of number of firms and countries) and better econometric 
procedures. The current study is a first attempt to directly examine the nexus between a host 
of industrial, institutional and macroeconomic variables on basic capital structure decisions of 
a firm within the African milieu.  
Second, despite existence of extensive theoretical and empirical efforts on the subject 
of capital structure choice, much less is known about debt maturity structure of firms. This 
paucity is even worse when we consider the literature within the African context. The only 
exception to this phenomenon is Chapter 4 of the unpublished doctoral work of Gwatidzo 
(2009). Unlike the work of Gwatidzo which focused on the mix of debt sources, the current 
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study focuses on the debt maturity structure of firms (i.e., the long-term vs. short-term mix). 
There is no published work yet along the lines of the determinants of debt maturity structure 
in Africa. This thesis attempts to fill this gap. 
Third, at the core of the debate on basic capital and debt maturity structure has been 
whether a firm exhibits target behaviour. Although the literature has taken a new leap by 
considering dynamic specifications that allow for target adjustment of capital and debt 
maturity structures, there is no empirical work which looks at the manner in which firms in 
Africa adjust their financial structure over time. Again, this study is a first attempt to 
investigate determinants of the adjustment speed of financial structure using data pertaining 
to firms in selected African countries.  
Fourth, there is a long tradition of examining industry effects on financing decisions 
of firms. However, neither single-country nor cross-country studies carried out in the African 
setting addressed this important dimension in the capital and debt maturity structure debate. 
In the present study, the research includes industry variables to examine the role of industry 
characteristics on firm’s financing decisions.  
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CHAPTER 1 
 
INTRODUCTION 
 
1.1 Background to the Study 
 
There is a large body of literature that studies the link between finance and economic 
growth, however, the debate on the direction of causality remains unsettled (e.g., King and 
Levine 1993; Beck, Levine and Loayza 2000). Corporate financing decisions
1
 have important 
bearings on policy matters at macro- and micro-levels. At macro-level, they have bearings on 
a country’s overall competitiveness, financial development and interest rates and securities 
price determination and regulation. They also affect micro-level issues such as capital 
structure, debt maturity structure, dividend policy, corporate governance and corporate 
development (e.g., Singh and Hamid 1992; Browne 1994; Green, Murinde and Suppakitjarak 
2003). Although corporate financing decisions have such far reaching consequences, how 
firms in developing countries [in general and in Africa in particular] finance their investments 
and what combination of factors determine their financing dynamics remains an unsettled 
academic and policy question (e.g., Prasad, Green and Murinde 2001).  
Since the late 1950s, there has been a preponderance of empirical and theoretical 
debates on the relevance [or irrelevance] of corporate financing decisions to firm value. The 
path-breaking work of Modigliani and Miller (1958, MM hereafter) provided a much sought 
direction for exploring and explaining firm’s financing decisions. According to MM (1958), 
under certain conditions, neither the decisions on basic capital structure (i.e., debt-equity mix) 
nor those on debt maturity structure (i.e., long term-short term mix) should impact firm value. 
Several subsequent researches, however, have endeavoured to relax some of the conditions 
                                                          
1
 Although the phrase “financing decisions” may refer to a range of decisions related to sources of finance, 
capital structure, debt maturity, dividend policy, etc made by an “agent”, in the context of this thesis, it refers to 
capital structure decisions of a firm where the debt-equity composition and its dynamics are determined or the 
debt maturity structure decision of a firm where the maturity composition and its dynamics are determined.  
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imposed in MM (1958), and forwarded theoretical and empirical arguments favouring the 
“relevance” of financing decisions in the determination of firm value. Despite the bounteous 
research efforts, there hasn’t been one universal theory that explains the financing decisions 
of a firm (e.g., Myers 2001). The extant literature identifies a range of conditional theories.  
As in the theoretical literature, empirical endeavours are far from consensus even on 
some of the most basic issues conclude Elsas and Florysiak (2008). In a presidential address 
to the American Finance Association, Stewart Myer (1984) famously asked “how do firms 
choose their capital structure?” Expectedly, his answer was “we don’t know.” Fifty years 
after MM’s (1958) seminal paper, Stewart Myer’s (1984) answer is still valid. Nonetheless, 
we have gained significant insights into both capital and debt maturity structure “puzzle.” 
Broadly speaking, two important “stylized facts” emerged from past endeavours to 
empirically differentiate between competing theories. First, there is a substantial dynamic 
component in the determination of both basic capital structure and debt maturity structure of 
firms (e.g., Antoniou, Guney and Paudyal 2006; Flannery and Rangan 2006; Antoniou, 
Guney and Paudyal 2008; Dang 2011; Deesomsak, Paudyal and Pescetto 2009; Terra 2011). 
Second, firms’ financing decisions are a function of not only firm-specific factors but also of 
industry, macroeconomic and institutional factors (e.g., Rajan and Zingales 1995; Demirguc-
Kunt and Maksimovic 1996; De Jong, Kabir and Nguyen 2008).  
Notwithstanding the headway that has been made, the extant literature on the subject 
of financing decisions has several shortcomings. Most previous empirical work is limited to 
single-country studies (e.g., De Jong et al. 2008; Terra 2011). It is especially so with regard 
to debt maturity decisions. Of course, single-country studies would advance our 
understanding of firm’s financing decisions by helping us identify firm-specific variables that 
determine its financing decisions. Such studies, by design, won’t provide explanations for 
cross-country variations in financing decisions, nonetheless. Lately, mindful of this 
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shortcoming of single-country studies, the literature witnessed a proliferation of cross-
country studies (e.g., Rajan and Zingales 1995; Demirgüç-Kunt and Maksimovic 1999; 
Antoniou et al. 2006; 2008; Deesomsak et al. 2009; Terra 2011). These cross-country studies 
predominantly focus either on advanced economies or, at most, non-African economies, 
however
2
.  
We, however, know that cross-country differences in macroeconomic and institutional 
characteristics do explain part of the variation in financing decisions (e.g., Rajan and Zingales 
1995; Demirguc-Kunt and Maksimovic 1996; Booth, Dermirguc-Kunt and Makismovic 
2001). We also know that developing/emerging economies in general and African economies 
in particular are epitomized by: (i) relatively inefficient and incomplete capital markets; (ii) 
noticeably higher information asymmetry; and (iii) somehow different financing 
arrangements compared to advanced economies (e.g., Eldomiaty 2007). Thus, studies carried 
out in the context of developed economies could be of limited applicability for decision 
making in the context of African economies. 
The notable exception to this disturbing dearth of cross-country studies in the African 
context is the recent work by Gwatidzo and Ojah (2009) on capital structure and Gwatidzo 
(2009:149-222) on debt [source] choice. Looking at a sample of firms from five selected 
African countries - Ghana, Kenya, Nigeria, South Africa, and Zimbabwe – the authors report 
presence of cross-country variations in both basic capital structure as well as debt [source] 
choice. Chapter 2 of this thesis extends the work of Gwatidzo and Ojah (2009) in several 
ways. Firstly, by including civil code countries in the sample, it explicitly investigates the 
role of legal institutions on capital structure decisions of a firm. Secondly, by including 
macroeconomic characteristics of sample countries into the models, it directly examines the 
role of macroeconomic variables on capital structure decisions of a firm. Thirdly, by 
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 Although the works of Sing and Hamid (1992), Singh (1995), Booth et al. (2001), Prasad et al. (2001), and 
Terra (2011) focused on developing/emerging economies, they were on non-African economies. 
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including industry indicator variables, it improves model specifications, and hence, assesses 
the inter-industry variation in capital structure decision of sample firms. Fourthly, by using 
better econometric procedures (i.e., system GMM and SUR), it addresses endogeneity 
problem that usually plagues capital structure research. 
Myers (1984) insightfully suggests that the main empirical implication of hypotheses 
that fall under trade-off theories is that firms should adjust their capital structure to some 
optimal level if shocks to actual leverage occur. Heeding to this suggestion, recently, the 
literature witnessed what could arguably be called a very fruitful and important approach in 
designing empirical tests that could discriminate between trade-off theories and other 
competing theories (Elsas and Florysiak 2008). There has been a proliferation of empirical 
literature that supports not only that there is a substantial dynamic component in a firm’s 
financing decisions but also that the dynamism depends on firm, industry, macroeconomic 
and institutional factors (e.g., Drobetz and Wanzenried 2006; Drobetz, Pensa and Wanzenried 
2007; Flannery and Hankins 2007; Deesomsak et al. 2009; Terra 2011). In the context of 
Africa, there is no published work that investigates the dynamic partial adjustment of a firm’s 
basic capital structure and debt maturity.  
Using data collected from nine African countries, the current study examines the 
influence of firm, industry, macroeconomic and institutional factors in the determination of 
both basic capital structure and debt maturity structure of a firm. It also investigates whether 
firms in the sample countries adjust their capital and debt maturity structures to a target, and 
if so, what factors determine the pace at which firms adjust their capital and debt maturity 
structures to a target. Carrying out such a study in the context of African countries is very 
important for, at least, two reasons. First, the popular view holds that the highly imperfect 
legal and market institutions in African economies hinder access to finance by firms which in 
turn is an impediment for investment and growth. Findings of this study will enhance African 
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governments’ and policymakers’ understanding on how they may use policies and 
legislations to reduce firms’ financial constraints to boost investment and growth. Second, it 
will provide an opportunity for examining the salient features of financing decisions in 
African countries, and hence, will serve as an “out-of-sample” test for financial theories 
developed in the heavily studied Western economies. The following subsections provide 
background information regarding the institutional and macroeconomic setup of sample 
countries; the problem statement; the specific research questions and objectives; the research 
paradigm, approach, and design; the contribution and significance of the study; and the 
outline of the study. 
 
1.2 Institutional and Macroeconomic Environment as a Background to the Study 
 
Consistent with institutional theory which explains how a firm’s behaviour and 
practices are moulded through changes induced by contextual pressures
3
, recent literature on 
firm finance suggests that financial decisions of a firm could hardly be understood in 
isolation from the institutional – legal and financial - and macroeconomic environment that 
characterizes the country in which it operates (e.g., Booth et al. 2001; Deesomsak et al. 2004; 
2009; Antoniou et al. 2006; 2008; Fan, Titman and Twite 2008; Lopez-Iturriaga and 
Rodriguez-Sanz 2008). This is partly because institutional and macroeconomic environment 
of a country vitally determines the supply of capital by surplus units and demand for capital 
by deficit units for financing investments (Faulkender and Petersen 2006). This section 
presents some contextual information regarding the institutional and macroeconomic 
environment in Africa, with particular emphasis on the sample countries. We especially look 
at the evolution of legal and financial institutions and select country-characteristics that 
define macroeconomic conditions. 
                                                          
3
 DiMaggio and Powell (1983) in their seminal work entitled ‘The iron cage revisited: institutional isomorphism 
and collective rationality in organizational fields’ published in the American Sociological Review present an 
elaborate discussion on institutional theory.   
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1.2.1 Legal institutions 
 
The role of institutional context in examining the dynamics in firm finance was 
recognized as early as Rajan and Zingales (1995). Although they do not directly investigate 
the effect of institutional differences on capital structure, Rajan and Zingales (1995) remark 
that the differences that they found in capital structure determination among G-7 countries 
could partly be due to differences in the tax code, bankruptcy laws, the state of development 
of bond markets and patterns of ownership, suggesting that future research should focus on 
analyzing the relation between institutional characteristics and capital structure 
determination.  
The earlier literature had suggested that the role of law on corporate finance, in 
comparison to competitive capital, product and labour markets, is at best of secondary 
importance or even trivial (e.g., Easterbrook and Fischel, 1991; Black, 1990). In a serious 
rebuttal to this view, La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes, Shleifer and Vishny (1997, 1998) show that 
legal institutions are rather “front-bench-sitters” when it comes to the determination of 
financing decisions of a firm. They examine the influence of laws governing investor 
protection, the quality of enforcement of those laws and ownership concentration on the 
demand for external finance and its availability. According to these authors, legal structures 
with little investor protection exacerbate information asymmetries and contracting costs. 
Hence, firms in such countries tend to have lesser access to capital and thus investment and 
economic growth are likely to be lower (e.g., Demirguc-Kunt and Maksimovic 1998; 
Jappelli, Pagano and Bianco 2005; Laeven and Majnoni 2005).   
One common regularity that La Porta et al. (1997; 1998) point out is that common law 
countries tend to protect both shareholders and creditors the most; in contrast, French civil 
law countries tend to protect shareholders and creditors the least. They further highlight that 
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those countries which afford the strongest protection to investors are also characterized by 
well-developed financial markets which in turn affect the financing patterns of firms. This 
view was also corroborated by more recent studies including Djankov, La Porta, Lopez-de-
Silanes and Shleifer (2008) and Fan et al. (2008) who remark that the law and its enforcement 
influences financing decisions as they are used to mitigate agency problems that exists 
between corporate insiders and outsiders, and thus, influence outsiders’ confidence in the 
markets and consequently their development.  
In terms of basic capital structure, La Porta et al. put forward that firms in common 
law countries would have greater debt than those in civil law countries as the severity of 
agency problem tends to be stronger in the former than the latter. Extending this notion, 
Demirguc-Kunt and Maksimovic (1998) proffer evidence that firms in countries with 
stronger protection to investors and superior law enforcement tend to use long-term external 
finance. Furthermore, the dynamic adjustment literature suggests that adjustment costs should 
be lower and/or adjustment benefits higher in common law originated countries, leading to 
faster adjustment (e.g., Öztekin and Flannery 2008). In light of this backdrop, we note that 
five of the nine countries in our sample drew their legal systems from the English common 
law tradition whereas the other drew from the French civil law implying that the protection 
afforded to investors and the quality of their enforcement are likely to vary across our sample 
countries (see Table 1.1).  
 
(Insert table 1.1 about here) 
 
The literature alludes to the fact that the utility of contracts as vehicles to mitigate 
agency problems between insiders and outsiders to a firm is a function of not only the laws 
written in the books but also on the quality of their enforcement (e.g., Levine and Zervos 
1998; Pistor, Raiser, Gelfer and Square 2000; Fabbri 2001; De Jong et al. 2008; Fan et al. 
2008). However, in practice, there are varying degrees of disparity between the laws in the 
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books (de jure) and laws in action (de facto) and this is more pronounced when it comes to 
Africa as all African countries have adopted (or “transplanted”) their laws from some 
Western origins (Berkowitz et al. 2003). Thus, I find it imperative to investigate the influence 
of investor protections granted in the laws as well as the quality of their enforcement on 
financing decisions of firms in Africa. In the ensuing paragraphs, I explore creditor rights 
protection, shareholder rights protection, and quality of law enforcement in Africa with 
special emphasis on the sample countries
4
.  
The important role that creditor rights protection plays in mitigation of the agency 
problem that exists between insiders and outsiders was recognized in La Porta et al. and other 
subsequent works. These authors devised an index to measure the degree of creditor rights 
protection in a country by considering such factors as restrictions on debtors, automatic stay 
on debtor’s assets, priority rights upon liquidation of a bankrupt firm and retention of 
administration by management of a firm to be restructured. Through its effect on the risk that 
lenders and borrowers face and agency costs, creditor rights protection has a bearing on basic 
capital structure as well as debt maturity structure (e.g., La Porta et al. 1998; Deesomsak et 
al. 2004, 2009; Cheng and Shiu 2007; Fan et al. 2008). In terms of capital structure 
adjustment speed, the literature suggests that firms in countries with stronger creditor rights 
protection tend to adjust their capital structure more quickly than those in countries with 
weaker creditor rights protection (e.g., Wanzenried 2006; Clark, Francis and Hasan 2009).  
We note that the empirical literature proffers mixed evidence on the association 
between creditor rights protection and capital structure (e.g., Deesomsak et al. 2004; Cheng 
and Shiu 2007; De Jong et al. 2008). In terms of debt maturity structure, Deesomsak et al. 
(2009) show that firms in countries with superior creditor rights use relatively more short-
term debt. In a related study, Qian and Strahan (2007) examine the influence of differences in 
                                                          
4
 The exact definitions of creditor rights protection, shareholder rights protection, and quality of law 
enforcement and how the corresponding indices were calculated is indicated in notes to the tables presented at 
the end of the chapter.  
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legal systems on the terms of bank loans and find that higher creditors’ rights indices are 
associated with lower interest rates and longer maturities. Using dynamic adjustment models, 
Öztekin and Flannery (2008) document that adjustment is faster in countries with stronger 
creditor rights protection. Although we note that the average creditor rights index for our 
sample countries was not varying over the 10-year period considered in the study, we observe 
that it varies from a low of zero (0) in Tunisia to a high of four (4) in Kenya and Nigeria 
(Table 1.1) suggesting a potential for cross-country variation in financing decisions of firms 
in sample countries stemming from differences in creditor rights protection. 
Creditors aren’t the only providers of capital to the firm. Shareholders are also 
important contributors to external funds and the extant literature alludes to the fact that firm 
financing is also a function of the quality of shareholder rights protection. It suggests that 
stronger shareholder rights protection reduces severity of agency costs between shareholders 
and other stakeholders, and hence encourages development of equity markets and utilization 
of long-term debt by firms (e.g., La Porta et al. 1998; Cheng and Shiu 2007; Fan et al. 2008; 
Deesomsak et al. 2009). This literature also develops an index to measure the degree of 
shareholder rights protection by considering such important factors as restrictions on mailing 
proxy votes, restrictions on whether shareholders have to deposit their shares prior to a 
general shareholders meeting, restriction on representation of minorities on the board of 
directors, mechanisms to handle oppressed minorities, requirements for calling an 
extraordinary shareholders’ meetings and pre-emptive rights.  
Shareholder rights protection, through its influence on agency costs and access to 
capital, does matter in the basic capital and debt maturity structure decisions of a firm. The 
empirical evidence is inconclusive though (e.g., Chen, Lee and Kao 2000; De Jong et al. 
2008; Deesomsak et al. 2009). Although we note that the shareholder rights protection index 
was stable for our sample countries over the 10-year period considered (Table 1.2), it varies 
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from a low of two (2) in Kenya and Morocco to a high of five (5) in Ghana and South Africa 
(Table 1.1). This suggests that there could be variations in financing decisions of sample 
firms arising from differences in shareholder rights protection across sample countries. 
Better law enforcement is likely to dis-incentivize engagement in risky behaviour by 
insiders, and hence, reduce the possibility of firms going into financial distress (e.g., Gul 
2001; De Jong et al. 2008). Efficient law enforcement also enhances the creditor’s ability to 
recoup money it lent to debtors, and hence, enhances the development of debt markets. 
Hence, firms that operate in a country where there is stronger law enforcement tend to have 
higher leverage (e.g., De Jong et al. 2008). However, Fan et al. (2008) argues that quality of 
law enforcement and the probability of debtholders to be expropriated by insiders are 
inversely related as there won’t be willing lender if the quality of law enforcement is poor. 
Thus, firms in such environment tend to use more equity than debt and hence, less leverage. 
With regard to debt maturity structure, one could argue that since short-term debt is more 
difficult to expropriate, firms in countries with poor law enforcement are likely to issue more 
short-term debt than long-term debt (e.g., Fan et al. 2008; Deesomsak et al. 2009). In terms of 
dynamic capital and debt maturity structures, the literature suggests that firms located in 
countries with stronger law enforcement adjust their capital and debt maturity structures 
relatively quickly to the optimum. 
Empirical evidences by De Jong et al. (2008) and Antoniou et al. (2008) show a 
negative association between the quality of a country’s legal enforcement and firm leverage 
while those by Demirgüç-Kunt and Maksimovic (1999), Fan et al. (2008) and Deesomsak et 
al. (2009) report a positive association between debt maturity and quality of law enforcement. 
Berkowitz et al. (2003) developed a time varying index of the quality of law enforcement in a 
given country called “legality index” using a weighted average of legality variables 
introduced by La Porta et al. (1997; 1998; 2000). Nonetheless, our study covers periods 
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outside the period for which this index is calculated and some of the countries in our sample 
don’t have their legality indices computed. Hence, this study uses a more or less similar index 
called “rule of law” computed by Kaufmann et al. (2009) as a time varying measure of 
quality of law enforcement. We note that the rule of law index for our sample countries varies 
not only over time (from a low of -0.125 to a high of -0.030) but also across countries (from a 
low of -1.31 in Nigeria to a high of 0.85 in Mauritius). These cross-country and temporal 
variations in the rule of law variable might have partly caused the variations in financing 
decisions of firms in our sample. 
 
1.2.2 Financial institutions 
 
Prior to the advent of the “law-and-finance” literature, a more conventional 
comparison of corporate governance systems focused on the institutions that provide capital 
to firms than the legal protections to investors. This prior literature which sometimes is 
referred to as the “financial-orientation” literature bifurcates corporate governance systems 
into “bank-centred” and “stock market-centred” corporate governance systems (e.g., La Porta 
et al. 1999; Song and Philippatos 2004). The “financial-orientation” literature contends that 
financing patterns “fit” the governance system in the sense that those to whom the 
governance system gives most power to influence the policies of corporations would also be 
the main providers of funds (e.g., Hackethal and Schmidt 2004; Antoniou et al. 2008; Lopez-
Iturriaga and Rodriguez-Sanz 2008).
5
 In this sub-section, the thesis explores the degree of 
financial deepening in African countries with particular emphasis on sample countries.  
The relatively better access to equity funds and reduction in earnings volatility due to 
ample diversification opportunities enjoyed by firms in countries with developed stock 
markets may entice such firms into using more equity than debt. In the contrary, the reduced 
                                                          
5
 Although Mayer (1988, 1990) suggests that there is no correspondence between a firm’s financing pattern and 
corporate governance system, this view is a considered anomalous and Mayor’s work was criticized on 
methodological and conceptual grounds. 
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information asymmetry and agency problems that epitomize developed stock markets may 
result in increased borrowing opportunities to deficit units leading to more leverage. The 
reduction in these problems may as well make lending to publicly held firms less risky and 
hence firms in such countries may tend to use more long-term debt (e.g., Demirgüç-Kunt and 
Maksimovic 1999; Wanzenried 2006; Cheng and Shiu 2007; Deesomsak et al. 2009). 
Furthermore, the likely smaller transaction costs and reduced agency costs associated with 
developed stock markets would mean that firms find it easier to adjust their capital and debt 
maturity structures to a target (e.g., Grossman and Stiglitz 1980; Demirgüç-Kunt and 
Maksimovic 1999; Wanzenried 2006; Clark et al. 2009). Also, the better financial flexibility 
and lesser financial constraint that firms operating in countries with developed stock markets 
are likely to experience should make it easier for them to adjust their capital and debt 
maturity structures toward the target (Flannery and Hankins 2007). 
The empirical literature on the relationship between stock market development and 
basic capital structure is inconclusive. While Cheng and Shiu (2007) report, albeit 
definitionally sensitive, a significantly positive association between the two variables, Song 
and Philippatos (2004) find a significantly negative association. Similarly, Demirguc-Kunt 
and Maksimovic (1999) and Deesomsak et al. (2009) report that the nexus between stock 
market development and debt maturity structure is sensitive to the level of development of 
the country in which a firm operates.   
In Africa, the financial landscape has changed with the growth of stock markets and 
the banking sector. The continent now has over 20 stock exchanges with varying stages of 
development as measured by liquidity (turnover), value traded, market capitalization, and 
number of listed firms
6
. Table 1.2 presents a descriptive summary of the various measures of 
stock market development by country and by period. We note that sample countries’ stock 
                                                          
6
 While the definition of each measure of stock market development is presented in the notes to the tables, a 
fairly detailed discussion on the profile of African stock exchanges can be found in Gwatidzo (2009). 
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exchanges are at different stages of development. For example, the market capitalization of 
South Africa was almost 17 times that of Tunisia, roughly twelve times that of Ghana and 
Nigeria, seven times that of Botswana and Kenya, five times that of Mauritius and Morocco, 
and four times that of Egypt. On the other hand, whereas the number of listed domestic 
companies showed a generally declining trend, turnover and total value of stocks traded ratios 
had increased over the sample period. This cross-country and temporal variation in stock 
market development suggests a possibility for potential variation in financing decisions of 
sample firms stemming from variations in stock market development of sample countries.  
 
(Insert Table 1.2 here) 
 
Banks have the advantage of economies of scale in screening, monitoring, and 
controlling borrowers, and hence, reduce costs related with information asymmetry, agency, 
and bankruptcy. The literature suggests that firms in countries where the weight of the 
banking sector is heavier than the stock exchanges are likely to have more debt in general and 
longer-term debt in particular (e.g., Demirgüç-Kunt and Maksimovic 1999; Chui, Lloyd and 
Kwok 2002; Wanzenried 2006; Cheng and Shiu 2007; Deesomsak et al. 2009). As in 
developed stock markets, developed banking sector is expected to reduce transaction and 
agency costs, reduce financial constraints and enhance financial flexibility of firms, and 
hence, increase adjustment speed of firm’s financial structure to a target (Flannery and 
Hankins 2007). 
The figures in Table 1.2 indicate that the banking sectors of sample countries were not 
only at different stages of development but also had been evolving during the 10 years 
period
7
. For example, the ratio of domestic credit to the private sector to GDP of South 
Africa, on average, was 10 times that of Ghana and Nigeria, eight times that of Botswana, 
                                                          
7
 While the definition of each measure of banking sector development is presented in the notes to the tables, Fry 
(1995) has a detailed discussion on the advantages and disadvantages of the various measures of banking sector 
development. Also, Gwatidzo (2009) presents an elaborate discussion on the profile of the banking sector of five 
of the nine countries in our sample. 
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five times that of Kenya, and almost twice that of Mauritius suggesting that higher income 
countries tend to have deeper financial systems. We also note that domestic credit to the 
private sector to GDP and liquid liabilities to GDP – both measures of banking sector 
development – have increased significantly over the sample period. In summary, these 
variations in the banking sector development might have bearings on the financing decisions 
of our sample firms. 
 
1.2.3 Macroeconomic conditions 
 
The literature also has long recognized the macroeconomic context in which a firm 
operates as an important factor in the determination of firm’s financing decisions. Studies by 
Singh and Hamid (1992) and Singh (1995), although criticized on methodological and 
empirical grounds (e.g., Cobham and Subramaniam 1998), suggest that firms in developing 
countries are less levered than their counterparts in the developed world. In terms of debt 
maturity structure, Fan et al. (2008) and Deesomsak et al. (2009) suggest that firms in less 
developed countries tend to use far less long-term debt than firms in more developed 
countries.  
On the other hand, the extant literature also points out that there is a correlation 
between the growth rates of individual firms and the growth rate of the economy as the latter 
is seen as a proxy for the investment opportunity set faced by firms (e.g., Smith Jr and Watts 
1992; Demirguc-Kunt and Maksimovic 1998; 1999; Beck, Demirgüç-Kunt and Maksimovic 
2002). And hence, economic growth is usually taken as an indicator of the financing needs of 
firms (e.g., Wanzenried 2006). I also expect that the potential for increased financial 
flexibility and reduced financing constraints likely to be experienced by firms at times of 
economic growth should make it easier for firms to adjust their financial structure to a target.  
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Taxation has been recognized as another macroeconomic variable that affects 
financing decision of firms ever since the birth of capital and debt maturity structure research 
(e.g., Borio 1990; Fan, Titman et al. 2008). Many authors suggest that firms which operate in 
countries that assign a higher tax advantage to debt financing will tend to have higher debt in 
order to maximize the tax benefits of debt (e.g., Coates and Wooley 1975; Rajan and Zingales 
1995; Booth, Dermirguc-Kunt et al. 2001; Cheng and Shiu 2007). On the other hand, Kane et 
al. (1985) argue that debt maturity is negatively associated with tax advantage of debt.  
Inflation rate is usually considered as a proxy for a government’s ability to manage 
the economy and it provides information about the stability of the currency in long-term 
contracting (Demirgüç-Kunt and Maksimovic 1999; Wanzenried 2006). On the one hand, 
higher inflation is expected to result in higher firm leverage because firms may switch to 
issuance of debt: (i) since the real value of debt declines under inflationary situations, and (ii) 
inflation enhances the real tax advantage of debt for firms (e.g., Taggart 1985; Frank and 
Goyal 2007a). On the contrary, higher inflation may well lead to lower firm leverage 
probably because equity, relative to debt, provides better protection against inflation for 
investors (e.g., Coates and Wooley 1975; Beck, Demirgüç-Kunt et al. 2002). In terms of debt 
maturity, as debt contracts are generally nominal contracts and high inflation, which is 
generally associated with high uncertainty about future inflation, may tilt lenders away from 
long-term debt (Fan, Titman et al. 2008; Deesomsak, Paudyal et al. 2009). 
The macroeconomic conditions of our sample countries vary widely in terms of the 
size of economy, economic growth rates, highest corporate marginal tax rate, and inflation. 
Table 1.3 presents a descriptive summary of these variables with particular emphasis on the 
sample countries. We note that average marginal corporate tax rates in sample countries 
spanned from a low of 15.0 per cent (Botswana) to a high of 36.0 per cent (Egypt) while 
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average inflation rates spanned from a low of circa 1.7 per cent (Morocco) to a high of circa 
17.9 per cent (Ghana) over the sample period (Table 1.3).  
 
(Insert Table 1.3 here) 
 
These variations in marginal corporate tax rates and inflation rates could be 
reflections of differences in the way governments manage the economy and the ability of 
local currencies to provide a stable measure of value to be used in long-term contracting. We 
also observe that income level of sample countries is diverse. It ranges from upper-middle-
income countries (Botswana, Mauritius and South Africa) to lower-middle-income (Egypt, 
Morocco, and Tunisia) to low-income countries (Ghana, Kenya and Nigeria). Table 1.3 also 
indicates that gross domestic product and its growth rates vary considerably across sample 
countries confirming the existence of disparity in the wealth of sample countries.  
 
1.3 Problem Statement 
 
It is widely accepted that industrial, institutional and macroeconomic factors are 
important in determining basic capital and debt maturity structure decisions of firms. 
Although we know that African economies are characterized by relatively inefficient and 
incomplete capital markets, noticeably higher information asymmetry, more severe agency 
problems and somehow different financing arrangements compared to advanced economies 
(e.g., Eldomiaty 2007; Ncube 2007); we are yet to witness a research that directly examines 
the role of financial and legal institutions on capital and debt maturity structure decisions in 
the context of African firms
8
. Understanding the role of financial and legal institutions on 
basic capital and debt maturity structure decisions of a firm is important because access to 
                                                          
8
 Of course, Gwatidzo and Ojah (2009) did investigate the determinants of corporate capital structure of firms in 
five selected countries in Sub-Saharan Africa; however, this research does not venture into directly examining 
the role of institutional, macroeconomic, and industrial factors on capital structure decisions of a firm.   
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finance is partly a function of these institutions and access to finance in turn is expected to 
promote investment and growth.  
The literature also points to the importance of industry factors such as operating 
characteristic, industry financing norms, nature of assets and technology, and industry risks in 
the determination of a firm’s financial decisions (e.g., MacKay and Phillips 2005; Antoniou 
et al. 2008). However, to our knowledge, there is virtually no empirical work that focuses on 
inter-industry variation in the financing decisions of firms within the context of Africa. As in 
other developing countries, African governments sometimes institute policy interventions to 
foster investment in certain sectors/industries by way of subsidies and directed credit. 
Comprehending the place of industry factors on financing decisions of a firm is crucial for 
the purpose of crafting appropriate policy interventions. 
Lately, research on basic capital structure has rather taken what could arguably be 
called a very fruitful leap in discriminating between two major theories of capital structure – 
trade-off theory and information asymmetry theory. The most salient outcome of these 
research effort is evidence that there is a substantial dynamic component in a firm’s financing 
decisions and that the dynamism depends on firm, industry, macroeconomic and institutional 
factors (e.g., Drobetz and Wanzenried 2006; Drobetz et al. 2007; Flannery and Hankins 2007; 
Deesomsak et al. 2009; Terra 2011). However, there is no published work that investigates 
the dynamic adjustment of a firm’s basic capital and debt maturity structures. Carrying out a 
similar research within the context of African economies will serve as an “out-of-sample” test 
for financial theories developed in the heavily studied Western economies. The purpose of 
this study is to fill these gaps in the literature by examining the role of firm, industrial, 
institutional and macroeconomic factors in financing decisions of a firm within the African 
setting.  
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1.4 Research Questions (RQs) and Objectives (ROs) 
 
This study seeks to obtain answers to the following research questions:  
 
  RQ1: Can the stylized relations between basic capital structure and several firm, 
industry, institutional and macroeconomic variables obtained from the 
literature be generalized to firms in African economies? 
  
Chapter 2 attempts to track down empirical answers to RQ1 by extending the work of 
Gwatidzo and Ojah (2009) through inclusion of additional variables into the models (i.e., 
industry, institutional and macroeconomic variables) and civil law countries into the sample 
and use of better econometric procedures (i.e., the present study, in addition to the basic 
estimation procedures for panel data regression, uses system-GMM and Seemingly Unrelated 
Regression procedures which handle data endogeneity problems for the purpose of robustness 
check). 
 
  RQ2: Can the stylized relations between debt maturity structure and several firm, 
industry, institutional and macroeconomic variables obtained from the 
literature be generalized to firms in African economies? 
 
The work in chapter 4 is a first attempt to provide an empirical response to RQ2. By 
identifying important firm, industry, institutional and macroeconomic antecedents of debt 
maturity structure, the chapter presents insights for governments, policymakers and other 
stakeholders for crafting policy and legislative intervention that promote access to long-term 
finance.  
 
  RQ 3 Does the basic capital structure of firms in African economies adjust toward 
a target level? If so, what firm, industry, institutional and macroeconomic 
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variables determine the adjustment speed?  
 
Lately, the extant literature witnessed proliferation of both theoretical and empirical 
effort addressing RQ3 within the context of advanced economies. However, it remained 
behind the curve when one considers the African setting. Chapter 3 is a first attempt to lift the 
debate on basic capital structure in Africa up-to-par with similar debates elsewhere and as 
such it challenges African governments, policymakers and other stakeholders to enact 
policies that enhance benefits and/or reduce costs of adjusting capital structure of a firm 
toward the optimum.  
 
  RQ 4 Does the debt maturity structure of firms in African economies adjust toward 
a target level? If so, what firm, industry, institutional and macroeconomic 
variables determine the adjustment speed?  
 
Although both theoretical and empirical literature on adjustment speed of basic capital 
structure has taken a significant step forward, we haven’t seen similar leaps in relation to debt 
maturity structure; virtually none to my knowledge. By drawing lessons from the literature on 
basic capital structure and applying dynamic specification with robust estimation procedures 
on data drawn from nine African countries, the work in chapter 5 attempts to proffer 
empirical answers to RQ4 and also presents policy recommendations. 
 
To proffer answers to the foregoing questions, the thesis is set out to attain the 
following main research objectives: 
 
  RO 1: Examine the influence of firm, industry, institutional and macroeconomic-
factors on a firm’s basic capital structure decision within the context of nine 
African countries.   
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  RO 2 Investigate the effect of firm, industry, institutional and macroeconomic 
factors on a firm’s debt maturity structure decisions within the context of 
nine African countries.  
 
  RO 3 Assess the role of institutional, macroeconomic, industry and firm 
characteristics on the adjustment speed of basic capital structure within the 
context of nine African countries. 
 
  RO 4 Examine the role of institutional, macroeconomic, industry and firm 
characteristics on the adjustment speed of corporate debt maturity structure 
within the context of nine African countries. 
 
It is not uncommon to find a list of hypotheses in empirical, especially quantitative, 
studies of this nature. Given that the study dealt with relatively large number of variables, 
presenting a roll coaster of hypotheses would have made reading the thesis an unpleasant 
engagement. However, all of the hypotheses are directly and clearly implied in the 
econometric models presented in the ‘Empirical Framework’ sections of each chapter. Thus, 
with a view to enhance readability, we opted not to have the hypotheses listed separately.  
 
1.5 The Research Paradigm, Approach and Design 
 
1.5.1 The Research Paradigm 
 
We seldom find explicit discussions of the philosophical issues of worldviews or 
paradigms in the financial economics literature (e.g., Schmidt 1982; McGoun 1992; Ryan, 
Scapens and Theobald 2002:7-116)9. Nonetheless, Guba and Lincoln (1998:201) note that 
inquiry paradigms define the researcher’s legitimate limits of inquiry and are derived from 
                                                          
9 The only exceptions to this are Friend (1973); McGroun (1992); Bettner et al. (1994); Frankfurter (1994, 
2002); and Ardalan (2003a, b, and c). 
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the answers to ontological, epistemological and methodological questions. These authors 
remark that if a researcher doesn’t have a specific paradigm, his/her research lacks orientation 
and criteria of choice, and hence, all problems, all methods, and all techniques are equally 
legitimate. By contrast, a paradigm provides a researcher not only with a map but also with 
some of the directions essential for mapmaking. In learning a paradigm, a researcher acquires 
theory, methods and standards together, usually in an inextricable combination (Corbetta 
2003:10). Thus, just for the purpose of pointing out the paradigmatic footing of the present 
study, I find it important that the paradigm that underpins this research is explored.  
The literature on social theory and organizational analysis identifies four different 
paradigms based on synthesis of the nature of social science research and the nature of 
society10: functionalist view, interpretivist view, radical humanist view and radical 
structuralist view (Burrell and Morgan l979 cited in Ardalan 2003a, 2003b, 2003c; Hassard 
1991). For the purpose of better understanding the particular paradigm which underpins this 
study, in what follows, I present a very brief discussion of Burrell and Morgan’s (BM’s, 
henceforth) four classes of paradigms and their corresponding assumptions below
11
:  
 
1. The functionalist paradigm is based on the assumption that: society is real and 
concrete; it is aimed at consensus and compromise; social science is objective and 
value free; the researcher is independent of the object of research; the goal of the 
researcher is to find the orders that prevail within the phenomenon being studied. 
Functionalists assume that properties of aggregates are determined by properties of 
its units.  
                                                          
10
 Different authors in the social theory and methodology literature follow slightly different ways of classifying 
paradigms. This thesis follows Ardalan (2003a) and uses the word “paradigm” as a synonym for “worldview”. 
 
11
 The discussion on research paradigms was intentionally kept to the minimum as its purpose was just to proffer 
the paradigmatic footing of the present study. More elaborate discussions on the subject could be found in the 
philosophy of science literature including, but not limited to, the works of Imre Lakatos (1970), Thomas Khun 
(1962), Karl Popper (1959;1972), Martin Heidegger (1962).  
22 
 
 
2. The interpretivist paradigm is based on the assumption that: social reality doesn’t 
exist outside the ‘individual’s constructions’; however, it is aimed at consensus and 
compromise; the phenomenon being studied and the researcher are not necessarily 
independent; the goal of the interpretive researchers is to find how the subjective 
orders that prevail within the phenomenon under consideration are created, 
sustained, and altered. Interpretivists assume that properties of individual units can 
be obtained through an understanding of the properties of the whole. 
 
3. The radical humanists paradigm is based on the assumption that: reality is socially 
created and sustained; it is aimed at contention and domination; the phenomenon 
being studied and the researcher are not necessarily independent; the perception of 
human beings is dominated by the ideological superstructures of the social system; 
the goal of the radical humanist researcher is to find the way ideological dominance 
of the social system occurs and finding ways in which human beings can release 
themselves.  
 
4. The radical structuralist worldview is based on the assumption that: reality is 
objective and concrete; it is aimed at contention and domination; the researcher is 
independent of the object of research. Radical structuralism assumes that totality 
shapes and is present in all its constituent parts. 
 
Needless to say, there are also so many other authors who wrote on the issue of 
paradigms including Guba and Lincoln (1998:201-208); Corbetta (2003:10); and Neuman 
(2005:60) but the thesis limits itself to BM’s four classification of paradigms for these are the 
ones which attracted the most attention in financial economics research (Bettner, Robinson 
and McGoun 1994).  
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Bettner et al. (1994) note that present day finance research is based on a worldview 
that assumes: there is a cause and effect mechanism underlying all financial behaviour 
(ontology); society has certain unassailable rules that researchers can discover 
(epistemology); the rules are set by voluntary consensus (human nature); and knowledge 
about finance is quantifiable and stable and can be acquired through observation and 
measurement (methodology). Hence, Bettner et al. write that present day academic finance 
research is based on functionalist paradigm which is embedded in the tradition of positivism. 
This view, indeed, is shared by other authors including McGoun (1992); Frankfurter and 
McGoun (1999); Ardalan (2002); and Ardalan (2003a, 2003b, 2003c).  
This thesis adopts the dominant paradigm - the functionalist paradigm - which treats 
the world of finance as a place of concrete reality where the individual’s behaviour is 
determined by the external environment (e.g., McGoun 1992; Frankfurter and McGoun 1999; 
Ardalan 2003a, 2003b). This choice is made because the current study aims at examining 
whether the “conventional” factors identified in the literature also influence financing 
decisions of African firms. Thus, it is conceived on the basis of a worldview that there are 
universally valid patterns, governing principles and rules, and explanations for financing 
decisions of firms. By contrast, the interpretive paradigm assumes that there are no 
universally valid rules of finance and financial management. As a result, this study is a misfit 
for an interpretive paradigm. Researches based on radical humanist and radical structural 
paradigms are just non-existent (Bettner et al. 1994; Ardalan 2003b).  
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1.5.2 The Research Approach 
 
The choice of a suitable research approach12 is not something to be made in the 
abstract. It should be aligned with the researcher’s assumptions about the nature of the 
phenomenon being studied, the nature of knowledge, and methods through which knowledge 
can be obtained (e.g., Ardalan 2003c). Contingent upon these assumptions, a researcher may 
adopt either a quantitative or a qualitative approach to the study problem at hand. Bettner et 
al. (1994); Guba and Lincoln (1998:208); and Gliner and Morgan (2000:8) write that the 
quantitative approach is based on positivism and, hence, is based on a belief that all 
phenomena can be reduced to empirically observable truth; there is only one truth, an 
objective reality that exists independent of human perception; the investigator and 
investigated are independent entities. Denzin and Lincoln (1998:10-11) add that the goal of 
quantitative approach to research is to measure and analyze causal relationships between 
variables within a value-free framework. This view is indeed shared by many others (e.g., 
Firestone 1987; Sarantakos 1994:41-42; Creswell 2003:19; Leedy and Ormrod 2005:232; 
Shields and Tajalli 2006; Neuman 2007:85) who observe that quantitative approach is 
suitable in situations where the researcher is interested in theory verification through testing 
of hypotheses.  
In contrast, the qualitative approach to research relies upon interpretivism (Neuman 
2007:85), and hence, is based on a worldview that there are multiple realities or multiple 
truths based on one’s construction of reality; reality is socially constructed and sustained; 
there is no access to reality independent of our minds, no external referent by which to 
compare claims of truth; the researcher and the object of study are interactively linked so that 
findings are mutually created within the context of the situation which shapes the inquiry 
                                                          
12 The social research literature is not uniform in the use of the phrase ‘research approach.’ This thesis follows 
Sarantakos (1998), Creswell (2003), Neuman (2007), and Leedy and Ormrod (2005) and uses the phrase 
‘research approach’ to mean ‘research methodology’ which is determined by the principles entailed in ‘research 
paradigm.’ 
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(e.g., Denzin and Lincoln 1994:10-11; Guba and Lincoln 1998:208). Denzin and Lincoln 
(1998:10) further add that the emphasis of qualitative research is on process and meanings.  
Bettner et al. concedes that quantitative research dominates present day finance 
research. The present study uses the quantitative approach since its prime purpose is verifying 
whether capital and debt maturity structure theories developed in Western settings apply 
equally to financing decisions of African firms.  
 
1.5.3 The Research Design  
 
The thesis investigates the influence of institutional, macroeconomic, industry, and 
firm-specific factors on financing choices of African firms during the 10 years between 1999 
and 2008. The inquiry was carried out with the intention of verifying relationships between 
variables to see whether mainstream capital and debt maturity structure theories are relevant 
to African firms. The study was ‘passive’ in that it didn’t involve manipulation of either the 
independent or the dependent variables; nor did it involve random assignment of units of 
analysis (i.e., firms, industries, countries, etc). Hence, it could appropriately be labelled as an 
ex post facto non-experimental design (e.g., Pedhazur and Schmelkin 1991:304; Creswell 
2003; Leedy and Ormrod 2005:232; Welman, Kauger and Mitchelle 2005:88).  
Furthermore, for at least two reasons, it could be said that the principal object of this 
study was explanatory. First, in many respects, the theoretical framework in finance has 
reached a very high degree of sophistication, although the linkages between theory and 
empirical results have not always been well structured (Ryan et al. 2002:50). Thus, the 
research questions [and hypotheses] can be investigated under a well-developed structure that 
results from a long history of research with evolving theories (Kuhn 1962). As such, an 
explanatory or analytical design suits the topic. Second, the subject of financing decisions of 
firms has attracted quite enormous attention since the seminal work of MM (1958). Thus, 
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typical factors explaining firms’ financing decisions are known and this study partly aims to 
examine the relevance of these explanations to the African setting.  
 
1.6 Contributions of the Study 
 
The scientific contributions of this study are fivefold. First, it directly investigates the 
influence of institutional and macroeconomic context on basic capital structure decisions of 
firms within the context of nine (9) selected African countries
13
. To our knowledge, this study 
presents a first attempt to directly examine the influence of a host of institutional and 
macroeconomic variables on capital structure decision of firms within the context of Africa
14
. 
Second, despite the proliferation of both empirical and theoretical works on the subject of 
capital structure choice, much less is known about debt maturity structure of firms (e.g., 
Stohs and Mauer 1996; Schiantarelli and Sembenelli 1997; Antoniou et al. 2006). This 
paucity is even worse when one considers the African literature. There is no published work 
within the context of the African continent on this subject and chapter 4 of this thesis 
provides an empirical insight into debt maturity decisions of firms in Africa in this regard.  
Third, the literature has taken a new leap by considering a dynamic specification that 
allows for adjustment of basic capital structure (e.g., Antoniou et al. 2008). Apparently, there 
is no empirical work which looks at how institutional and macroeconomic contexts in Africa 
affect the way in which firms adjust their financial structure over time. Again, this study is a 
first attempt to investigate determinants of the adjustment speed of capital structure by using 
data from the African continent. Fourth, although the recent years have witnessed empirical 
work documenting that debt maturity structure of firms has a dynamic component (e.g., 
                                                          
13
 The selection of countries in the sample was essentially made based on: (i) existence of functioning stock 
markets; (ii) number of firms actively traded in the respective stock exchanges; and (iii) availability of complete 
data.  
14
 Chapter 2 of this thesis extends the work of Gwatidzo and Ojah (2009) by including additional variables (i.e., 
industry, institutional and macroeconomic variables) into the models, civil code countries into the sample, and 
employing better estimation procedures. 
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Antoniou et al. 2006); we haven’t seen any published work that investigates the determinants 
of adjustment speed of debt maturity structure yet. The work in Chapter 5 is a first attempt to 
identify the determinants of adjustment speed of debt maturity structure. Fifth, despite the 
fact that there is a long tradition of examining industry effects on financing decisions of firms 
(e.g., MacKay and Phillips 2005; Antoniou et al. 2008); the African literature on the subject 
apparently disregarded this important variable
15
. The present study includes industry 
variables into its model specifications, and hence, provides additional insights into firm 
finance research.  
1.7 Significance of the Study 
 
The significance of the present study is twofold. First, it is a first attempt to proffer 
evidence on the influence of institutional, macroeconomic and industry variables on the 
dynamics surrounding basic capital and debt maturity structure of a firm within the context of 
Africa; it adds additional insight into corporate finance theory and practice. In fact, the 
Chapter that deals with the adjustment speed of debt maturity structure is arguably new even 
in the international literature. Second, the findings of this research are very crucial to better 
understand the institutional and macroeconomic policies that would create an enabling 
environment for investment and growth. Governments in African economies have high 
propensities to intervene in the functions of financial and legal institutions especially through 
directed lending where they identify so-called strategic sectors and allocate to them cheap 
funds for investment (Gwatidzo 2009: 202-234). In this regards, we envisage interest by 
people in governments and other policy making spheres in the findings of this research.   
 
                                                          
15
 A pilot study co-authored by the writer (Lemma and Negash 2011) within the context of South Africa shows 
that industry effect is, in fact, the strongest determinant of capital structure decisions among South African 
firms.  
28 
 
1.8 Organization of the Thesis 
 
This thesis is made up of six chapters. By way of introduction, the first chapter 
proffers a background to the study; overview of the institutional and macroeconomic 
environment that characterizes the sample countries; problem statement, questions and 
objectives of the research; the paradigm, approach, and design of the research; and, finally, 
contributions and significance of the study. The introductory chapter is followed by four 
standalone but highly related chapters based on four academic papers submitted for 
publication in peer-reviewed journals. The papers are being scrutinized by reviewers of the 
journals. Given that the study was purposely designed to produce standalone empirical papers 
in Chapters 2, 3, 4 and 5, it was found necessary to include brief reference to the relevant 
background literature in each of the chapters, thereby inevitably leading to some limited 
amount of duplication. However, the repetition has been kept to the strictest minimum. 
In chapter 2, the thesis looks into the determinants of basic capital structure decisions 
of a firm. It, specifically, examines the role of “conventional” firm, industry, institutional and 
macroeconomic factors on basic capital structure decisions of a firm within the context of 
nine (9) African economies. Using a range of econometric procedures, the chapter documents 
evidence that corroborates mainstream capital structure theory and other interesting patterns. 
An article based on this chapter is being reviewed for possible publication in a peer-reviewed 
journal. 
Chapter 3 extends the debate on basic capital structure to the next level by considering 
a dynamic adjustment model. It, particularly, investigates the data if firms adjust their capital 
structure toward a target, and if so, what firm, industry, institutional and macroeconomic 
factors influence the pace with which firms adjust their capital structure within the context of 
the Nine (9) African countries. An academic paper based on this chapter is being reviewed 
for possible publication in a peer-reviewed journal of international standing.  
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In chapter 4 we examine the role that “conventional” firm, industry, institutional, and 
macroeconomic factors play in the determination of debt maturity structure. After subjecting 
the data to a range model specifications and battery of estimation procedures for robustness 
check, we chronicle the influence of “conventional” factors on debt maturity structure 
decisions of a firm within the context of African economies. An article based on this chapter 
is accepted for publication in the Journal of Business and Policy Research. 
Although the recent literature enjoyed a massive leap in terms of investigating the 
adjustment speed of basic capital structure of a firm toward a target, we are yet to witness 
similar research with regard to debt maturity structure. In chapter 5, we extend the debate on 
debt maturity structure by considering a dynamic adjustment modelling. We specifically 
examine if firms adjust their debt maturity structure, and if so, what firm, industry, 
institutional, and macroeconomic factors influence the pace with which a firm adjusts its debt 
maturity structure within the context of the nine African countries included in the sample. A 
paper based on this chapter is being considered for publication in a peer-reviewed journal. 
Chapter 6 proffers the main insights and conclusions drawn from the entire work and also 
highlights potential areas for future research. 
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Table 1.1  Summary of legal institutions and their evolution  
 
Panel A: Descriptive Summary of Legal Institutions 
Country  Creditor Rights 
Shareholder 
Rights 
Rule of 
Law Origin 
Botswana 3.00 3.50 0.62 1.00 
Egypt  2.00 3.00 -0.04 0.00 
Ghana 1.00 5.00 -0.10 1.00 
Kenya 4.00 2.00 -0.95 1.00 
Mauritius 2.25 3.50 0.85 0.00 
Morocco 1.00 2.00 -0.03 0.00 
Nigeria 4.00 4.00 -1.31 1.00 
South Africa 3.00 5.00 0.12 1.00 
Tunisia 0.00 3.00 0.20 0.00 
 
Notes: All the figures, except those for the origin variable, are averages for the 10 year period considered in the 
study. The values for the origin variable are fairly stable and a value of 1 is assigned to countries whose laws were 
adapted from English common law and 0 is assigned to those whose laws were adapted from the French civil law. 
 
Panel B:  Evolution of the Legal Institutions in Sample Countries** 
Year 
Creditor 
Rights 
Shareholder 
Rights Rule of Law 
1999 2.384 3.550          . 
2000 2.384 3.550 -0.077 
2001 2.384 3.550       . 
2002 2.384 3.550 -0.102 
2003 2.384 3.550 -0.125 
2004 2.384 3.550 -0.036 
2005 2.384 3.550 -0.030 
2006 2.384 3.550 -0.099 
2007 2.384 3.550 -0.119 
2008 2.384 3.550 -0.100 
Overall 2.384 3.550 -0.086 
 
** All figures are averages of all countries in the sample. 
 
Notes: “Creditor rights” refers to an index aggregating creditor rights following La Porta et al. (1998). A score of one 
is assigned when each of the following rights of secured lenders is defined in laws and regulations: First, there are 
restrictions, such as creditor consent or minimum dividends, for a debtor to file for reorganization. Second, secured 
creditors are able to seize their collateral after the reorganization petition is approved, i.e. there is no "automatic stay" 
or "asset freeze." Third, secured creditors are paid first out of the proceeds of liquidating a bankrupt firm, as opposed 
to other creditors such as government or workers. Finally, if management does not retain administration of its 
property pending the resolution of the reorganization. The index ranges from 0 (weak creditor rights) to 4 (strong 
creditor rights) and is constructed as at January for every year from 1978 to 2003.  “Shareholder rights” refers an 
index of anti-director rights following La Port et al. (1998 computed by adding one when: (1) the country allows 
shareholders to mail their proxy vote; (2) shareholders are not required to deposit their shares prior to the General 
Shareholders= Meeting; (3) cumulative voting or proportional representation of minorities on the board of directors is 
allowed; (4) an oppressed minorities mechanism is in place; (5) the minimum percentage of share capital that entitles 
a shareholder to call for an Extraordinary Shareholders= Meeting is less than or equal to ten per cent (the sample 
median); or (6) when shareholders have pre-emptive rights that can only be waived by a shareholders meeting. The 
range for the index is from zero to six. “Rule of law” refers to an index measuring the extent to which agents have 
confidence in and abide by the rules of society. It includes several indicators such as perceptions of the incidence of 
crime, the effectiveness, and predictability of the judiciary, and the enforceability of contracts. “Origin” refers to a 
dummy variable that identifies the legal origin of the Company law or Commercial Code of each country.  Dummy 
variable equal to one if common law and equal to zero otherwise.  The data for these variables were obtained from 
World Bank Development Indicators.  
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Table 1.2  Summary of financial institutions and their evolution 
 
Panel A: Descriptive Summary of Financial Institutions* 
Country  
Domestic 
Credit  
Liquid 
Liabilities  
Number of 
Listed 
Companies 
Market 
Capitalization  
Total Value 
Traded  
Turnover 
Ratio  
Botswana 17.32 30.11 17.50 27.01 0.78 3.21 
Egypt  58.48 95.73 828.10 53.74 16.91 32.97 
Ghana 13.59 29.38 27.30 16.56 0.45 3.07 
Kenya 26.60 39.91 52.80 25.79 2.11 7.35 
Mauritius 70.35 98.75 45.60 42.15 2.30 6.65 
Morocco 52.99 84.04 59.50 44.57 8.91 18.76 
Nigeria 14.83 21.51 202.60 17.88 2.25 14.05 
South Africa 137.96 47.14 474.10 201.47 81.65 48.02 
Tunisia 65.92 59.92 46.40 12.00 1.61 14.87 
* All the figures are averages for the 10 year period considered in the study. 
 
Panel B: Evolution of the Financial Institutions in Sample Countries** 
Year 
Domestic 
Credit  
Liquid 
Liabilities  
Number of 
Listed 
Companies 
Market 
Capitalization  
Total Value 
Traded  
Turnover 
Ratio 
1999 46.07 50.48 260.63 44.53 9.36 11.93 
2000 46.59 50.89 259.38 35.94 9.50 12.50 
2001 47.76 51.96 254.50 30.09 8.81 11.59 
2002 44.43 53.17 248.38 38.53 9.86 17.39 
2003 46.90 55.38 222.63 42.93 9.15 12.26 
2004 48.86 55.50 198.63 54.92 11.54 13.21 
2005 50.33 62.66 192.38 62.43 15.75 16.19 
2006 53.35 59.71 176.63 78.92 24.71 22.00 
2007 63.02 67.40 166.75 94.54 31.09 24.45 
2008 - - 154.50 - - 26.10 
 
** All figures are averages of all countries in the sample. 
 
Domestic credit refers to the ratio of private credit to GDP. Liquid liabilities refers to the ratio of liquid 
liabilities of financial intermediaries to GDP. Number of listed companies refers to the total number of domestic 
companies listed in stock exchanges of a country. Market capitalization refers to the number of listed shares 
times their price as a percentage of GDP. The total value traded refers to the total value of shares traded divided 
by GDP. Turnover ratio refers to the ratio of value of shares traded divided by the market capitalization.  
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Table 1.3  Summary of macroeconomic conditions and their evaluation  
 
Panel A: Descriptive Summary of Macroeconomic Variables* 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
* All the figures, except for the income group variable, are averages for the 10 year period considered in the 
study. 
 
 
Panel B: Evolution of the Macroeconomic Conditions in Sample Countries** 
Year Taxation Inflation 
Size of 
Economy 
Growth of 
Economy 
1999 35.108 4.098 3.188 2.332 
2000 34.985 4.213 3.199 2.621 
2001 34.985 4.821 3.206 1.677 
2002 34.985 5.363 3.210 1.034 
2003 34.863 5.797 3.220 2.206 
2004 34.863 8.252 3.233 3.202 
2005 34.863 5.530 3.246 2.980 
2006 34.531 7.001 3.266 4.609 
2007 23.404 8.021 3.285 4.592 
2008 23.404 NA NA NA 
Overall 32.599 5.899 3.228 2.806 
 
** All figures are averages of all countries in the sample. 
 
Notes: “Taxation” refers to the average of the highest marginal corporate tax rate (%) between 1999 and 2008. 
“Inflation” is the average of consumer price adjusted inflation rates. “Size of economy” denotes the average of 
the natural logarithm of gross domestic product per capita (constant 2000 US$). “Growth economy” is the 
average of the annual percentage of GDP per capita growth between 1999 and 2008. “Income group” refers to 
World Bank’s grouping of countries based on GDP per capita where UMI refers to upper-middle-income 
countries, LMI refers to lower-middle-income countries, and LI refers to low-income countries.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
Country Taxation Inflation 
Size of 
overall 
Economy 
Growth rate 
of Real GDP 
Income 
Group 
Botswana 15.00 8.26 3.60 4.40 UMI 
Egypt 36.00 5.38 3.20 2.91 LMI 
Ghana 29.90 17.93 2.43 2.82 LI 
Kenya 30.30 8.82 2.62 1.15 LI 
Mauritius 23.00 6.03 3.62 3.36 UMI 
Morocco 35.00 1.66 3.17 2.93 LMI 
Nigeria 25.00 11.76 2.61 2.92 LI 
Tunisia 31.34 2.92 3.35 3.93 LMI 
South Africa 29.50 5.31 3.51 2.53 UMI 
 
21.06 6.38 2.38 2.39 NA 
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CHAPTER 2 
 
DETERMINANTS OF CAPITAL STRUCTURE OF A FIRM  
  
2.1 Introduction 
 
Capital structure research, arguably, is at the core of modern corporate finance. Cross-
country studies show that capital structure decisions hinge not only on firm-specific 
characteristics but also on the country’s legal and market environment and macroeconomic 
conditions (e.g., Rajan and Zingales 1995; Beck et al. 2002; Antoniou et al. 2008; De Jong et 
al. 2008; Lopez-Iturriaga and Rodriguez-Sanz 2008). As previously hinted, understanding the 
role of these country contexts in capital structure decisions of firms is important both at 
macro- as well as micro-level (e.g., Singh and Hamid 1992; Prasad et al. 2001; Green et al. 
2003).  
The hitherto literature on the nexus between country milieu and capital structure 
decisions certainly advanced our understanding of firm’s financing behaviour. Until recently, 
most empirical works were mainly skewed to advanced economies or, at best, non-African 
economies. There are profound institutional and macroeconomic differences between 
advanced and developing economies, however (e.g., Booth et al. 2001). Cognizant of this 
limitation, recent literature experienced small but growing strand of studies dealing with the 
subject of capital structure within the context of African economies
16
. Nevertheless, as most 
of these studies are single-country studies we could not know the influence of institutional 
and macroeconomic factors on the capital structure decisions of African firms. To our 
knowledge, empirical work that directly investigates the influence of institutional and 
                                                          
16 Mutenheri, E. and C. J. Green (2003) examine the impact of the economic reform programme on the 
financing choices of Zimbabwean listed companies.  Yartey, C. A. (2009) investigates the effect of stock market 
development on the importance of debt relative to external equity in the balance sheet of Ghanaian firms. Abor, 
J. (2006) and Abor and Biekpe(2008) investigates the impact of firm charaterisitcs on capital structure decisions 
within the context of Ghana.  Negash, M. (2001, 2002) examine the association between taxes, debt, and capital 
strucutre.  Toby, A..J., (2005) investigates the role of Nigerian banks in funding the short-term and long-term 
financing requirements of Nigerian quoted  manufacturing enterprises. 
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macroeconomic contexts on capital structure decisions of African firms is virtually non-
existent. Gwatidzo and Ojah’s (2009) work apparently is the first cross-country study 
investigating capital structure decisions of a firm within the African setting. Although these 
authors report differences in capital structure of firms in their sample countries, they did not 
venture into directly examining how institutional and macroeconomic variables impact 
capital structure decisions of firms in their sample countries.  
In this chapter, we attempt to examine the nexus between firm, industrial, institutional 
and macroeconomic factors, on the one hand, and basic capital structure, on the other, within 
the context of selected African countries. Such a study contributes to the existing literature in 
several ways. Firstly, to our knowledge, it is a first attempt to directly test the influence of 
institutional and macroeconomic variables on capital structure decisions of African firms. 
Secondly, as all of the sample countries in Gwatidzo and Ojah’s (2009) study are common 
law countries, by including civil law countries, this chapter investigates fully the role of legal 
institutions in explaining the variations in basic capital structure of African firms.  
Thirdly, although there is ample evidence that industry characteristics do matter in 
capital structure decisions of firms, we are yet to witness a study that examines inter-industry 
variations in capital structure decisions of African firms. This study, apparently, is a first 
attempt to document inter-industry variations in capital structure decisions of African firms. 
Fourthly, despite the fact that firm heterogeneity, firm and time effects, and endogeneity 
problems are typical issues that entangle finance research (e.g., Parsons and Titman 2007; 
Getzmann, Lang and Spremann 2010), empirical research on capital structure decisions of 
African firms choose to ignore these problems. This study, in addition to the usual methods, 
uses Generalized Method of Moments (GMM) and Seemingly Unrelated Regression (SUR) 
methods which are robust to these problems. 
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The empirical analysis focused on 10 years (1999 – 2008) data pertaining to a sample 
of 986 non-financial firms drawn from nine (9) African countries which have functioning 
stock exchanges. With a view to identify which set of factors are important determinants of 
basic capital structure, the chapter analyses the data using five sequentially ordered models. 
Firstly, it examines results for a baseline model (Model 1) which specifies basic capital 
structure as a function of firm characteristics. Secondly, it further examines if the results in 
Model 1 persist after controlling for industry effects (Model 2). Thirdly, it considers cross-
country variations in capital structure by further including country dummies (Model 3). 
Fourthly, it introduces some broad measures of cross country differences (i.e., legal family 
and level of development) that are known to effect on capital structure (Model 4). Finally, it 
injects more specific and direct measures of institutional and macroeconomic conditions to 
see if such variables affect capital structure decisions of African firms (Model 5).  
The chapter documents that firm size has a positive influence on leverage while firm 
profitability has an inverse influence on leverage. However, the nexus between asset 
tangibility, non-debt-related tax shield and dividend payout and leverage is dependent on how 
the latter is defined. The results also confirm the view that differences in industry 
characteristics lead to inter-industry variation in capital structure. Also, the chapter proffers 
evidence that income level of countries moderates the influence of firm-specific factors on 
capital structure decisions. Finally, the findings indicate that: (i) macroeconomic conditions 
(i.e., overall size of the economy, growth rate of real GDP per capita, inflation); (ii) legal 
institutions (i.e., shareholder and creditor rights protection and rule of law); and (iii) financial 
institutions (i.e., relative size of banking sector and stock market development) do matter in 
capital structure decisions of African firms. 
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The remainder of the chapter proceeds as follows: section 2 presents a brief review of 
the literature on capital structure. Section 3 develops the empirical setup for analyses. Section 
4 presents the results and discussions and section 5 concludes.  
 
2.2 Literature Review  
 
2.2.1 Theories of capital structure 
 
Ever since the ground breaking work of MM (1958), capital structure decisions of a 
firm became a subject of intense research. Nonetheless, there has been no one universal 
theory that explains the capital structure decisions of a firm. Rather, there are only 
conditional theories (e.g., Myers 2001). For the purpose of understanding the many and 
disperse theoretical contributions to explain the capital structure “puzzle,” we classify capital 
structure theories into two major groups: trade-off theory and information asymmetry theory. 
Of course such simplification in classifying capital structure theories is open to criticism, but 
our classification is ample enough to encompass theoretical work done so far, yet 
discriminating enough to point out the fundamental differences between each classification.   
Arguments for the trade-off theory are based on the proposition that basic capital 
structure is determined by a trade-off between benefits and costs of debt. Two major theories 
may conveniently be clustered under trade-off theories - tax/bankruptcy trade-off and agency 
theories. The tax/bankruptcy trade-off theory views (e.g., Modigliani and Miller 1963; Kraus 
and Litzenberger 1973; Miller 1977; Kim 1978) the firm as setting (and moving towards) a 
target capital structure which involves a trade-off between benefits of debt (i.e., the advantage 
of tax deductibility of interest paid on debt or other non-debt-related tax-shields) and its costs 
(the costs of financial distress and personal tax expense debtholders incur) to arrive at a value 
maximizing capital structure (e.g., Graham and Harvey 2001). The works of DeAngelo and 
Masulis (1980); Bradley et al. (1984); Titman and Wessels (1988) and more recently in 
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Barclay and Smith (1999) and Fama and French (2002) were based on the tax/bankruptcy 
theory. The theory of agency, on the other hand, points to the potential conflict of interest 
between firm’s stakeholders and conjectures that capital structure of a firm is the result of its 
financial manager trying to balance agency costs of debt against benefits of debt (e.g., Jensen 
and Meckling 1976; Harris and Raviv 1991; Myers 2001). 
Another whole family of theories derives from the asymmetric information problems 
that exist between insiders and outsiders to a firm. The first of these is the pecking order 
theory, which suggests that a firm goes through a specific hierarchy of securities (i.e., first 
internal sources of funding, then debt financing and finally equity) in financing its 
investments. This pecking order explanation of capital structure is based on the argument that 
there are information asymmetries and transactional costs that a firm faces in raising capital 
(e.g., Myers 1984; Myers and Majluf 1984; Myers 2001)
17
. The works of Krasker (1986), 
Narayanan (1988), Heinkel and Zechner (1990), and Brennan and Kraus (1987) were broadly 
based on pecking order argument. 
Also within the asymmetric information mind set, capital structure can be regarded as 
a tool used by a firm to credibly signal the superiority of its projects to the market (e.g., Ross 
1977; Harris and Raviv 1991; Barclay and Smith 1999; Graham and Harvey 2001). The 
works of Leland and Pyle (1977), Bhattacharaya (1979; 1980), Heinkel (1982), and Glazer 
and Israel (1990) also extend this argument. Finally, market timing theory suggests that firms 
look at the current conditions in the securities market and time the raising of funds in 
accordance with the conditions in these markets. Thus, according to this theory, firms tend to 
raise funds from markets that currently look more favourable (e.g., Baker and Wurgler 2002).  
Advocates of this theory contend that capital structure is a cumulative outcome of past 
                                                          
17 In addition to information asymmetry and transaction costs, the potential dilution of ‘voting control’ is also presented as a 
justification for the pecking order theory, especially in the case of closed (or ‘privately held’) corporations. 
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attempts to time the equity market, thus, it is strongly related to historical market values of 
the firms’ own securities. 
Based on these theories, the literature identifies a number of firm-, industry-, and 
country-level factors that determine basic capital structure of a firm. However, neither 
theoretical predictions nor empirical results are uniform. Table 2.1 presents a summary of the 
theoretical predictions and empirical results. 
 
(Insert table 2.1 about here) 
 
2.2.2 Measuring basic capital structure 
  
Similar to the competing theories, there is no universally accepted definition of capital 
structure in the literature. Researchers agree that measures of capital structure should vary 
depending on the purpose of analysis (e.g., Rajan and Zingales 1995; Bevan and Danbolt 
2002). In addition, empirical studies show that different measures of capital structure produce 
different results, hence, can affect interpretation of results (e.g., Harris and Raviv 1991). 
Further, the competing theories have different implications for capital structure depending on 
how it is defined (e.g., Titman and Wessels 1988; Bhaduri 2002a, 2002b; Frank and Goyal 
2007a). Accordingly, the literature emphasizes the importance of considering: (i) both short-
term and long-term and (ii) market-based and book-based measures of capital structure.  
Ostensibly, most studies do not use market based measures of capital structure since: 
(i) most theoretical predictions apply to book values (e.g., Fama and French 2002); (ii) book-
based measures may better reflect management’s target capital structure since market values 
of equity depend on a number of factors that often cannot be controlled by the firm; and (iii) 
market values of debt are often not available (e.g., Thies and Klock 1992). Many researchers 
report that the use of book value delivers similar results to market value as the two, as 
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Bowman (1980) demonstrates, are highly correlated. Further, information obtained from 
financial statements is more credible.  
On the other hand, Welsh (2010) shows how the common use of financial-debt-to-
asset (FD/A) ratio as a measure of leverage is fundamentally flawed. Mindful of all these, this 
and the next chapter employ three book-based measures of capital structure: short-term 
leverage (STL); long-term leverage (LTL); and total leverage (TL). In what follows, the 
thesis assesses the literature on the nexus between firm, industry, institutional and 
macroeconomic factors, on the one hand, and basic capital structure, on the other. 
 
2.2.3 Firm characteristics and basic capital structure 
 
The capital structure literature considers firm-specific factors as proxies for tax 
advantages, agency costs, bankruptcy costs, and information asymmetries and analyses their 
role in the determination of firm leverage (e.g., Antoniou et al. 2008). Consistent with the 
literature, this study includes a set of firm level variables that capture factors that are known 
to effect on capital structure. These variables include earnings volatility, firm size, 
profitability, growth opportunities, asset tangibility, dividend payout and tax-shield.  
The literature suggests that earnings volatility impacts capital structure of a firm since 
it represents a firm’s probability of financial distress and also Myers and Majluf’s  (1984) 
underinvestment problem (e.g., Deesomsak et al. 2004; Frank and Goyal 2007a). Likewise, 
firm size and asset tangibility are additional firm level factors that the literature usually 
identifies as determinants of firm’s capital structure since they are usually considered as 
inverse proxies for probability of bankruptcy, information asymmetry and agency and 
transaction cost (e.g., Jensen and Meckling 1976; Titman and Wessels 1988; Rajan and 
Zingales 1995; Frank and Goyal 2007a). In a similar vein, firm’s past profitability and future 
growth opportunities are considered to be important determinants of capital structure and are 
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taken as proxies for probability of bankruptcy, agency costs, tax advantage and need  for 
additional fund (e.g., Myers and Majluf 1984; Jensen 1986; Titman and Wessels 1988; 
Barclay and Smith 1999; Mazur 2007). Following the correction work of MM (1963), the 
literature routinely examines the nexus between taxes and corporate debt. A few studies see 
firm’s dividend policy as proxy for additional fund needed, and information asymmetry and a 
tool for managing agency problems, and hence, consider it as a determinant of capital 
structure (e.g., Martin and Scott 1974; Miller and Rock 1985; Frank and Goyal 2007a; Mazur 
2007). See Table 2.1 (Panel B) presented at the end of the chapter for a summary of 
theoretical predictions and empirical findings regarding the relationship between firm-
specific characteristics and leverage. 
 
2.2.4 Industry classification and basic capital structure  
 
Prior literature proffers ample evidence on inter-industry variation in basic capital 
structure. For instance, in a response to Remmers, Stonehill, Wright and Beekhuisen (1974) 
who questioned the assertion of a nexus between industry classicisation and financial 
structure, Scott and Martin (1975), using Kruskal-Wallis one-way analysis of variance, 
present evidence that financial structures of firms vary across a wide array of industries. 
Later, Harris and Raviv (1991) remark that capital structures of firms within an industry are 
more similar than those in different industries. This pattern could be due to: (i) inter-industry 
differences in the operating characteristics; (ii) managers benchmarking industry’s capital 
structure when they decide on their own firm; and (iii) a set of some correlated, but otherwise 
omitted, factors which influence capital structure at industry level (e.g., Frank and Goyal 
2007a). There is no prior empirical research within the African setting has examined inter-
industry heterogeneity in basic capital structure. 
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2.2.5 Institutions and basic capital structure 
 
Consistent with institutional theory, recent literature highlights the importance of 
legal and financial institutions in the financial decisions of firms (e.g., Booth et al. 2001; 
Cheng and Shiu 2007; Antoniou et al. 2008; Lopez-Iturriaga and Rodriguez-Sanz 2008). In 
Table 2.1 (Panel A), the thesis presents a summary of the theoretical predictions and 
empirical evidence pertaining to the nexus between institutional variables and leverage. In 
what follows, the impact of legal and financial institutions on firm’s capital structure 
decisions is explored.  
 
2.2.5.1 Legal institutions  
 
The literature accentuates the critical role of legal institutions in understanding 
patterns of corporate finance in different countries (e.g., La Porta, et al. 1998). Theory 
suggests that a major factor in a firm’s choice of capital structure is the existence of agency 
costs. And, the legal environment in which contracting takes place affects the extent of 
agency problem that exists between corporate insiders and outsiders, and thus, influences 
outsiders’ confidence in the markets and consequently their development (e.g., Djankov et al. 
2008; Fan et al. 2008). Prior empirical work indicates that there are varying degrees of 
disparities between the laws in the books and laws in action. This phenomenon is particularly 
conspicuous when one considers the African continent as all African countries had adopted 
(or “transplanted”) laws from Western origin (e.g., Berkowitz et al. 2003). This study 
considers the legal tradition on which a country’s legal system is based to investigate cross-
country disparities in capital structures. It further considers variables that are known to more 
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specifically define the legal institutions in a country: shareholder rights protection; creditor 
rights protection; and quality of law enforcement
18
.  
 
2.2.5.2 Financial institutions 
 
The extant literature considers the level of development of suppliers of capital - 
financial institutions - as one of the key factors in capital structure decisions of a firm. At the 
core of this argument is that financing patterns “fit” the governance system in the sense that 
those to whom the governance system gives most power to influence the policies of 
corporations would also be the main providers of funds (e.g., Hackethal and Schmidt 2004; 
Antoniou et al. 2008; Lopez-Iturriaga and Rodriguez-Sanz 2008). This chapter examines the 
influence of stock market and banking sector development on capital structure decisions of a 
firm. It uses two of the most commonly used measures of stock market development, namely, 
stock market size and stock market liquidity to capture stock market development. 
Furthermore, it uses the size of banking sector relative to GDP to measure banking sector 
development.
19
  
 
2.2.6 Macroeconomic variables 
 
The literature also alludes to the important role that the macroeconomic context in 
which a firm operates plays in the determination of its capital structure. The macroeconomic 
literature chronicles the vast debate on how to succinctly define and measure macroeconomic 
condition of a country and yet remains unsettled. In what follows, the chapter explores how 
macroeconomic conditions impact on firm’s basic capital structure decisions by invoking a 
                                                          
18
 Although there are some critiques of the “law and finance” theory (e.g. Graff 2008; Spamann 2008, 2010) 
pioneered by La Porta et al., it remains the dominant view that explains differences in protections afforded to 
different classes of investors. 
  
19
 Demirguc-Kunt and Levine (1996) present a detailed discussion regarding the various measures of size and 
efficientcy of financial intermediaries.  
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host of macroeconomic variables. The variable selection was largely based the literature on 
capital structure and data availability.
20
 
 
2.2.6.1 Economic development and its growth rate 
 
The notion that economic development of a given country is associated with the 
financing pattern of firms in that country is not new (e.g., Rajan and Zingales 1995; Booth et 
al. 2001). At the core of the argument that the level of economic development influences firm 
leverage is that it reflects the wealth disparity between countries and hence access to finance. 
Also, the literature conjectures that a firm’s capital structure decisions might be impacted by 
the rate at which a country’s economy grows as the latter is believed to be correlated with 
firm growth which is a proxy for a firm’s investment opportunity set and its financing needs 
(Demirguc-Kunt and Maksimovic, 1998, 1999; Smith and Watts, 1992; Beck et al., 2002; 
Wanzenried 2006).  
However, the fact that economic growth could be taken as a proxy for a multitude of 
factors partly explains the lack of consensus noted in both theoretical and empirical literature. 
For instance, one line of argument puts forwards economic growth as a possible driver for 
decline in expected bankruptcy cost, increase in the collateral values of assets, increase in 
stock prices and increase in free cash flow. Alternatively, another line of argument presents 
economic growth as an inverse proxy for agency conflicts between insiders and outsiders 
(e.g., De Haas and Peeters 2006; Frank and Goyal 2007b; Korajczyk 2003; Wanzenried 2006; 
Booth et al., 2001).  
As indicated previously, zeroing on a succinct measure of economic development and 
its growth has been difficult and, expectedly, all of the indicators have limitations (e.g., 
Mahmud, Herani, Rajar and Farooqi 2009). The chapter first explores the potential 
                                                          
20
 Although some of the macroeconomic variables may have endogeneity problems, the system-GMM and SUR 
estimation procedures used in the chapter are robust to endogeneity issues.  
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relationship between economic development and leverage by trifurcating sample countries 
into income groups (Model 4) and then introduces more specific measures of the overall size 
of the economy (i.e., GDP per capita) and its growth rate (growth rate of real GDP per capita) 
as barometers to gauge the economic context within which a firm operates (Model 5). 
 
2.2.6.2 Taxation 
 
Taxation has long been recognized as a factor that effects on capital structure 
decisions of a firm (e.g., Borio 1990; Fan et al. 2008) as debt is expected to have tax 
advantage over equity. Notwithstanding the attention that taxation and tax institutions have 
received in capital structure research, there has not been one easy way of measuring them. 
One common approach considers effective (or marginal) tax rates computed from the 
financial statements to account for tax code differences between countries (e.g., Coates and 
Wooley 1975; Cheng and Shiu 2007). Such an approach fails to measure differences in tax 
institutions, at least, for two reasons. Firstly, it measures not only differences in statutory 
corporate tax rates in different countries but also differences in effective (marginal) tax rate 
due to firm specific characteristics. Secondly, it suffers from the disadvantage that effective 
tax rate also serves as a proxy for profitability because less profitable firms pay lower taxes 
than more profitable firms, or even pay no taxes (e.g., Cheng and Shiu 2007).  
Another approach (e.g., Pattenden 2006; Fan et al. 2008) consider categorizing time 
periods and countries based on tax regimes. Although this approach mitigates the limitations 
of the previous approach to measuring tax effects, it wrongly assumes that tax expense of 
firms within the same tax regime is the same. Hence, it loses information related to 
differences in firm tax expense within a given tax regime. A third approache to measuring tax 
effects is the one employed by Rajan and Zingales (1995), Booth et al. (2001), etc. This 
approach uses a ‘tax-advantage-index’ called Miller’s Tax Advantage (Miller 1977). 
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Although this approach solves many of the limitations linked with the previous two, it comes 
with a caveat that has to do with complications in computing the personal tax component of 
the index and tax code details that may not be easily captured by the formula (e.g., Booth et 
al. 2001). In this chapter, the highest marginal corporate tax rate is used as a proxy to 
measure differences in taxation systems across countries. 
 
2.2.6.3 Inflation 
 
The argument that inflationary situations affect the financing pattern of firms is, 
arguably, as old as capital structure research itself. Inflation rate is usually considered as a 
proxy for a government’s ability to manage the economy and it provides information about 
the stability of the currency in long-term contracting (e.g., Demirgüç-Kunt and Maksimovic 
1999). Following the extant literature, we use the log difference of consumer price index to 
proxy inflation. 
 
2.3 The Empirical Framework 
 
2.3.1 The sample and data  
 
The study focused on firms in nine (9) selected countries in Africa including 
Botswana, Egypt, Ghana, Kenya, Mauritius, Morocco, Nigeria, South Africa and Tunisia. 
The choice of the sample countries was motivated by several factors. Firstly, they are all in 
Africa where the literature on the role of firm, industry, institutional and macroeconomic 
factors on a firm’s capital structure is sparse. Secondly, these countries have different 
institutional setups, such as financial markets, legal traditions and level of economic 
development. In particular, Botswana, Ghana, Kenya, Nigeria and South Africa have legal 
systems based on the British common law, and thus, have some common attributes in 
corporate governance and control whereas Egypt, Mauritius, Morocco and Tunisia have legal 
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systems based on the French civil law. In addition, while the stock exchanges in Botswana, 
Ghana, Kenya, Nigeria, Mauritius, Morocco and Tunisia are young those in South Africa and 
Egypt are more established. Further, although not as wide, there is considerable difference in 
the level of economic development of these countries. This diversity offered the opportunity 
to assess the effects of different institutional and macroeconomic environments on capital 
structure.  
Studies on capital structure may be based either on national flows-of-funds statements 
or individual company accounts. The merits and deficiencies of each source are discussed in 
Mayor (1989) and Sing and Hamid (1992). Sing and Hamid (1992) note that: (i) either source 
of data yields much the same conclusions with respect to corporate financing patterns and (ii) 
if the object of investigation is the financial characteristics of individual firms and inter-firm 
variations in these characteristics, it necessarily has to be based on company accounting 
information. As this chapter aims to go beyond aggregate analyses and involve in 
examination of the determinants of inter-industry and inter-firm differences, the later source 
of data was found to be more suitable.  
The firm-specific data used for the analyses in this chapter was extracted from the 
financial statements of listed firms in the sample countries. The data were sourced from 
OSIRIS that maintains a comprehensive financial database of over 46,000 firms over 140 
countries. We started with all the firms listed in the stock exchanges of 17 African countries 
which had data in the OSIRIS database as at 31 December 2009
21
. We required that firms in 
our sample should have at least three years of available data over the study period and 
countries should have at least 10 firms. We dropped firms in the financial industry (US SIC 
code 6000~) as such firms are regulated by a different set of regulations in regards to their 
capital structure.  
                                                          
21
 Although the OSIRIS database includes data on non-listed firms, this study focused on listed companies as we 
believe that the debt maturity choice of non-listed firms is limited by other factors such as access to finance. 
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The final dataset analysed included a 10-year (between 1999 and 2008) data 
pertaining to 986 non-financial firms drawn from the sample countries. The sampled firms 
represent circa 48 per cent of listed companies which are active by the end of December 
2009. We adjusted differences in fiscal years of firms in the sample to provide a more 
accurate empirical work. Hence, if the date of preparation of financial statements for a firm is 
on or before June 30, its year is stamped as one-year prior to its fiscal year and if a firm’s 
fiscal year is after June 30, that same year is stamped as the firm’s fiscal years.  
Data on country specific variables were collected from various sources. Data on the 
legal variables, except for the rule of law data, were downloaded from the webpage of Andrei 
Shelifer.22 The rule of law data were taken from Kaufmann et al. (2009). All the data on 
country’s macroeconomic and market conditions were taken either from World Development 
Indicators or Financial Structure Database of the World Bank. Additional country-specific 
variables were taken from previous studies including Berkowitz et al. (2003). The reader is 
reminded that we use data pertaining to the same sample firms for analysis in all of the 
subsequent chapters in the thesis. 
 
2.3.2 Econometric modelling and estimation 
 
2.3.2.1 Model specification 
 
With a view to determine which set of factors – firm, industry or country factors – are 
more important determinants of capital structure, Fan et al. (2008) employ a sequential 
approach to modelling capital structure. A similar approach is employed in this chapter. 
Firstly, we analyse the data using a baseline model (Model 1) that defines capital structure as 
a linear function of firm characteristics     
  . The model is written as:  
 
                                                          
22 We thank Andrei Shleifer for making several creditor rights, shareholder rights and legal origin data freely 
available on his page (http://www.economics.harvard.edu/faculty/shleifer/dataset).  
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                    (1) 
 
where        is a measure of capital structure,     
 
 is a vector of firm characteristics,    is a 
column vector containing the corresponding coefficients.  
Secondly, we control for industry effects by introducing dummies    
   for each 
industry to examine if the industry in which a firm operates matter in the capital structure 
decisions of a firm (Model 2). The model is written as: 
 
              
     ∑      
               (2) 
 
where   
  is a dummy variable for industry classification to which firm i belongs and    is the 
corresponding coefficient. To avoid a dummy variable trap, we used the manufacturing 
industry as a reference industry
23
. Thus, the coefficient    is interpreted as the significance of 
a particular measure of capital structure relative to firms in the manufacturing industries. 
Thirdly, we further controlled for cross-country variations by introducing country 
dummies to see if the country in which a firm operates matter in capital structure decisions of 
a firm (Model 3). The model is written as follows: 
 
              
     ∑      
  ∑     
 
             (3) 
 
where   
  is a country-dummy and    is the corresponding coefficient. Again, in order to 
avoid a dummy variable trap problem, we use South Africa as a reference groups. South 
Africa was considered a reference group as it, arguably, has the most advanced institutional 
and macroeconomic infrastructure among the sample countries (e.g., Gwatidzo and Ojah 
2009).  
                                                          
23
 The phrase ‘dummy variable trap’ refers to a situation where we experience perfect (multi)collinearity among 
independent variables due to inclusion of dummy variables for all of the groups while the model has an overall 
intercept. Hence, since we opted to have an overall intercept in our econometric model, the number of dummy 
variables introduced must be one less than the categories of that variable to avoid this problem.  
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Fourthly, we introduce legal, market, and macroeconomic variables that broadly 
define cross-country differences in institutions and macroeconomic characteristics of a 
country (Model 4). At this stage, we particularly introduce dummy variables for origin of 
legal systems    
   - that is, 1 for common law based legal systems, and 0 for civil law based 
legal systems - and economic development    
 
  - that is, upper middle income groups, lower 
middle income group, and low income group. We also include interaction variables between 
country and firm characteristics to examine how the cross-sectional determinants of capital 
structure vary from country to country. The model is as follows: 
 
              
    ∑     
 
    ∑      
   ∑ ∑        
 
   
         (4) 
 
where   
  is a dummy variable for legal group to which firm i belongs and    is a column 
vector containing the corresponding coefficients;   
 
  is a dummy variable for income group to 
which firm i belongs and    is a column vector containing the corresponding coefficients.  
Finally, in Model 5, we replace legal and macroeconomic variables that broadly 
define country characteristics by more specific legal, market and macroeconomic 
variables         
  . The model is written as follows: 
 
              
    ∑      
      
               (5) 
 
where     
  is a vector of institutional and macroeconomic variables that are known to have 
effect on capital structure and    is a column vector containing the corresponding coefficients. 
 
2.3.2.2 A brief comment on estimation procedures 
 
The econometrics literature alludes to the superiority of panel data regression over 
cross-sectional regression procedures (e.g., Hsiao 1985; Baltagi 2005).
24
 It identifies three 
basic panel data estimation procedures: pooled OLS, fixed effects (FE) and random effects 
                                                          
24
 Baltagi (2005) provides an elaborate discussion of the benefits and limitations of panel data procedures. 
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(RE). Although empirical literature favours FE over RE in basic capital structure research, 
the fact that our sample was not randomly drawn makes the sole use of FE problematic. Thus, 
we report parameter estimates using all of the three procedures. Nonetheless, the literature 
also points to the shortcomings of these basic procedures and suggests some variants of these 
procedures to address their limitations (e.g., Owusu-Gyapong 1986; Johnston and DiNardo 
1997; Gujarati 2003; Cameron and Trivedi 2005; Lemmon, Roberts and Zender 2008; 
Menard 2008). The most common of these variants is the Seemingly Unrelated Regression 
(SUR) and system-GMM (Generalized Method of Moments) panel data estimation 
procedures. These procedures, unlike the three basic procedures mentioned earlier, are robust 
to firm heterogeneity and endogeneity problems that commonly plague modern finance 
research (e.g., Antoniou et al. 2006; Deesomsak et al. 2009). Thus, we use these later 
procedures for robustness check. 
 
2.4 Results and Discussion 
 
2.4.1 Descriptive statistics 
 
2.4.1.1 The sample 
 
To provide an insight about the sample, Table 2.2 presents an overview of the number 
of firms available in the dataset by country and industry. In terms of country distribution, we 
note that firms from Egypt and South Africa may heavily influence the sample; they 
constitute circa 79 per cent of firms included in the sample. On the other hand, those from 
Botswana and Ghana have little influence on the sample as they constitute only 2 per cent of 
firms included in the sample.  
 
(Insert Table 2.2 about here) 
 
51 
 
Industry-wise, we observe firms in Non-durable, Manufacturing and Service 
industries may dominate the results with participation of 18 per cent, 18 per cent and 11 per 
cent, respectively. Firms from Durables and Health industries are at the other end of the 
spectrum, with only 3 per cent and 5 per cent participation, respectively. 
 
2.4.1.2 The dependent variable 
 
The capital structure of African firms has been evolving over the sample period. Table 
2.3 presents descriptive statistics of measures of capital structure and its determinants for the 
sample firms. The overall mean leverage of all the firms included in the sample is 49.3 per 
cent, 11.8 per cent, and 37.5 per cent for total, long-term, and short-term leverage, 
respectively. 
 
(Insert Table 2.3 about here) 
 
Four salient patterns pertaining to financing decisions of African firms are noteworthy 
in Table 2.3. Firstly, independent of how capital structure is measured, we observe that the 
leverage ratios were varying over time. This is considered as an early indication that African 
firms might be attempting to adjust their capital structure toward a target. Secondly, we note 
a general upward trend in all the three measures of capital structure during the sample period. 
Total leverage, for example, increased from 41.3 per cent in 1999 to 47.6 per cent in 2008 
while long-term leverage went from 9.9 per cent to 13.9 per cent over the same time period. 
As financial theory suggests, this trend could be due to the confluence of expansion in the 
economies and stock markets and rising inflation in the sample countries during the study 
period. It might also be due to the steady increase in profitability, growth opportunities, and 
dividend payout experienced by firms in the sample countries.  
Thirdly, short-term leverage was on the decline over the second half of the sample 
period. This could be due to the effect of expanding stock markets in the sample countries 
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which may have encouraged quoted firms from using short-term debt to long-term debt. The 
steady increase in the size, profitability, and growth opportunities of the sampled firms during 
the study period might also have triggered the decline in short-term leverage (e.g., Barclay 
and Smith Jr 1995; Ozkan 2002; Deesomsak et al. 2009).  
Finally, disaggregation of total leverage into its components (see Table 2.3 and 2.4) 
shows that short-term leverage dominates the capital structure of sampled firms. For example, 
long-term leverage ratio varied between a low of 9.9 per cent and a high of 13.9 per cent 
while short-term leverage varied between a low of 31.4 per cent and a high of 39.2 per cent 
over the sample period. We observe qualitatively similar results for the sub-samples as well 
(see Table 2.4 - Panel A to C). Prior empirical efforts in the African setting proffer broadly 
similar results (e.g., Negash 2002; Mutenheri and Green 2003; Toby 2005; Abor and Biekpe 
2006; Yartey 2006; Salawu and Ile-Ife 2007; Gwatidzo and Ojah 2009). The tendency to rely 
on short-term leverage by African firms is consistent with the often small (if not non-existent) 
corporate bond markets; underdeveloped stock markets; relatively high information 
asymmetries; poor legal protection and enforcement systems; and macroeconomic instability 
(especially inflation) that epitomized African economies (e.g., Eldomiaty 2007; Ncube 2007).    
 
(Insert Table 2.4 about here) 
    
We probe the descriptive statistics to see if there are inter-industry variations in 
capital structure in Table 2.4 - Panel A. The results imply a preliminary inference: the mean 
leverages of industries are heterogeneous. For instance, in terms of total leverage, we note 
that firms in Chemical and Construction, Regulated, and Wholesale and Retail industries 
were the three most levered in that order. In contrast, those in Durables and Health industries 
were the least levered. On the other hand, in terms of short-term leverage, we observe that 
firms in Chemical and Construction, Business Equipment, and Wholesale and Retail 
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industries were the most levered in that order. In contrast, those in Oil and gas industry are 
the least levered.  
Table 2.4 also presents a country-by-country summary statistics for the three 
measures of leverage. In terms of total leverage, it is noteworthy that firms in Nigeria and 
Ghana were the most levered while those in Morocco and Botswana are the least levered. In 
terms of short-term leverage, on the other hand, firms in Mauritius and Botswana were the 
least levered. Furthermore, firms in civil law countries appeared more highly levered, in 
terms of total and long-term leverage, than is the case in common law countries. The nature 
of variation in leverage ratios across income groups depends on the measure of leverage used. 
Specifically, firms in upper-middle-income countries generally tend to have higher long-term 
leverage and lesser short-term leverage compared to their counterparts in lower-middle-
income and low income countries. Overall, this variation in capital structures of firms in the 
sub-samples is, perhaps, an early indication of potential heterogeneity in underlying factors 
that determine basic capital structure.  
Previous cross-country studies on basic capital structure report that firms in 
developing countries exhibit lower leverage than those in developed countries (e.g., De Jong 
et al. 2008). As such, we assess whether the leverage ratios in our sample countries are 
comparable with those for developed and other developing economies
25
 reported in Cheng 
and Shiu (2007)
26
. As noted earlier, Table 2.4 indicates that the total leverage for our sample 
countries varies from a low of 44.1 per cent (Morocco) to a high of 64.9 per cent (Nigeria)
27
. 
Cheng and Shiu (2007), on the other hand, report that total leverage varies from a low of 
                                                          
25
 The categorization of a country into developed and developing economy was based on the World Bank’s 
income group of countries. 
 
26
 Comparisons in most studies make reference to Rajan and Zingales (1995). However, since we note that 
Cheng and Shiu (2007) is more recent and comprehensive we opted to compare our results with Cheng and Shiu 
(2007).   
 
27
 Average leverage ratio figures of our sample countries appear to be invariably greater than five countries 
sampled in Gwatidzo and Ojah (2009). These differences may probably have resulted due to the bigger sample 
we examined and some differences in definitions of leverage ratios 
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circa 41.9 per cent (Taiwan) to a high of 66.9 per cent (Indonesia) for developed countries 
and from a low of 31.8 per cent (Venezuela) to a high of circa 62.9 per cent (Pakistan) for 
other developing nations (see Table 2.5). Thus, unlike the allusions in other studies, in terms 
of total and long-term leverage, the level of leverage in our sample countries is more or less 
similar with those in other developing and developed economies. This finding suggests that 
one has to look into more specific measures of macroeconomic factors and more 
sophisticated econometric procedures to discern cross-country differences in capital structure.  
 
(Insert Table 2.5 about here) 
    
2.4.1.3 Firm characteristics 
 
Firm-specific determinants of capital structure were selected based on those often 
suggested in the extant literature. Table 2.6 - Panel B presents a descriptive summary of the 
firm characteristics of our sample. From the table, we observe that countries with relatively 
smaller median firm size were Ghana and Tunisia; those with larger firm size included 
Mauritius, Nigeria and Morocco in that order. On the other hand, firms in Ghana exhibited 
the largest variation in firm size whereas those in Tunisia came last in terms of within country 
firm size variation. We also observe earnings volatility for firms in Nigeria, South Africa and 
Ghana were the highest while it was the lowest in Tunisia. The median return on assets 
(ROA) was highest in Botswana, Nigeria and South Africa in that order; it was the lowest in 
Mauritius, Tunisia and Morocco in that order. However, the ROA of firms in Nigeria is the 
most dispersed. In terms of median growth opportunities, firms in Ghana had 4 times the 
median growth opportunities experienced by those in Tunisia.   
Our results also indicate that firms in Mauritius and Nigeria were the ones which had 
the most tangible assets while those in South Africa and Botswana had the least tangible 
assets. While firms in Tunisia and Egypt had the highest dividend payout ratio, those in 
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Nigeria and Ghana were paying out the least. In terms of non-debt related tax shield, firms in 
Tunisia had the biggest shield while those in Nigeria had the smallest. By way of summary, 
results in Table 2.6 affirm the view that firm characteristics exhibit cross-country as well as 
within country variations. We conjecture that these differences could result in differences in 
capital structure of firms in our sample.  
 
2.4.1.4 Macroeconomic conditions 
 
To gain insight into dissimilarities in macroeconomic characteristics of sample 
countries, we review macroeconomic variables including (i) taxation, (ii) inflation, (iii) size 
of overall economy, (iv) real GDP growth rate, and (v) income group to which the sample 
countries belonged. We note that average marginal corporate tax rates in sample countries 
spanned over a range of 15.0 per cent (Botswana) to 36.0 per cent (Egypt) while average 
inflation rates spanned from a low of circa 1.7 per cent (Morocco) to a high of circa 17.9 per 
cent (Ghana) over the sample period (see Table 2.6). These variations in marginal corporate 
tax rates and inflation rates might be reflections of differences in the way governments 
manage the economy and the ability of local currencies to provide a stable measure of value 
to be used in long-term contracting.  
 
(Insert Table 2.6 about here) 
 
We also observe that income level of sample countries is fairly diverse. It ranges from 
upper-middle-income countries (Botswana, Mauritius and South Africa) to lower-middle-
income countries (Egypt, Morocco, and Tunisia) to low-income countries (Ghana, Kenya and 
Nigeria). Table 2.6 also indicates that GDP per capita and its growth rates vary considerably 
across sample countries confirming the existence of disparity in the wealth of sample 
countries, and hence, disparity in financing needs of firms in those countries (e.g., Demirgüç-
Kunt and Maksimovic 1999).  
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2.4.1.5 Legal and financial institutions 
 
In accordance with the view that legal and financial institutions shape the capital 
structure decisions of firms, the study explores the legal and financial institutions of sample 
countries. Table 2.6 presents a descriptive summary of the proxies for the level of 
development of legal and financial institutions in our sample countries. The results indicate 
that there are considerable cross-country variations in these institutions as measured by 
creditor rights protection index (from a low of 0 in Tunisia to a high of 4 in Kenya and 
Nigeria), shareholder rights protection index (from a low of 2 in Kenya and Morocco to a 
high of 5 in Ghana and South Africa), rule of law index (from a low of -1.31 in Nigeria to a 
high of 0.85 in Mauritius) and origin of legal systems. The legal systems of four of the 
sample countries (i.e., Egypt, Mauritius, Morocco, and Tunisia) were based on civil law 
tradition while those of five countries (South Africa, Botswana, Ghana, Kenya, and Nigeria) 
were based on common law. These variations in legal institutions of our sample countries 
could explain disparities in the optimal contract between firms and lenders’ and creditors’ 
ability to recoup loans which may affect the capital structure firms (e.g., Demirgüç-Kunt and 
Maksimovic 1999). 
In terms of financial institutions, the size of the banking sector relative to GDP is the 
largest in Mauritius, Egypt, and South Africa in that order whereas it is the smallest in 
Nigeria, Botswana, and Ghana. The share of banking sector relative to GDP in Mauritius was 
close to five times that in Nigeria, three times that in Kenya, one and half times those in 
Morocco and Tunisia indicating a huge difference in the importance of banking sector in the 
sample countries. We also observe that there are considerable disparities in the level of stock 
market development as measured by liquidity and size of stock market. For instance, in terms 
of size, the Johannesburg Stock Exchange was 10 times the average stock market size for the 
sample countries and circa 17 times larger than the stock market in Tunisia and 4 times larger 
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than the first runner up (stock market size of Egypt) (Table 2.6). These variations in the 
relative size of banking sector and stock market development could result in cross-country 
disparity in access to external finance and diversification opportunities available to firms. 
 
2.4.2 Correlation analyses 
 
We present Pearson’s pairwise correlation coefficients of variables along with their 
statistical significances in Table 2.7. We note that the correlation between short-term leverage 
and total leverage is stronger than is the case between long-term leverage and total leverage. 
This, perhaps, is because short-term leverage is the dominant form of financing in our sample 
countries. The correlation analysis also reveals that firm size is positively and significantly 
associated with leverage independent of how the latter is defined. While earnings volatility is 
positively and significantly correlated with leverage, dividend payout ratio is negatively and 
significantly associated with all the three measures of basic capital structure.  
 
(Insert table 2.7 about here) 
 
Also apparent in the correlation matrix is an inverse and statistically significant 
association between profitability and all the three measures of basic capital structure. Not 
surprisingly, the association between asset tangibility and leverage is sensitive to how the 
latter is defined; it is positively related with long-term leverage and inversely related with 
short-term leverage.  
Our results also indicate that the association between most of the macroeconomic and 
institutional variables and leverage is dependent on how leverage is defined. For example, the 
highest marginal corporate tax rate, size of the overall economy, and rule of law are 
negatively and significantly related with total- and short-term leverage while they are 
positively and significantly associated with long-term leverage. We also observe that creditor 
and shareholder rights protection indices are positively associated with total and long-term 
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leverage ratios. The correlation matrix also shows that the relative size of a country’s banking 
sector is negatively and significantly associated with leverage independent of how the latter is 
defined.  
On the other hand, we note that the association between measures of stock market 
development (i.e., its size and liquidity) and leverage is sensitive to how the latter is 
measured. Specifically, both measures of stock market development are inversely related to 
short-term leverage while they have the opposite association with the other two measures of 
leverage. Finally, we note that the correlation coefficients between country-level 
determinants of capital structure are very high. To keep the estimation problem tractable and 
avoid problems of multicollinearity when estimating Equation 5 in the presence of high 
correlations, we develop slightly different specifications of Equation 5 by excluding highly 
correlated variables. 
 
2.4.3 Regression results 
 
In this section, we report regression results and their interpretation for Equations 1 up 
to 5. A range of estimation procedures were considered to examine if results are robust to 
econometric procedures.  
 
2.4.3.1 Firm characteristics 
 
We begin our analysis with a perusal of results of the baseline regression model 
(Model 1) which specifies only firm-specific factors as the independent variables that 
determine a firm’s capital structure. Table 2.8 presents the parameter estimates and their 
corresponding statistical significance (or lack of it) for a range of estimation procedures.  
 
(Insert table 2.8 about here) 
 
59 
 
 Our results show that the nexus between firm size and leverage is positive and robust 
to estimation procedures and model specifications (see Tables 2.8, 2.9, 2.10, and 2.12). This 
result renders credence to the tax/bankruptcy trade-off argument which contends that larger 
firms are likely to be more diversified and hence pose less default risk to the lender which in 
turn affords larger firms more capacity to borrow. It is also consistent with information 
asymmetry argument which contends that larger firms are more visible, and hence, have 
lesser information asymmetry problems which in turn affords larger firms to borrow more. 
Many prior empirical endeavours reported similar results (e.g., Barclay and Smith 1999; 
Wiwattanakantang 1999; Booth, Dermirguc-Kunt et al. 2001; Deesomsak et al. 2004; Salawu 
and Ile-Ife 2007; Abor 2008; Antoniou et al. 2008).  
In sync with the pecking order theory, we find a robustly significant and inverse 
relationship between profitability and capital structure. Tables 2.9 and 2.10 indicate that this 
inverse relationship persists even after the influence of industry and country variables is 
accounted. This signifies that firms in our sample would borrow less to fund their investment 
if they had increased internal fund. Although this finding is in contrast with propositions 
based on tax/bankruptcy and signalling theories it is consistent with empirical results reported 
in similar studies (e.g., Friend and Lang 1988; Rajan and Zingales 1995; Booth et al. 2001; 
Bevan and Danbolt 2002; Eldomiaty 2007; Mazur 2007; Salawu and Ile-Ife 2007; Abor 2008; 
Antoniou et al. 2008).  
As in the preliminary results reported earlier, we note that the relationship between 
asset tangibility and leverage variables is a function of how the latter is measured. 
Specifically, the relationship is generally negative and statistically significant for short-term 
leverage while it is somehow positive for long-term leverage. This suggests that firms with 
more tangible assets tend to use their tangible assets as collateral to access long-term debt, 
and hence, depend less on short-term leverage. This is in line with reasoning based on both 
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tax/bankruptcy and agency theories which forward that firms with more tangible assets tend 
to have lower cost of bankruptcy and lower agency costs of debt (e.g., Jensen and Meckling 
1976; Rajan and Zingales 1995; Frank and Goyal 2007a; Abor 2008; Antoniou et al. 2008; 
De Jong et al. 2008). Bevan and Bolt (2002) and Abor (2008) report similar results. 
It is also interesting to note that the relationship between non-debt-related tax shield 
and leverage depends on how leverage is measured; while it negatively influences short-term 
and total leverage, it positively influences long-term leverage. This finding partially supports 
the argument that the higher the non-debt-related tax-shields such as depreciation, net 
operating loss carry forwards and tax credits, the lower the tax advantage that arises from 
interest deduction (e.g., Barclay and Smith 1999; Deesomsak, et al. 2004; Antoniou et al. 
2008). While the inverse relationship corroborates the findings reported in Wiwattanakantang 
(1999) and Deesomsak et al. (2004), the direct relationship supports Song and Philippatos 
(2004).  
Our results also indicate that the dividend payout variable negatively influences long-
term leverage proffering support for the argument forwarded by agency theory which sees 
dividend payment and debt issues as substitutes in mitigating agency problems (e.g., Bhaduri 
2002a, 2002b). This evidence also provides support for the argument presented by the 
information asymmetry camp which suggests that dividend announcements provide the 
missing pieces of information about firms and allow the market to estimate a firm’s current 
earnings which in turn allows the firm to more readily access external finance (e.g., Miller 
and Rock 1985). As in the present study, an empirical study by Abor (2008) notes the 
sensitivity of the relation between dividend payout and leverage to how leverage is measured.   
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2.4.3.2 Industry characteristics 
 
With a view to directly examine inter-industry variations in basic capital structure of 
sample firms, the chapter provides (see Table 2.9) parameter estimates for Model 2 using a 
range of estimation procedures.  
 
(Insert table 2.9 about here) 
 
We note that the short-term and total leverage of firms in the Wholesale and Retail 
and Chemical and Construction industries are significantly higher than those of firms in the 
Manufacturing industry
28
. The results also indicate that the long-term and total leverage of 
firms in Regulated industries tend to be higher than those of firms in the Manufacturing 
industries. It is worthwhile to note that these results are robust to model specifications and 
estimation procedures (see Table 2.9, 2.10, 2.11, and 2.12). This evidence corroborates the 
view that industry-specific characteristics such as technologies and assets employed by 
industries and regulations to which industries are subjected influence the level of leverage by 
firms in those industries (e.g., Frank and Goyal 2007a).  It also supports findings reported in 
other similar studies (e.g., Remmers et al. 1974; Hovakimian, Opler and Titman 2001; Faccio 
and Masulis 2005). Song and Philippatos (2004) particularly report that leverages of 
Regulated, Chemical and Construction industries, the Wholesale and Retail industries are 
higher than those of other industries. 
Firms in the Durables industry, although sensitive to model specification and 
estimation procedures, also tend to have higher leverage than those in Manufacturing 
industries. In contrast, firms in Service and Other industries tend to have lower leverage than 
those in the referent Manufacturing industries.  
                                                          
28
 As agriculture is still the main stay of most African economies, it would have been interesting to see how 
capital structures of firms in other industries compare against those in the agriculture sector. However, since we 
didn’t have enough number of listed companies for the agriculture sector in all the countries we considered, we 
opted to using manufacturing as our reference industry.   
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2.4.3.3 Country characteristics 
 
It has previously been highlighted that a country’s institutional and macro-economic 
contexts could decisively affect firm’s capital structure. In line with this notion, in Table 
2.10, the study attempts to examine cross-country variations in capital structure decisions of 
sample firms using various estimation procedures (Model 3).  
 
(Insert table 2.10 about here) 
 
The results indicate that firms in Nigeria had higher short-term and total leverage and 
lower long-term leverage than those in South Africa (Table 2.10). This could be due to the 
lower corporate marginal tax, higher inflation, smaller size of the overall economy, relatively 
less developed financial markets, inferior protection of shareholder rights, and inefficient law 
enforcement that epitomize Nigeria relative to South Africa (see Table 2.6-Panel A). This 
evidence only partially supports the findings reported in Gwatidzo and Ojah (2009). 
Ostensibly, this discrepancy in our findings is due to differences in model specification.    
The results also show that firms in Egypt and Morocco had lower long-term and total 
leverage level relative to those in South Africa (see Table 2.10). Similarly, firms in Ghana 
and Tunisia had lower level of total leverage. Overall, our results corroborate the view that 
cross-country variations in country characteristics do matter in capital structure decisions of a 
firm.  
The estimation results for Model 4 using a battery of econometric procedures are 
presented in Table 2.11 with a view to investigate the effect of contextual factors on capital 
structure decisions of sample firms.  
 
(Insert table 2.11 about here) 
 
63 
 
The results of Model 4 indicate that firms in low-income countries tend to have higher 
short-term and total leverage compared to those in upper-middle-income countries. This is in 
line with our earlier speculation that more specific measures of country characteristics and 
more sophisticated econometric procedures may lead to better insights into cross-country 
variation in leverage. It is also consistent with the view that firms in less developed countries 
tend to use far more short-term leverage than those in more developed countries (e.g., Fan et 
al. 2008; Deesomsak et al. 2009).  
Model 4 included interaction variables to see if firm characteristics impact on basic 
capital structure differently in different institutional and macroeconomic setups (see Table 
2.11). We observe that the negative influence of profitability on short-term leverage is 
stronger in lower-middle-income countries than in other income group countries. Similarly, 
the positive influence of dividend payout ratio on long-term and total leverage is stronger in 
low-income countries than in the other two groups. Although econometrically not robust, our 
results show that origin of the legal system of a country influences the way firm-specific 
factors determine capital structure. Taking a cue from prior literature (e.g., Song and 
Philippatos 2004; De Jong et al. 2008; Fan et al. 2008), our interpretation of these results is 
that country characteristics, in addition to their direct impact on capital structure, indirectly 
influence capital structure by enhancing or mitigating the impact of firm-specific factors on 
capital structure.  
As has been indicated previously, we further refine our definition of macroeconomic 
and institutional factors in Model 5. In this model, we include 10 variables that more-
narrowly define country characteristics. Because of the high correlation between the 
variables, we could not include all the variables in a single regression. Rather, we estimate 
separate regressions for a group of variables which do not have sever multicollinearity 
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problems. For reasons of brevity, Table 2.12 presents regression results of only seemingly 
unrelated regression (SUR) procedure.  
 
(Insert table 2.12 about here) 
 
The evidence indicates that the overall size of economy variable is positively related 
with long-term leverage; while it is negatively related with short-term and total leverage (see 
Table 2.12). That is, firms in richer countries tend to have more long-term and less short-term 
leverage relative to their counterparts in poorer countries. This could be due to the more 
developed financial and legal institutions (i.e., bigger and more liquid stock markets, bigger 
banking sector, superior shareholder rights protection, and more efficient rule of law) that 
epitomized richer countries in our sample (see Table 2.7). Our interpretation of this result is 
that the nexus between size of overall economy variable and leverage is dependent on how 
the latter is measured and is moderated by the influence that economic development has on 
the development of financial and legal institutions. This evidence signifies the role of access 
to finance, bankruptcy, agency and transaction costs in capital structure decisions of sample 
firms. However, our result does not support the suggestion by some early studies (e.g., Singh 
and Hamid 1992; Singh 1995) that the there is a positive relationship between economic 
development and leverage regardless of how the latter is defined. Rather, it confirms the 
“qualified” relationship reported in Booth et al. (2001) which underscored the definitional 
sensitivity of the relationship.  
Besides the size of overall economy, its growth rate also affects firm’s leverage 
decisions. We observe that the growth rate of real GDP per capita negatively influences long-
term and total leverage (see Table 2.12) supporting the proposition that the likely increase in 
stock price during times of economic growth should lead to lower leverage by a firm (e.g., 
Korajczyk 2003; De Haas and Peeters 2006; Frank and Goyal 2007b). This evidence also 
renders credence to the view that the likely increase in profits during times of economic 
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growth should lead to lower leverage by a firm (e.g., Booth et al. 2001; Song and Philippatos 
2004; Wanzenried 2006). Cheng and Shiu (2007) and Beck et al. (2002) report similar 
results. This implies that issue of market timing; agency, transaction and bankruptcy costs; 
and information asymmetry might be well at play in the capital structure decisions of sample 
firms (e.g., De Haas and Peeters, 2006, Frank and Goyal, 2007b, Korajczyk, 2003, 
Wanzenried, 2006, Booth et al., 2001). 
In line with the conjecture that a firm is likely to issue more debt under inflationary 
environment since inflationary situations not only decrease the real value of debt but also 
increase the real tax advantage of debt for firms (e.g., Taggart 1985; Frank and Goyal 2007a), 
we find a positive association between inflation and leverage (see Table 2.12). Arguments 
based on both tax/bankruptcy and market timing theories lead conjectures that propose a 
positive association between the two variables. 
Also, we document clear evidence that investor (both shareholders and creditors) 
rights protection positively and significantly influences firm’s leverage. The direct 
relationship between shareholder rights protection variable and leverage is consistent with the 
view that strong protection of shareholder rights protracts demise of a firm during financial 
distress, and hence, a firm in such a country is likely to use more debt (e.g., De Jong et al. 
2008). Song and Philippatos (2004), in a study of firms in 30 OECD countries, report similar 
results. On the other hand, the positive relationship between creditor rights protection 
variable and leverage is in congruence with the view that stronger creditor rights protection 
reduces creditor’s risk, and hence, promotes development of debt markets which in turn 
increases the likelihood that a firm uses debt to finance its investments (e.g., La Porta et al. 
2000; Djankov et al. 2007). Evidence reported in Deesomsak et al. (2004) and Cheng and 
Shiu (2007) corroborates out results.  
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The inverse relationship between the rule of law variable and leverage (see Table 
2.12) that we observe in our results appears to be in line with Fan et al.’s (2008) view that 
poor quality of law enforcement discourages lenders from lending as it increases the 
likelihood that they will be expropriated by insiders, thus, reducing the borrowing 
opportunities of a firm. However, this result is in stark contrast with the hypotheses that 
better quality of law enforcement is likely to reduce agency costs and enhances the 
development of debt markets which in turn increases firm leverage (e.g., Gul 2001). In a 
study which examined the role of firm-and country-specific factors in the determination of a 
firm’s capital structure, De Jong et al. (2008) reports similar results. In a similar vein, 
Antoniou et al. (2008) carried out a comparative study of the determinants of capital structure 
of firms in European countries and found that rule of law is negatively related with leverage. 
In terms of the effect of size of banking sector variable on leverage, we note that the 
former has a negative influence on the latter (see Table 2.12) implying that the bigger the 
relative size of the banking sector, the less levered would a firm in such a country be. We, 
however, find this result to be in contradiction with the expectation that more developed 
banking sector reduces costs related with information asymmetry, agency and bankruptcy, 
and hence, likely to increase the level of leverage by a firm (e.g., Levine 2002; Antoniou et 
al. 2008). Our interpretation of this result is that the stronger creditor rights protection and 
better quality of law enforcement that characterized those countries with bigger banking 
sector in our sample (see Table 2.7) may have discouraged firms from borrowing money, as 
they may want to reduce the risks that come with debt. This result is consistent with the 
findings reported in Demirgüç-Kunt and Maksimovic (1999) and Cheng and Shiu (2007). 
We find the role of development of stock markets, as measured by its size and 
liquidity, on leverage depends on how the latter is measured. We observe that the two 
variables that measure stock market development influence long-term leverage positively 
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while their relationship to short-term and total leverage variables is negative and statistically 
weak. This partially supports the view that developed stock markets reduce information 
asymmetry problems faced by creditors, and hence, enhance the borrowing opportunities of a 
publicly quoted firm. As in this study, Cheng and Shiu (2007) report that the relationship is 
dependent on how leverage is measured.  
 
2.5 Conclusions 
 
Based on mainstream capital structure theory, this chapter argued that basic capital 
structure of a firm is a function of not only firm characteristics but also of industry, 
institutional and macroeconomic characteristics. The chapter interrogated the data by 
employing a sequence of models to examine the role of different factors and checked 
robustness of results through [all] available econometric procedures. The chapter documents 
a number of findings from the analyses.  
We observe differences in basic capital structure of firms in our sample attributable to 
firm-specific characteristics. Leverage, independent of how it is defined, tends to be higher in 
larger firms whilst it is likely to be lower in smaller firms. Also, asset tangibility is observed 
to have a positive influence on long-term leverage whilst it has an inverse influence on short-
term leverage. These evidences imply that firms in our sample consider probability of default, 
adverse selection and agency costs as important factors in the determination of their basic 
capital structure. On the other hand, the evidence that more profitable firms tend to have less 
leverage while less profitable firms tend to have more leverage signifies the role that 
transaction costs and information asymmetry problems play in the determination of basic 
capital structure of firms in our sample. Furthermore, the chapter established that non-debt-
related tax-shield is positively related to long-term leverage while is negatively related short-
term leverage. This evidence partially corroborates the argument that the higher the non-debt-
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related tax-shields such as depreciation, net operating loss carry forwards and tax credits, the 
lower the tax advantage that arises from interest deduction. Finally, the chapter indicates that 
dividend payout variable negatively influences long-term leverage proffering further 
evidence that firms in our sample considers agency costs and information asymmetry issues 
in basic capital structure decisions.  
The industry in which a firm operates also seems to have an influence on the basic 
capital structure decisions of firms in our sample. We observe that the inter-industry 
differences appear to be a function of how capital structure is defined. We particularly note 
that short-term and total leverage of firms in the Wholesale and Retail and Chemical and 
Construction industries are significantly higher than those of firms in the Manufacturing 
industry. On the other hand, long-term leverage of firms in Regulated industries tends to be 
higher than those of firms in the Manufacturing industries. This signifies the role that 
industry specific operating characteristics and regulations play in a firm’s capital structure 
decisions.   
In terms of macroeconomic conditions, we observe that firms in richer countries tend 
to have more long-term and less short-term leverage than is the case in poorer countries. In 
contrast, the rate of economic growth is indirectly related with long-term and total leverage. 
Also, firms in our sample countries are likely to issue more debt under inflationary 
environment. In addition to direct influences, we observe that the negative influence of 
profitability on short-term leverage is stronger in lower-middle-income countries than is the 
case in other income group countries. Similarly, the positive influence of dividend payout 
ratio on long-term and total leverage is stronger in low-income countries than is the case in 
the other two groups. Put together, these evidences connote that such factors as access to 
finance, firm’s investment opportunity set and financing needs, probability of bankruptcy, 
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agency costs and market timing issues are central in the determination of basic capital 
structure of firms in our sample. 
At institutional level, our findings indicated that there is: (i) a direct relationship 
between investor (both shareholders and creditors) rights protection and a firm’s leverage; (ii) 
an inverse relationship between the rule of law variable, size of banking sector and leverage; 
and (iii) a “definitionally-sensitive” relationship between development of stock markets and 
leverage. These evidences suggest that agency and contract enforcement costs are among the 
considerations in basic capital structure decisions of a firm in the sample. 
Recently, the literature has leaped into the investigation of whether firms adjust their 
capital structure toward a target. In Chapter 3, the thesis examines whether the sample firms 
adjust their capital structures toward a target, and if so, attempts to identify the factors that 
impact on the adjustment speed towards the target. 
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Table 2.1: Determinants of capital structure, theoretical predictions, and empirical findings  
Panel A: Institutional and macroeconomic characteristics and capital structure 
S. 
No 
Variables 
Theoretical Framework  Summary of Empirical Results  
Tax-
bankruptcy 
Agency 
Market 
timing 
 Positive influence on capital 
structure  
Negative influence on 
capital structure   
± 
No influence on 
capital structure 
1. Shareholder Rights   -   Song & Philippatos (2004) Chen et al. (2000)  De Jong et al. (2008) 
2. Rule of Law + +/-  
  De Jong et al. (2008) 
Antoniou et al. (2008) 
  
3. Creditor Rights  + +/-  
 Deesomsak et al. (2004);  
Cheng and Shiu (2007) 
De Jong et al. (2008) 
  
4. Taxation +   
 Rajan & Zingales (1995); Booth 
et al. (2001), Cheng & Shiu 
(2007),  
 
Song & Philippatos 
(2004) 
Mayor (1994) 
5. Inflation +/-  + 
  Cheng & Shiu (2007), 
Beck et al. (2002) 
Booth et al. (2001) Fan et al. (2008) 
6. Size of economy    - 
 Sing & Hamid (1992) 
Sing (1995); Song & Philippatos 
(2004); Booth et al. (2001); Chui 
et al. (2002); Fan et al. (2008) 
Cobham and Subramaniam 
(1998); Beck et al. (2002); 
Cheng and Shiu (2007) 
  
7. Economic Growth + +/- - 
 Chui et al. (2002), Song & 
Philippatos (2004), De Jong et al. 
(2008) 
Beck et al. (2002) Booth et al. (2001) 
De Haas & Peeters 
(2006) 
8. Market Capitalization - +    Song & Philippatos (2004) Cheng & Shiu (2007)  
9. Stock Market Turnover - +    Song & Philippatos (2004) Cheng & Shiu (2007)  
10 Size of Banking Sector + +  
 
Song & Philippatos (2004) 
Booth et al. (2001) 
Demirguc-Kunt & 
Maksimovic (1999) 
Cheng & Shiu (2007) 
 
Rajan & Zingales 
(1995) 
Notes:  The table presents a summary of the theoretical predictions and empirical results regarding the relationship between institutional and macroeconomic variables and 
capital structruere. TBT refers to tax-bankruptcy trade-off theory; POT denotes pecking order theory; ST signifies signalling theory. When a theory is silent or 
when there is significant ambiguity regarding the appropriate interpretation, the cell is left blank. The (+/-) sign signifies the possibility that plausible arguments 
could be made for a positive as well as a negative relationship using a given theory. ± denotes the sensitivity of empirical results either to the way the dependent 
variable is defined or country variations. 0 denotes that there were studies which reported support for no relationship between the variable indicated and financing 
decisions. 
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Panel B: Firm characteristics and capital structure  
S. No Variables 
Theoretical Predictions  Summary of Empirical Results 
TBT Agency  POT ST*  
 Positive influence on capital 
structure 
Negative influence on 
capital structure  
± 
No influence on capital 
structure 
1. Firm size +  +/-  
 Prasad et al. (2001), 
Wiwattanakantang (1999), Barclay 
& Smith (1999), Abor (2008), 
Booth et al. (2001), Deesomsak et 
al. (2004), Song & Philippatos 
(2004), Antoniou et al. (2008), 
Salawu and Ile-Ife (2007) 
Fan et al. (2008) 
Bhaduri  (2002a & 2002b), 
Bevan &Danbolt (2002), 
Titman & Wessels (1988), de 
Jong et al. (2008) 
Rajan & Zingales (1995), de 
Jong et al. (2008) 
 
2. Profitability  +  - + 
  Song & Philippatos (2004), 
Booth et al. (2001), Abor 
(2008), Friend (1988), Bevan 
& Danbolt (2002), Rajan & 
Zingales (1995), Mazur 
(2007), Antoniou et al. 
(2008), Eldomiaty (2007), 
Salawu and Ile-Ife (2007) 
 
 
 
Titman & Wessels (1988) 
 
 
Deesomsak et al. (2004) 
3. 
Growth 
opportunities  
- - +  
 
Bevan & Danbolt (2002), Abor 
(2008), Chen et al., (1999), Salawu 
and Ile-Ife, 2007) 
Barclay & Smith  (1999), 
Song & Philippatos (2004) 
Bevan & Danbolt (2002), 
Bhaduri (2002a & 2002b) 
Rajan & Zingales (1995), 
Deesomsak et al. (2004), Booth 
et al. (2001), de Jong et al. 
(2008) 
 
4. Asset tangibility  + + +/-  
 
Bradley et al. (1984), Rajan & 
Zingales (1995), Prasad et al. 
(2001), de Jong et al. (2008) 
 Abor (2008), Bevan & Danbol t 
(2002), Salawu & Ile-Ife (2007), 
Bevan & Danbolt (2002), Booth 
et al. (2001) 
 
Bhaduri (2002a & 2002b), 
Titman & Wessels (1988), 
Wiwattanakantang (1999), 
Deesomsak et al. (2004) 
5. Tax shield -    
 Song & Philippatos (2004), Deesomsak et al. (2004), Song 
& Philippatos (2004), 
Wiwattanakantang (1999) 
 Barclay & Smith (1999), 
6. 
Earnings 
volatility 
- + -  
 
 
Eldomiaty (2007) 
 
Abor (2008), De Jong et al. 
(2008), Booth et al. (2001) 
Titman & Wessels (1988), 
Wiwattanakantang (1999), 
Deesomsak et al. (2004) 
8. Dividend policy  - + +/-    Abor (2008)  
Notes:  The table presents a summary of the theoretical predictions and empirical results regarding the relationship between institutional and macroeconomic variables and 
capital structruere. TBT refers to tax-bankruptcy trade-off theory; POT denotes pecking order theory; ST signifies signalling theory. When a theory is silent or when 
there is significant ambiguity regarding the appropriate interpretation, the cell is left blank. The (+/-) sign signifies the possibility that plausible arguments could be 
made for a positive as well as a negative relationship using a given theory. ± denotes the sensitivity of empirical results either to the way the dependent variable is 
defined or country variations. 0 denotes that there were studies which reported support for no relationship between the variable indicated and financing decisions. 
72 
 
 
 
 
Table 2.2: Composition of the sample 
 
  Country   
All 
firms 
  
All firms 
(%) 
Industry 
Egypt 
South 
Africa Botswana Ghana Kenya Mauritius Morocco Nigeria Tunisia 
Non-durables 107 26 1 3 8 9 8 14 3 179 18 
Durables  18 9 1 0 1 1 0 1 1 32 3 
Manufacturing  114 31 0 2 4 1 7 11 3 173 18 
Oil and Gas 7 41 0 0 3 1 4 2 1 59 6 
Chem. & constriction  75 16 0 1 1 0 3 5 4 105 11 
Business equipment  11 35 0 1 0 0 5 2 2 56 6 
Regulated  23 15 0 0 5 2 2 1 2 50 5 
Wholesale & Retail 51 38 6 2 4 7 6 10 3 127 13 
Health  38 5 0 1 0 0 1 6 2 53 5 
Service & other 80 36 3 0 6 4 3 19 3 153 16 
All firms 522 252 11 10 32 25 39 71 24 986 100 
All firms (%) 53 26 1 1 3 3 4 7 2 100   
Notes: The table provides a country-by-country and industry-by-industry composition of the sampled firms. Non-durables (IND1) include industries 
which fall within the following US SIC classifications: 0100-0999, 2000-2399, 2700-2799, 3100-3199, and 3940-3989. Durables (IND2) 
include industries which fall within the following US SIC classifications: 2400*, 2500-2519, 2590-2599, 3630-3659, 3710-3711, 3714-3714, 
3716-3716, 3750-3751, 3792-3792, 3900-3939, and 3990-3999. Manufacturing (IND3) includes industries which fall within the following US 
SIC classifications: 2520-2589, 2600-2699, 2750-2769, 3000-3099, 3200-3569, 3580-3629, 3700-3709, 3712-3713, 3715-3715, 3717-3749, 
3752-3791, 3793-3799, 3830-3839, and 3860-3899. Oil and Gas industry (IND4) includes industries which fall within the following US SIC 
classifications: 1000*, 1400*, 1200-1399, and 2900-2999. Chemical and construction industries (IND5) include industries which fall within 
the following US SIC classifications: 1500*, 1600*, 1700*, 2800-2829, 2840-2899. Business equipment industry (IND6) includes industries 
which fall within the following US SIC classifications: 3570-3579, 3660-3692, 3694-3699, 3810-3829, 7370-7379. Regulatory industries 
(IND7) include industries which fall within the following US SIC classifications: 4000*, 4400*, 4500*, 4600*, 4800-4899, 4900-4949. 
Wholesale and retail industries (IND8) include industries which fall within the following US SIC classifications: 5000-5999, 7200-7299, 
7600-7699. Health industries (IND9) include industries which fall within the following US SIC classifications: 2830-2839, 3693-3693, 3840-
3859, 8000-8099. Service & etc industries (IND10) include all others. 
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Table 2.3  Evolution of firm and country characteristics  
 
Panel A: Descriptive statistics of firm characteristics 
Year 
Firm  
Size 
Earnings  
Volatility Profitability 
Growth  
Opportunities 
Asset  
Tangibility 
Dividend  
Payout 
Tax  
shield 
1999 5.221 0.244 0.274 0.024 0.543 0.293 0.031 
2000 5.108 0.270 0.059 0.034 0.457 0.634 0.030 
2001 5.150 0.274 0.124 0.058 0.390 0.553 0.038 
2002 4.968 0.216 0.086 0.029 0.369 0.675 0.036 
2003 4.961 0.235 0.094 0.056 0.362 0.687 0.036 
2004 4.973 0.219 0.106 0.053 0.348 0.632 0.034 
2005 5.067 0.234 0.118 0.035 0.337 0.584 0.033 
2006 5.170 0.208 0.114 0.078 0.326 0.601 0.031 
2007 5.321 0.225 0.130 0.086 0.322 0.614 0.031 
2008 5.417 0.209 0.122 0.075 0.325 0.613 0.033 
Overall 5.116 0.224 0.112 0.059 0.350 0.619 0.034 
Note: Firm size refers to the average of the natural logarithm total sales. Earnings volatility 
refers to the average of absolute value of first difference of the natural logarithm of 
profit after tax. Profitability refers to the average of the ratio of earnings before 
interest and taxes to total assets. Growth opportunities refer to the average of the first 
difference of the natural logarithm of sales. Asset tangibility refers to the average of 
the ratio of tangible fixed assets to total assets. Dividend payout refers to the average 
of the ratio of cash dividend paid to profit after tax. Tax shield refers to the average of 
the ratio of depreciation, amortization and depletion to total assets. 
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Panel B: Descriptive statistics of institutional and macroeconomics characteristics 
Year 
Total 
Leverage 
Long-term 
Leverage  
Short-term  
Leverage Taxation Inflation 
Size of 
Economy 
Growth of 
Economy 
Size of 
Stock Market 
Liquidity of 
Stock Market 
Size of  
Banking Sector 
Creditor 
Rights 
Shareholder 
Rights 
Rule of 
Law 
1999 0.413 0.099 0.314 35.108 4.098 3.188 2.332 73.484 26.960 0.660 2.384 3.550          . 
2000 0.448 0.100 0.348 34.985 4.213 3.199 2.621 58.206 28.824 0.657 2.384 3.550 -0.077 
2001 0.488 0.121 0.367 34.985 4.821 3.206 1.677 46.577 18.948 0.691 2.384 3.550       . 
2002 0.501 0.115 0.386 34.985 5.363 3.210 1.034 61.606 30.713 0.702 2.384 3.550 -0.102 
2003 0.500 0.109 0.392 34.863 5.797 3.220 2.206 62.971 20.428 0.699 2.384 3.550 -0.125 
2004 0.500 0.112 0.388 34.863 8.252 3.233 3.202 85.285 23.278 0.705 2.384 3.550 -0.036 
2005 0.499 0.115 0.384 34.863 5.530 3.246 2.980 112.525 35.167 0.709 2.384 3.550 -0.030 
2006 0.498 0.121 0.377 34.531 7.001 3.266 4.609 125.792 44.854 0.691 2.384 3.550 -0.099 
2007 0.490 0.131 0.359 23.404 8.021 3.285 4.592 144.504 42.829 0.679 2.384 3.550 -0.119 
2008 0.476 0.139 0.337 23.404 NA NA NA NA 51.166 . 2.384 3.550 -0.100 
Overall 0.493 0.118 0.375 32.599 5.899 3.228 2.806 85.661 32.317 0.688 2.384 3.550 -0.086 
Notes: Total leverage refers to the average of the ratio of total liabilities total assets. Long-term leverage refers to the average of the ratio of non-current liabilities to total assets. 
Short-term leverage denotes the average of the ratio of current liabilities to total assets. Taxation refers to the average of the highest corporate marginal tax rate (%). Inflation refers to 
the average of the consumer price index which is the annual percentage change in the cost to the average consumer of acquiring a fixed basket of goods and services that may be fixed 
or changed at specified intervals, such as yearly. Size of economy is measured by the average of the logarithm of GDP per capita (constant 2000 US$). Growth of Economy denotes the 
average of the logarithm of GDP per capita growth (constant 2000 US$). Size of stock market refers to the average of the value of listed shares to GDP, calculated using the following 
deflation  method:  {(0.5)*[Ft/P_et + Ft-1/P_et-1]}/[GDPt/P_at] where F is stock market capitalization, P_e is end-of period CPI, and P_a  is average annual CPI. Liquidity of stock 
market refers to the average of ratio of the value of total shares traded to average real market capitalization, the denominator is deflated using the following method:  
Tt/P_at/{(0.5)*[Mt/P_et + Mt-1/P_et-1] where T is total value traded, M is stock market capitalization, P_e is end-of period CPI P_a is average annual CPI. Size of banking sector 
denotes the average of Claims on domestic real nonfinancial sector by deposit money banks as a share of GDP, calculated using the following deflation method:  {(0.5)*[Ft/P_et + Ft-
1/P_et-1]}/[GDPt/P_at] where F is deposit money bank claims, P_e is end-of period CPI, and P_a is average annual CPI. Creditor rights protection index refers to an index aggregating 
creditor rights, following La Porta and others (1998).  A score of one is assigned when each of the following rights of secured lenders is defined in laws and regulations:  First, there are 
restrictions, such as creditor consent or minimum dividends, for a debtor to file for reorganization. Second, secured creditors are able to seize their collateral after the reorganization 
petition is approved, i.e. there is no "automatic stay" or "asset freeze."  Third, secured creditors are paid first out of the proceeds of liquidating a bankrupt firm, as opposed to other 
creditors such as government or workers.  Finally, if management does not retain administration of its property pending the resolution of the reorganization.   The index ranges from 0 
(weak creditor rights) to 4 (strong creditor rights) and is constructed as at January for every year from 1978 to 2003. Shareholder rights protection index refers to an index of Anti-
director rights is formed by adding one when: (1) the country allows shareholders to mail their proxy vote; (2) shareholders are not required to deposit their shares prior to the General 
Shareholders= Meeting; (3) cumulative voting or proportional representation of minorities on the board of directors is allowed; (4) an oppressed minorities mechanism is in place; (5) 
the minimum percentage of share capital that entitles a shareholder to call for an Extraordinary Shareholders= Meeting is less than or equal to ten per cent (the sample median); or (6) 
when shareholders have pre-emptive rights that can only be waived by a shareholders meeting. The range for the index is from zero to six. 
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Table 2.4  Summary statistics of leverage by sub-samples 
 
Panel A: Summary statistics of measures of capital structure by industry 
 
Short-term leverage 
 
Long-term leverage 
 
Total leverage 
 
Mean SD* Obs# 
 
Mean SD* Obs# 
 
Mean SD* Obs# 
Non-durables 0.345 0.209 1006 
 
0.109 0.159 1055 
 
0.467 0.288 1011 
Durables 0.342 0.178 167 
 
0.088 0.115 170 
 
0.432 0.212 167 
Manufacturing  0.357 0.194 921 
 
0.124 0.176 958 
 
0.482 0.245 922 
Oil & Gas 0.265 0.233 385 
 
0.197 0.206 383 
 
0.477 0.321 386 
Chem. & Construction 0.445 0.224 523 
 
0.108 0.164 536 
 
0.555 0.230 523 
Business  Equipment 0.429 0.243 346 
 
0.078 0.105 350 
 
0.526 0.316 346 
Regulated  0.367 0.200 304 
 
0.182 0.194 310 
 
0.546 0.226 305 
Wholesale & Retail 0.428 0.229 697 
 
0.095 0.119 748 
 
0.545 0.309 705 
Health 0.352 0.189 283 
 
0.074 0.138 294 
 
0.435 0.232 283 
Service & Others 0.318 0.226 814 
 
0.132 0.160 862 
 
0.462 0.293 814 
*  SD = standard deviation; # Obs = number of observations 
 
Panel B: Summary statistics of measures of capital structure by country 
  Short-term leverage 
 
Long-term leverage 
 
Total-leverage 
 
Mean SD* Obs# 
 
Mean SD* Obs# 
 
Mean SD* Obs# 
Egypt 0.377 0.235 2685 
 
0.083 0.149 2702 
 
0.471 0.296 2697 
South Africa 0.349 0.199 1664 
 
0.167 0.176 1663 
 
0.523 0.261 1665 
Botswana 0.291 0.173 74 
 
0.151 0.167 74 
 
0.442 0.167 74 
Ghana 0.483 0.249 52 
 
0.085 0.169 54 
 
0.608 0.418 53 
Kenya 0.309 0.186 150 
 
0.200 0.157 163 
 
0.509 0.202 151 
Mauritius 0.286 0.188 173 
 
0.181 0.113 173 
 
0.467 0.211 173 
Morocco 0.356 0.182 288 
 
0.085 0.121 289 
 
0.441 0.221 288 
Nigeria 0.504 0.256 184 
 
0.098 0.155 371 
 
0.649 0.298 185 
Tunisia 0.319 0.182 176 
 
0.155 0.147 177 
 
0.475 0.241 176 
*  SD = standard deviation; # Obs = number of observations 
 
Panel C: Summary statistics of measures of capital structure by legal origin  
  Short-term leverage  Long-term leverage  Total -leverage 
 
Mean SD* Obs#  Mean SD Obs.  Mean SD Obs 
Common law 0.367 0.210 3322  0.092 0.174 3341  0.468 0.266 3334 
Civil law 0.361 0.228 2122  0.156 0.148 2325  0.533 0.284 2128 
 
Panel D: Summary statistics of measures of capital structure by income group  
  Short-term leverage  Long-term leverage  Total -leverage 
 
Mean SD* Obs#  Mean SD Obs.  Mean SD Obs 
Upper-middle-income countries 0.341 0.198 1911  0.168 0.171 1910  0.515 0.254 1912 
Lower-middle-income countries 0.372 0.229 3149  0.088 0.148 3168  0.469 0.287 3161 
Low income countries 0.425 0.248 388  0.125 0.163 588  0.589 0.292 389 
Notes:  The table presents a summary of descriptive statistics by industry, by, country, by legal origin and by 
income group. Common law refers to countries that had adopted their legal codes from the English 
common law tradition. Civil law refers to countries that had adopted their legal codes from the French civil 
law tradition. Classification of countries into income groups is based on the World Banks classification of 
countries as upper-middle-income, lower-middle-income, and low-income countries. 
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Table 2.5: Leverage Ratios Reported in Cheng and Shiu, 2007 
 
No. of  
Firms Time Period 
Total 
Leverage 
Long Term  
Leverage 
Developed Countries  
Greece NA 1998-2001 0.4691 0.0602 
Hong Kong NA 1998-2001 0.4215 0.0899 
Germany NA 1998-2001 0.6048 0.0966 
Singapore NA 1998-2001 0.4656 0.1028 
Italy NA 1998-2001 0.5859 0.1073 
UK NA 1998-2001 0.5150 0.1103 
Taiwan NA 1998-2001 0.4188 0.1121 
Spain NA 1998-2001 0.5356 0.1152 
Austria NA 1998-2001 0.6101 0.1218 
Japan NA 1998-2001 0.5858 0.1233 
France NA 1998-2001 0.6150 0.1239 
Isreal NA 1998-2001 0.4613 0.1251 
The Netherlands NA 1998-2001 0.6055 0.1270 
Portungal NA 1998-2001 0.5652 0.1359 
Belgium NA 1998-2001 0.5993 0.1387 
Sweden NA 1998-2001 0.5208 0.1429 
Denmark NA 1998-2001 0.5526 0.1447 
Australia NA 1998-2001 0.4215 0.1451 
Ireland NA 1998-2001 0.4743 0.1697 
Switzerland NA 1998-2001 0.5542 0.1735 
Finland NA 1998-2001 0.5160 0.1796 
Indonesia NA 1998-2001 0.6685 0.1960 
Canada NA 1998-2001 0.4639 0.2052 
USA NA 1998-2001 0.5834 0.2094 
South Korea NA 1998-2001 0.6620 0.2131 
New Zealand NA 1998-2001 0.4843 0.2470 
Norway NA 1998-2001 0.5562 0.2494 
Other Developing Countries  
Turkey NA 1998-2001 0.5237 0.0714 
Zimbabwe NA 1998-2001 0.4994 0.0778 
Venezuela NA 1998-2001 0.3180 0.0908 
Sri Lanka NA 1998-2001 0.4513 0.0943 
Colombia NA 1998-2001 0.3327 0.0949 
Malaysia NA 1998-2001 0.5187 0.1158 
Peru NA 1998-2001 0.4482 0.1199 
Argentina NA 1998-2001 0.4772 0.1425 
Chile NA 1998-2001 0.3953 0.1447 
Philippines NA 1998-2001 0.4634 0.1484 
Brazil NA 1998-2001 0.5760 0.1504 
Jordan NA 1998-2001 0.3394 0.1566 
Mexico NA 1998-2001 0.4733 0.1633 
Pakistan NA 1998-2001 0.6291 0.1779 
Thailand NA 1998-2001 0.6197 0.1870 
India NA 1998-2001 0.5687 0.2168 
 
Source: Cheng and Shiu (2007). “Investor protection and capital structure: International evidence.” Journal of 
Multinational Financial Management 17(1): 30-44.
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Table 2.6: Summary statistics of independent variables by country  
 
Panel A: Summary of Country Characteristics 
Notes:  The table presents average values for country level characteristics. All variables are averaged over the period 1999 – 
2008. The exact definition of the variables is as in table 2.3.  
 
Source: Data on country specific variables were obtained from World Development, Financial Structure Database of the World 
Bank, Berkowitz et al. (2003), Kaufmann et al. (2009) and the personal webpage of Andrei Shelifer.  
  
Panel B: Summary of Firm Characteristics by Country 
Country 
 
Statistic 
Firm 
Size 
Earnings 
Volatility Profitability 
Growth 
Opport. 
Asset 
Tangibility 
Dividend 
Payout 
Tax 
Shield 
Egypt Mean 4.912 0.220 0.095 0.055 0.362 0.714 0.030 
 
Median  4.903 0.132 0.086 0.052 0.328 0.567 0.024 
 
St. Dev 0.816 0.246 0.189 0.191 0.254 0.898 0.027 
 
Observation 2686 1784 2706 2155 2702 1570 2427 
South Africa Mean 5.343 0.241 0.123 0.072 0.278 0.462 0.037 
 
Median  5.520 0.163 0.119 0.061 0.206 0.262 0.032 
 
St. Dev 1.187 0.238 0.569 0.233 0.232 0.981 0.029 
 
Observation 1629 1053 1655 1357 1621 211 1401 
Botswana Mean 5.112 0.235 0.171 0.070 0.248 0.665 0.035 
 
Median  4.934 0.127 0.134 0.059 0.240 0.466 0.030 
 
St. Dev 0.678 0.265 0.163 0.213 0.178 0.805 0.030 
 
Observation 73 53 74 62 74 30 44 
Ghana Mean 4.428 0.229 0.099 0.120 0.428 0.258 0.036 
 
Median  4.545 0.154 0.110 0.103 0.367 0.158 0.033 
 
St. Dev 1.513 0.203 0.181 0.086 0.256 0.303 0.037 
 
Observation 54 28 54 33 53 41 48 
Kenya Mean 5.322 0.184 0.121 0.054 0.410 0.487 0.036 
 
Median  5.665 0.123 0.102 0.054 0.369 0.341 0.033 
 
St. Dev 1.060 0.194 0.140 0.142 0.220 0.634 0.025 
 
Observation 163 114 159 135 149 88 116 
Mauritius Mean 5.514 0.203 0.081 0.040 0.490 0.554 0.040 
 
Median  5.841 0.125 0.069 0.043 0.502 0.421 0.029 
 
St. Dev 1.021 0.223 0.076 0.092 0.187 0.560 0.035 
 
Observation 173 122 168 144 142 42 63 
Morocco Mean 5.405 0.204 0.104 0.047 0.271 0.587 0.044 
 
Median  5.563 0.125 0.086 0.044 0.242 0.473 0.036 
 
St. Dev 0.943 0.238 0.093 0.140 0.205 0.587 0.032 
 
Observation 289 231 289 250 280 130 286 
Nigeria Mean 5.449 0.234 0.206 0.056 0.600 0.248 0.018 
 
Median  5.612 0.175 0.126 0.067 0.530 0.000 0.000 
 
St. Dev 0.971 0.230 0.629 0.201 0.354 0.597 0.026 
 
Observation 379 228 371 326 340 245 265 
Tunisia Mean 4.566 0.188 0.077 0.040 0.327 0.693 0.054 
 
Median  4.604 0.107 0.083 0.026 0.311 0.576 0.050 
 
St. Dev 0.532 0.213 0.066 0.092 0.154 0.677 0.028 
 
Observation 177 115 177 153 177 91 162 
Notes:  The table presents mean (median in parenthesis) values for firm characteristics and number of observations for 
the sample countries. All variables are averaged over the period 1999 – 2008, in which data are required to be 
available at least for three years. The exact definition of the variables is as in table 2.3.  
 
 
Country Taxation Inflation 
Size of 
overall 
Economy 
Growth 
rate of 
Real GDP 
Income 
Group 
Stock 
market  
size 
Stock 
market 
liquidity 
Size of 
banking 
sector 
Creditor 
Rights 
Share- 
holder 
Rights 
Rule 
of Law Origin 
Egypt 36.00 5.38 3.20 2.91 LMI 53.74 32.97 0.78 2.00 3.00 -0.04 0.00 
South Africa 29.50 5.31 3.51 2.53 UMI 201.47 48.02 0.73 3.00 5.00 0.12 1.00 
Botswana 15.00 8.26 3.60 4.40 UMI 27.01 3.21 0.18 3.00 3.50 0.62 1.00 
Ghana 29.90 17.93 2.43 2.82 LI 16.56 3.07 0.24 1.00 5.00 -0.10 1.00 
Kenya 30.30 8.82 2.62 1.15 LI 25.79 7.35 0.33 4.00 2.00 -0.95 1.00 
Mauritius 23.00 6.03 3.62 3.36 UMI 42.15 6.65 0.84 2.25 3.50 0.85 0.00 
Morocco 35.00 1.66 3.17 2.93 LMI 44.57 18.76 0.64 1.00 2.00 -0.03 0.00 
Nigeria 25.00 11.76 2.61 2.92 LI 17.88 14.05 0.18 4.00 4.00 -1.31 1.00 
Tunisia 31.34 2.92 3.35 3.93 LMI 12.00 17.44 0.62 0.00 3.00 0.20 0.00 
 
21.06 6.38 2.38 2.39 NA 20.66 7.84 0.34 1.56 2.48 -0.08 NA 
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Table 2.7: Correlation Matrices 
Panel A: Leverage and firm characteristics 
 
Total 
leverage 
Long-term 
leverage 
Short-term 
leverage Firm Size 
Earnings 
Volatility Profit. 
Growth 
Opprtun. 
Asset 
Tangibility 
Div. 
Pay 
Tax 
Shield 
Total 
leverage 1.000 *** 0.436 *** 0.744 *** 0.104 *** 0.030 * -0.085 *** -0.002 
 
-0.085 *** -0.095 *** -0.009 
 Long-term 
leverage 0.436 *** 1.000 *** -0.181 *** 0.023 * 0.061 *** -0.052 *** 0.055 *** 0.230 *** -0.099 *** 0.130 *** 
Short-term 
leverage 0.744 *** -0.181 *** 1.000 *** 0.120 *** -0.008 
 
-0.039 *** -0.019 
 
-0.309 *** -0.039 * -0.096 *** 
Notes: The table reports the correlation coefficients between the three measures of leverage and firm-specific variables. Correlation coefficients that are significantly different from 
zero at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level are marked with ***, **, and *, respectively. The exact definition of the variables is as presented in Table 2.3. 
 
 Panel B: Leverage and country variables 
 
Taxation Inflation 
Size of 
Economy 
Grwth of 
Economy 
Size of  
Stk Mkt 
Liq. of  
Stk Mkt 
Size of 
 Bnk'g 
Creditor 
rights 
Sharehol 
rights 
Rule of 
Law 
Total leverage  -0.026 * 0.043 *** -0.033 ** 0.019 
 
0.049 *** 0.000 
 
-0.081 *** 0.100 *** 0.097 *** -0.075 *** 
Long-term leverage 0.052 *** -0.037 *** 0.122 *** 0.045 *** 0.155 *** 0.068 *** -0.032 ** 0.123 *** 0.168 *** 0.049 *** 
Short-term leverage -0.130 *** 0.068 *** -0.114 *** -0.019 
 
-0.050 *** -0.049 *** -0.042 *** 0.012 
 
-0.011 
 
-0.111 *** 
Notes: The table reports the correlation coefficients between the three measures of leverage and macroeconomic and institutional variables. 
Correlation coefficients that are significantly different from zero at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level are marked with ***, **, and *, 
respectively. The exact definition of the variables is as presented in Table 2.3. 
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Panel C: Pairwise correlation analysis of independent variables 
 
Firm Size 
[1] 
Earnings 
Volatility 
[2] 
Profit. 
[3] 
Growth 
Opprt. 
[4] 
Asset 
Tang. 
[5] 
Div. 
Pay 
[6] 
Tax 
Shield 
[7] 
Taxation 
[8] 
Inflation 
[9] 
Size of 
Economy 
[10] 
Grwth of 
Economy 
[11] 
Size of 
Stk Mkt 
[12] 
Liq. of 
Stk Mkt 
[13] 
Size of 
Bnk'g 
[14] 
Creditor 
Rights 
[15] 
Shareholder 
Rights 
[16] 
Rule of 
Law 
[17] 
[1] 1.000 *** 
                               
[2] -0.044 *** 1.000 *** 
                             
[3] 0.077 *** -0.011 
 
1.000 *** 
                           
[4] 0.111 *** 0.077 *** 0.124 *** 1.000 *** 
                         
[5] -0.020 
 
-0.009 
 
0.016 
 
0.018 
 
1.000 *** 
                       
[6] -0.031 
 
0.134 *** -0.040 ** -0.121 *** -0.015 ** 1.000 *** 
                     
[7] 0.029 ** -0.020 
 
-0.010 
 
0.003 
 
0.288 *** 0.045 ** 1.000 *** 
                   
[8] -0.186 *** 0.006 
 
-0.050 *** -0.039 *** -0.042 *** 0.090 *** -0.005 
 
1.000 *** 
                 
[9] 0.023 * -0.011 
 
0.034 ** 0.048 *** 0.169 *** -0.115 *** -0.117 *** -0.394 *** 1.000 *** 
               
[10] 0.034 ** 0.022 
 
-0.031 ** 0.018 
 
-0.258 *** 0.127 *** 0.128 *** -0.070 *** -0.398 *** 1.000 *** 
             
[11] 0.081 *** -0.024 
 
0.008 
 
0.041 *** -0.072 *** -0.008 
 
0.006 
 
-0.235 *** 0.150 *** 0.106 *** 1.000 *** 
           
[12] 0.145 *** 0.041 ** 0.029 ** 0.057 *** -0.196 *** -0.019 
 
0.023 
 
-0.347 *** -0.051 *** 0.649 *** 0.161 *** 1.000 *** 
         
[13] 0.092 *** 0.022 
 
0.008 
 
0.029 ** -0.152 *** 0.034 * 0.010 
 
-0.213 *** -0.026 ** 0.513 *** 0.363 *** 0.696 *** 1.000 *** 
       
[14] -0.096 *** 0.011 
 
-0.068 *** 0.001 
 
-0.188 *** 0.157 *** 0.042 *** 0.533 *** -0.475 *** 0.669 *** -0.053 *** 0.245 *** 0.330 *** 1.000 *** 
     
[15] 0.178 *** 0.034 ** 0.061 *** 0.026 * 0.078 *** -0.124 *** -0.101 *** -0.384 *** 0.350 *** -0.200 *** -0.135 *** 0.325 *** 0.062 *** -0.532 *** 1.000 *** 
   
[16] 0.127 *** 0.052 *** 0.033 ** 0.044 *** -0.084 *** -0.111 *** 0.028 ** -0.346 *** 0.125 *** 0.435 *** -0.041 *** 0.747 *** 0.388 *** -0.073 *** 0.515 *** 1.000 *** 
 
[17] -0.035 ** 0.021 
 
-0.011 
 
0.005 
 
-0.176 *** 0.097 *** 0.096 *** 0.129 *** -0.457 *** 0.852 *** -0.080 *** 0.338 *** 0.217 *** 0.769 *** -0.516 *** 0.144 *** 1.000 *** 
Notes: The table reports the Pairwise correlation coefficients between the independent variables. Correlation coefficients that are significantly different from zero at the 1%, 5%, and 10% 
level are marked with ***, **, and *, respectively. The exact definitions of the variables is as presented in Table 2.3.  
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Table 2.8: Firm characteristics and capital structure 
 Panel A: Dependent Variable - Short Term Leverage   
 
OLS 
 
RE FE GMM SUR 
Earnings Volatility -0.018   -0.022 * -0.014   -0.015  -0.022   
Firm Size 0.034 *** 0.040 *** 0.103 *** 0.010 * 0.037 *** 
Profitability -0.143 ** -0.150 *** -0.178 *** -0.040 * -0.126 *** 
Growth Opportunities 0.038 
 
0.020 
 
-0.010 
 
-0.004  0.038 
 Asset Tangibility -0.285 *** -0.162 *** -0.054 
 
-0.087 * -0.282 *** 
Dividend Payout -0.007 
 
0.004 
 
0.004 
 
0.011  -0.007 
 Tax Shield -0.183 
 
-0.388 ** -0.495 ** -0.599 ** -0.193 
 Constant 0.296 *** 0.216 *** -0.157   0.241 *** 0.247 *** 
F-statistic 17.04 *** - 
 
3.54 ***   - 
 Chi2  - 
 
37337.12 *** - 
 
129.81 *** 339.45 *** 
Hausman Test - 
 
58.28 *** 58.28 ***   - 
 N 1695   1695   1695   1662  1695   
 
 
Panel B: Dependent Variable – Long Term Leverage 
 
OLS RE FE GMM  SUR 
Earnings Volatility 0.043 *** 0.016   0.011   0.002  0.049 *** 
Firm Size 0.007 
 
0.008 
 
0.011 
 
-0.010  0.006 * 
Profitability -0.096 ** -0.127 *** -0.135 *** -0.022  -0.110 *** 
Growth Opportunities 0.015 
 
-0.001 
 
-0.002 
 
-0.005  0.009 
 Asset Tangibility 0.171 *** 0.135 *** 0.091 ** 0.012  0.175 *** 
Dividend Payout -0.019 *** -0.009 *** -0.007 ** 0.007  -0.020 *** 
Tax Shield 0.343 
 
-0.113 
 
-0.238 
 
-0.639 * 0.295 ** 
Constant -0.003   0.027   0.022   0.016  -0.003   
F-statistic 14.7 *** - 
 
2.04 ***     - 
 Chi2  - 
 
85.73 *** - 
 
 413.53 ***  340.12 *** 
Hausman Test - 
 
12.13 
 
12.13 
 
    - 
 N 1743   1743   1743    1725   1743   
 
 Panel C: Dependent Variable – Total Leverage 
 OLS   RE   FE   GMM   SUR   
Earnings Volatility 0.027   -0.005   0.001   -0.010  0.027   
Firm Size 0.045 *** 0.055 *** 0.136 *** -0.017  0.046 *** 
Profitability -0.217 *** -0.276 *** -0.317 *** -0.101 * -0.217 *** 
Growth Opportunities 0.043 
 
0.010 
 
-0.028 
 
-0.024  0.041 
 Asset Tangibility -0.090 ** 0.012 
 
0.079 
 
-0.006  -0.089 *** 
Dividend Payout -0.027 *** -0.005 
 
-0.003 
 
0.018  -0.027 *** 
Tax Shield 0.013 
 
-0.615 *** -0.790 *** -0.872 * 0.023 
 Constant 0.268 *** 0.195 *** -0.260   0.194 * 0.252 *** 
F-statistic 6.35 *** - 
 
3.2 ***     - 
 Chi2  - 
 
58981.04 *** - 
 
 169.08 ***  121.67 *** 
Hausman Test - 
 
21.94 
 
21.94 
 
    - 
 N 1696  1696  1696   1664   1696 
 Notes: The table reports the regression results for short-term, long-term and total leverage using Ordinary Least 
Square, Random Effects, Fixed Effects, Generalized Method of Moments and Seemingly Unrelated 
Regression. The parameter estimates that are significantly different from zero at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level are 
marked with ***, **, and *, respectively. The exact definition of the variables is as presented in Table 2.3.  
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Table 2.9: Firm characteristics, Industry Classifications and Capital Structure 
Panel A: Short-term Leverage OLS   RE  FE  GMM SUR 
Earnings Volatility -0.016 
 
-0.022 * -0.014 
 
-0.018  -0.021 
 Firm Size 0.031 *** 0.038 *** 0.103 *** 0.029  0.034 *** 
Profitability -0.128 * -0.144 *** -0.178 *** -0.027 * -0.110 *** 
Growth Opportunities 0.029 
 
0.019 
 
-0.009 
 
-0.010  0.029 
 Asset Tangibility -0.247 *** -0.139 *** -0.054 
 
-0.060 ** -0.245 *** 
Dividend Payout -0.007 
 
0.004 
 
0.004 
 
0.010  -0.007 
 Tax Shield -0.134 
 
-0.395 ** -0.495 ** -0.687 * -0.144 
 Non-durables  -0.004   0.001   -   -0.022  -0.005   
Durables  0.000 
 
0.026 
 
- 
 
0.127  -0.001 
 Oil and Gas  -0.001 
 
-0.003 
 
- 
 
0.001  0.000 
 Chem. & Construction  0.058 ** 0.059 ** - 
 
-0.031  0.057 *** 
Business Equipment  0.023 
 
0.067 
 
- 
 
-0.022  0.023 
 Regulated  0.006 
 
0.029 
 
- 
 
0.058  0.009 
 Wholesale & Retail 0.065 ** 0.081 *** - 
 
0.054 * 0.065 *** 
Health -0.008 
 
0.017 
 
- 
 
0.002  -0.010 
 Service & etc -0.034 
 
-0.009 
 
- 
 
-0.024 8 -0.030 ** 
Constant 0.286 *** 0.198 *** -0.157 
 
0.257 * 0.238 *** 
F-statistic 8.460 *** - 
 
3.540 *** 
 
  - 
 Chi2  - 
 
39328 *** - 
 
177.67  *** 394.4 *** 
Hausman Test - 
 
38.160 *** 38.160 *** 
 
  - 
 N 1695  1695   1695    1662   1695  
 
Panel B: Long term Leverage OLS RE FE GMM SUR 
Earnings Volatility 0.046 *** 0.016 
 
0.011 
 
-0.006  0.052 *** 
Firm Size 0.009 
 
0.010 
 
0.011 
 
-0.007  0.008 ** 
Profitability -0.105 *** -0.130 *** -0.135 *** -0.020 * -0.117 *** 
Growth Opportunities 0.014 
 
-0.002 
 
-0.002 
 
-0.006  0.008 
 Asset Tangibility 0.179 *** 0.134 *** 0.091 ** 0.009 * 0.184 *** 
Dividend Payout -0.017 *** -0.009 *** -0.006 ** 0.006  -0.018 *** 
Tax Shield 0.285 
 
-0.134 
 
-0.238 
 
-0.626 * 0.234 ** 
Non-durables  0.003   0.000   -   -0.025  0.005   
Durables  -0.007 
 
0.014 
 
- 
 
-0.049  -0.007 
 Oil and Gas  0.046 ** 0.061 *** - 
 
0.029 * 0.045 *** 
Chem. & Construction  0.015 
 
0.009 
 
- 
 
-0.031  0.016 
 Business Equipment  -0.007 
 
-0.016 
 
- 
 
-0.038  -0.007 
 Regulated  0.088 *** 0.091 *** - 
 
-0.011  0.087 *** 
Wholesale & Retail 0.014 
 
0.005 
 
- 
 
0.004  0.016 
 Health 0.002 
 
0.001 
 
- 
 
-0.008  0.004 
 Service & etc -0.004 
 
0.006 
 
- 
 
0.009  -0.005 
 Constant -0.026 
 
0.004 
 
0.022 
 
0.068  0.002 
 F-statistic 8.980 *** - 
 
2.040 ***   - 
 Chi2  - 
 
119.2 *** - 
 
474.02 *** 424.78 *** 
Hausman Test - 
 
13.550 
 
13.550 
 
  - 
 N 1743  1743  1743  1725  1743  
 
Panel C:Total Leverage OLS  RE  FE GMM SUR  
Earnings Volatility 0.031 
 
-0.005 
 
0.000 
 
-0.009  0.031 
 Firm Size 0.045 *** 0.056 *** 0.136 *** -0.011  0.046 *** 
Profitability -0.208 ** -0.272 *** -0.317 *** -0.121 * -0.206 *** 
Growth Opportunities 0.033 
 
0.008 
 
-0.028 
 
-0.023  0.033 
 Asset Tangibility -0.041 
 
0.032 
 
0.079 
 
0.003  -0.042 * 
Dividend Payout -0.026 *** -0.005 
 
-0.003 
 
0.016  -0.025 *** 
Tax Shield -0.006 
 
-0.641 *** -0.790 *** -0.680 * 0.002 
 Non-durables  -0.002   -0.003   -   -0.069 * -0.001   
Durables  -0.003 
 
0.043 
 
- 
 
0.027  -0.005 
 Oil and Gas  0.041 
 
0.056 
 
- 
 
0.010  0.041 
 Chem. & Construction  0.079 ** 0.074 ** - 
 
0.002  0.078 *** 
Business Equipment  0.025 
 
0.065 
 
- 
 
-0.086  0.023 
 Regulated  0.095 ** 0.124 *** - 
 
0.027  0.095 *** 
Wholesale & Retail 0.073 ** 0.081 ** - 
 
0.101 * 0.073 *** 
Health -0.004 
 
0.020 
 
- 
 
-0.049  -0.005 
 Service & etc -0.042 
 
-0.005 
 
- 
 
-0.041  -0.040 ** 
Constant 0.231 *** 0.153 ** -0.260 
 
0.210 * 0.215 *** 
F-statistic 4.550 *** - 
 
3.200 *** 
 
  - 
 Chi2  - 
 
61334 *** - 
 
347.33 ***  199.14 *** 
Hausman Test - 
 
18.290 
 
18.290 
  
  
  N 1696  1696  1696   1664   1696  
Notes: The table reports the regression results for short-term, long-term and total leverage using Ordinary Least Square, Random Effects, 
Fixed Effects, Generalized Method of Moments and Seemingly Unrelated Regression. The parameter estimates that are significantly 
different from zero at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level are marked with ***, **, and *, respectively. The exact definition of the variables 
is as presented in Table 2.3.  
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Table 2.10: Firm characteristics, industry and country dummies and capital structure 
 Panel A: Dependent Variable – Short term Leverage 
 
OLS RE FE GMM SUR 
Earnings Volatility -0.023 
 
-0.022 * -0.014 
 
-0.008 
 
-0.025 
 Firm Size 0.029 *** 0.038 *** 0.103 *** 0.019 ** 0.032 *** 
Profitability -0.132 ** -0.144 *** -0.178 *** -0.010 * -0.117 *** 
Growth Opportunities 0.021 
 
0.017 
 
-0.009 
 
-0.001 
 
0.020 
 Asset Tangibility -0.262 *** -0.146 *** -0.054 
 
-0.049 * -0.260 *** 
Dividend Payout -0.006 
 
0.004 
 
0.004 
 
0.014 * -0.006 
 Tax Shield 0.049 
 
-0.345 * -0.495 *** -0.448 
 
0.031 
 Non-durables  -0.011  -0.004   -   -0.053 
 
-0.011  
Durables  0.011 
 
0.033 
 
- 
 
0.131 
 
0.010 
 Oil and Gas  0.015 
 
0.008 
 
- 
 
0.005 
 
0.012 
 Chem. & Construction  0.060 ** 0.061 ** - 
 
-0.040 
 
0.060 *** 
Business Equipment  0.046 
 
0.083 * - 
 
-0.005 
 
0.044 * 
Regulated  0.011 
 
0.042 
 
- 
 
-0.042 
 
0.013 
 Wholesale & Retail 0.067 ** 0.082 *** - 
 
0.074 * 0.067 *** 
Health -0.008 
 
0.015 
 
- 
 
-0.053 
 
-0.009 
 Service & etc -0.039 * -0.013 
 
- 
 
-0.033 * -0.036 ** 
Egypt 0.034   0.021  -  0.116 ** 0.029 * 
Botswana -0.050 
 
-0.021 
 
- 
 
0.141 
 
-0.053 
 Ghana 0.054 
 
0.071 
 
- 
 
0.131 
 
0.056 
 Kenya 0.055 
 
0.031 
 
- 
 
0.060 
 
0.052 ** 
Mauritius 0.035 
 
-0.036 
 
- 
 
0.239 * 0.032 
 Morocco -0.007 
 
-0.022 
 
- 
 
0.114 
 
-0.012 
 Nigeria 0.174 *** 0.142 *** - 
 
0.128 * 0.168 *** 
Tunisia -0.027 
 
-0.018 
 
- 
 
0.245 ** -0.025 
 Constant 0.258 *** 0.174 ** -0.157 
 
0.110 
 
0.230 *** 
F-statistic 7.780 *** - 
 
3.540 *** 
  
- 
 Chi2  - 
 
40577 *** - 
 
155.81 *** 491.42 *** 
Hausman Test - 
 
37.460 *** 37.460 *** 
  
- 
 N 1695  1695   1695   1662
 
1695  
 
 
 Panel B: Dependent Variable  - Long term Leverage 
 
OLS RE FE GMM SUR 
Earnings Volatility 0.044 *** 0.016 
 
0.011 
 
-0.015 
 
0.048 *** 
Firm Size 0.002 
 
0.000 
 
0.011 
 
-0.008 
 
0.001  
Profitability -0.120 *** -0.132 *** -0.135 *** -0.031 * -0.128 *** 
Growth Opportunities 0.014 
 
0.001 
 
-0.002 
 
-0.010 
 
0.009  
Asset Tangibility 0.178 *** 0.140 *** 0.091 ** 0.013 ** 0.182 *** 
Dividend Payout -0.014 *** -0.008 *** -0.006 ** 0.004 
 
-0.014 *** 
Tax Shield 0.197 
 
-0.165 
 
-0.238 
 
-0.606 * 0.160  
Non-durables  -0.002  -0.004  -  -0.043 
 
0.000   
Durables  -0.020 
 
-0.001 
 
- 
 
-0.042 
 
-0.019  
Oil and Gas  0.002 
 
0.014 
 
- 
 
-0.010 
 
0.002  
Chem. & Construction  0.017 
 
0.011 
 
- 
 
-0.043 
 
0.018 * 
Business Equipment  -0.036 ** -0.051 *** - 
 
-0.092 * -0.034 ** 
Regulated  0.067 *** 0.062 ** - 
 
-0.039 
 
0.068 *** 
Wholesale and Retail -0.007 
 
-0.020 
 
- 
 
-0.030 
 
-0.006  
Health 0.003 
 
0.004 
 
- 
 
-0.050 
 
0.005  
Service & etc -0.018 
 
-0.006 
 
- 
 
-0.033 * -0.019 ** 
Egypt -0.105 *** -0.115 *** -  -0.031 ** -0.102 *** 
Botswana -0.025 
 
-0.018 
 
- 
 
0.164 
 
-0.024  
Ghana -0.118 *** -0.120 *** - 
 
0.011 
 
-0.120 *** 
Kenya -0.014 
 
-0.018 
 
- 
 
0.044 
 
-0.014  
Mauritius -0.008 
 
0.006 
 
- 
 
0.128 
 
-0.007  
Morocco -0.096 *** -0.084 *** - 
 
-0.034 * -0.085 *** 
Nigeria -0.070 *** -0.068 *** - 
 
0.012 
 
-0.049 *** 
Tunisia -0.058 ** -0.052 * - 
 
-0.008 * -0.058 *** 
Constant 0.111 ** 0.153 *** 0.022 
 
0.161 
 
0.126 *** 
F-statistic 10.640 *** - 
 
2.040 *** 
  
-  
Chi2  - 
 
236.08 *** - 
 
753.97 *** 629.64 *** 
Hausman Test - 
 
13.190 
 
13.390 
   
-  
N 1743  1743  1743  1725
 
1743   
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Table 2.10: (con’d…) 
  
 Panel C: Dependent Variable – Total Leverage 
 
OLS RE FE GMM SUR 
Earnings Volatility 0.022 
 
-0.006 
 
0.000 
 
-0.005 
 
0.022 
 
Firm Size 0.036 *** 0.047 *** 0.136 *** -0.002 
 
0.037 *** 
Profitability -0.224 *** -0.272 *** -0.317 *** -0.135 * -0.220 *** 
Growth Opportunities 0.022 
 
0.009 
 
-0.028 
 
-0.018 
 
0.021 
 
Asset Tangibility -0.057 
 
0.027 
 
0.079 
 
0.028 
 
-0.057 ** 
Dividend Payout -0.021 *** -0.004 
 
-0.003 
 
0.016 
 
-0.021 *** 
Tax Shield 0.075 
 
-0.621 *** -0.790 *** -0.551 
 
0.077 
 
Non-durables  -0.014   -0.011   -   -0.097 
 
-0.014   
Durables  -0.005 
 
0.037 
 
- 
 
0.005 
 
-0.005 
 
Oil and Gas  0.017 
 
0.022 
 
- 
 
0.026 
 
0.016 
 
Chem. & Construction  0.083 ** 0.078 ** - 
 
-0.004 
 
0.082 *** 
Business Equipment  0.021 
 
0.047 
 
- 
 
-0.151 
 
0.020 
 
Regulated  0.083 * 0.110 *** - 
 
-0.068 
 
0.083 *** 
Wholesale & Retail 0.051 
 
0.054 
 
- 
 
0.104 * 0.052 *** 
Health -0.003 
 
0.020 
 
- 
 
-0.103 
 
-0.003 
 Service & etc -0.061 ** -0.022 
 
- 
 
-0.072 * -0.060 *** 
Egypt -0.062 ** -0.088 *** -   0.080 
 
-0.063 *** 
Botswana -0.056 
 
-0.023 
 
- 
 
0.474 
 
-0.057 
 
Ghana -0.050 
 
-0.037 
 
- 
 
0.132 
 
-0.050 
 
Kenya 0.039 
 
0.011 
 
- 
 
0.157 
 
0.039 
 
Mauritius 0.035 
 
-0.031 
 
- 
 
0.199 
 
0.035 
 
Morocco -0.091 ** -0.103 ** - 
 
0.063 
 
-0.092 *** 
Nigeria 0.151 *** 0.104 ** - 
 
0.107 ** 0.151 *** 
Tunisia -0.066 
 
-0.059 
 
- 
 
0.207 
 
-0.067 ** 
Constant 0.329 *** 0.270 *** -0.260 
 
0.142 
 
0.319 *** 
F-statistic 5.940 *** - 
 
3.200 *** 
  
- 
 
Chi2  - 
 
61608 *** - 
 
215.86 *** 345.66 *** 
Hausman Test - 
 
24.100 * 24.100 * 
  
- 
 N 1696  1696   1696   1664
 
1696  
 
Notes: The table reports the regression results for short-term, long-term and total leverage using Ordinary Least Square, 
Random Effects, Fixed Effects, Generalized Method of Moments and Seemingly Unrelated Regression. The 
parameter estimates that are significantly different from zero at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level are marked with ***, **, 
and *, respectively. The exact definition of the variables is as presented in Table 2.3.  
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Table 2.11: Firm, industry, institutional and macroeconomic dummies and capital structure 
 
 Panel A: Dependent Variable – Short term Leverage 
 
OLS RE FE GMM SUR 
Earnings Volatility -0.169 * -0.016 
 
0.043 
 
0286 
 
-0.177 
 Firm Size 0.045 
 
0.064 
 
0.260 ** 0.137 
 
0.047 * 
Profitability 0.986 
 
0.240 
 
0.124 
 
-1.097 
 
1.140 ** 
Growth Opportunities -0.471 
 
-0.362 
 
-0.622 * -0.974 
 
-0.546 
 Asset Tangibility -0.465 
 
0.107 
 
0.464 ** 0.162 
 
-0.463 *** 
Dividend Payout -0.018 
 
-0.012 
 
0.000 
 
-0.012 
 
-0.016 
 Tax Shield 0.156   -0.245   -4.550    -10.466  * 0.035   
Non-durables  -0.013 
 
-0.006 
 
- 
 
-0.084 * -0.013 
 Durables  0.014 
 
0.035 
 
- 
 
0.139 
 
0.013 
 Oil and Gas  -0.008 
 
-0.012 
 
- 
 
0.072 
 
-0.010 
 Chem. & Construction  0.057 ** 0.060 ** - 
 
-0.021 
 
0.058 *** 
Business Equipment  0.026 
 
0.067 
 
- 
 
-0.101 
 
0.025 
 Regulated  0.005 
 
0.037 
 
- 
 
-0.043 
 
0.008 
 Wholesale & Retail 0.054 * 0.077 ** - 
 
0.017 * 0.054 *** 
Health -0.005 
 
0.018 
 
- 
 
-0.197 * -0.006 
 Service & etc -0.030   -0.004   -    0.024   -0.027 * 
Common 0.013 
 
0.378 
 
- 
 
1.111 
 
0.032 
 Dev2 -0.017 
 
0.289 
 
- 
 
1.224 
 
-0.017 
 Dev3 0.353 ** 0.314 ** - 
 
0.780 * 0.344 *** 
Common*Profitability -0.982 
 
-0.248 
 
-0.218 
 
1.072 
 
-1.130 ** 
Common*Asset Tangibility 0.199 
 
-0.243 
 
-0.375 
 
-0.217 
 
0.198 
 Common*Tax Shield 0.572 
 
-0.514 
 
3.020 
 
9.919 
 
0.611 
 Common*Growth Opport. 0.556 
 
0.350 
 
0.625 * 0.981 
 
0.647 
 Common*Earnings Vol. 0.100 
 
-0.020 
 
-0.060 
 
-0.145 
 
0.112 
 Common*Firm Size -0.021 
 
-0.034 
 
-0.144 
 
-0.277 
 
-0.022 
 Dev2*Earnings Vol. 0.168 * -0.006 
 
-0.063 
 
-0.183 
 
0.168 
 Dev3*Earnings Vol.  0.077 
 
0.017 
 
0.028 
 
0.047 
 
0.073 
 Dev2*Div. Payout 0.010 
 
0.016 * 0.005 
 
0.022 * 0.008 
 DEV3*Div. Payout 0.022 
 
0.019 
 
0.003 
 
0.003 
 
0.021 
 Dev2*Growth Opport. 0.491 
 
0.380 
 
0.616 * 1.005 
 
0.562 
 DEV3*Growth Opport. -0.161 
 
-0.052 
 
-0.039 
 
0.133 
 
-0.191 
 Dev2*Firm Size -0.002 
 
-0.013 
 
-0.158 
 
-0.269 
 
0.000 
 DEV3*Firm Size -0.032 
 
-0.032 
 
-0.008 
 
-0.115 * -0.031 * 
DEV2*Profitability -1.180 * -0.431 
 
-0.314 
 
0.975 
 
-1.310 ** 
DEV3*Profitability -0.060 
 
-0.168 
 
-0.155 
 
-0.116 
 
-0.051 
 DEV2*Asset Tangibility 0.219 
 
-0.255 
 
-0.537 *** -0.202 
 
0.218 
 DEV3*Asset Tangibility -0.089 
 
-0.091 
 
-0.204 
 
-0.105 
 
-0.093 
 DEV2*Tax Shield -0.374 
 
-0.085 
 
4.180 
 
9.924 
 
-0.249 
 DEV3*Tax Shield -1.010 
 
0.044 
 
0.690 
 
0.535 
 
-0.934 
 Constant 0.244 
 
-0.156 
 
-0.177 
 
-1.054 
 
0.199 
 F-statistic 5.910 *** - 
 
2.630 *** 
  
- 
 Chi2  - 
 
43053 *** - 
 
284.46 *** 492.99 *** 
Hausman Test - 
 
31.110 
 
31.110 
     N 1695   1695   1695   1662    1695   
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Table 2.11: (Cont’d …) 
 
 Panel B: Dependent Variable – Long term Leverage 
 
OLS RE FE GMM SUR 
Earnings Volatility -0.002 
 
-0.030 
 
-0.033 
 
-0.110 
 
0.005 
 Firm Size -0.005 
 
-0.011 
 
-0.033 
 
-0.179 
 
-0.007 
 Profitability -0.410 * -0.296 * 0.051 
 
-0.282 
 
-0.480 
 Growth Opportunities -0.136 
 
-0.003 
 
-0.062 
 
0.359 
 
-0.108 
 Asset Tangibility 0.406 *** 0.278 *** 0.051 
 
1.187 * 0.408 *** 
Dividend Payout -0.022 ** -0.004 
 
0.013 
 
-0.008 * -0.018 * 
Tax Shield -0.229   -0.271   -0.696    7.432   -0.170   
Non-durables  -0.003 
 
-0.006 
 
- 
 
-0.031 
 
-0.002 
 Durables  -0.007 
 
0.008 
 
- 
 
-0.016 
 
-0.007 
 Oil and Gas  -0.009 
 
0.011 
 
- 
 
-0.050 
 
-0.008 
 Chem. & Construction  0.018 
 
0.011 
 
- 
 
-0.050 
 
0.018 * 
Business Equipment  -0.027 
 
-0.039 ** - 
 
-0.065 * -0.026 * 
Regulated  0.072 *** 0.069 ** - 
 
0.022 * 0.071 *** 
Wholesale & Retail -0.005 
 
-0.017 
 
- 
 
-0.003 
 
-0.003 
 Health -0.001 
 
0.003 
 
- 
 
0.002 
 
0.000 
 Service & etc -0.008   -0.004   -    -0.015   -0.009   
Common 0.134 
 
0.032 
 
- 
 
0.739 
 
0.124 
 Dev2 -0.147 
 
-0.191 ** - 
 
0.249 
 
-0.145 
 Dev3 -0.105 
 
-0.103 
 
- 
 
-0.453 
 
-0.105 
 Common*Profitability 0.282 
 
0.296 
 
0.024 
 
0.264 
 
0.353 
 Common*Asset Tangibility -0.098 
 
-0.100 
 
-0.234 
 
-1.084 
 
-0.103 
 Common*Tax Shield -0.323 
 
0.487 
 
1.780 
 
-7.420 
 
-0.342 
 Common*Growth Opport. 0.183 
 
0.014 
 
0.119 
 
-0.410 
 
0.155 
 Common*Earnings Vol. 0.001 
 
0.030 
 
0.027 
 
0.095 
 
0.000 
 Common*Firm Size -0.016 
 
-0.009 
 
-0.077 
 
0.039 
 
-0.016 
 Dev2*Earnings Vol. 0.046 
 
0.052 
 
0.053 * 0.189 * 0.042 
 Dev3*Earnings Vol.  0.061 
 
0.025 
 
0.029 
 
0.038 
 
0.055 
 Dev2*Div. Payout 0.004 
 
-0.006 
 
-0.021 
 
0.007 
 
-0.001 
 DEV3*Div. Payout 0.044 *** 0.001 
 
-0.018 
 
-0.003 
 
0.034 ** 
Dev2*Growth Opport. 0.130 
 
-0.009 
 
0.046 
 
-0.368 
 
0.101 
 DEV3*Growth Opport. 0.012 
 
0.015 
 
-0.063 
 
0.057 
 
-0.020 
 Dev2*Firm Size 0.020 
 
0.023 
 
0.056 
 
0.118 
 
0.020 
 DEV3*Firm Size 0.005 
 
0.019 
 
0.165 
 
0.077 
 
0.009 
 DEV2*Profitability 0.284 
 
0.095 
 
-0.268 
 
0.224 
 
0.340 
 DEV3*Profitability -0.012 
 
-0.051 
 
-0.081 
 
-0.013 
 
0.003 
 DEV2*Asset Tangibility -0.249 *** -0.127 
 
0.094 
 
-1.157 * -0.254 *** 
DEV3*Asset Tangibility -0.144 
 
-0.131 
 
0.106 
 
-0.084 * -0.115 *** 
DEV2*Tax Shield 0.555 
 
0.051 
 
0.310 
 
-7.779 
 
0.521 
 DEV3*Tax Shield 0.949 
 
-0.099 
 
-0.995 
 
0.020 
 
0.584 
 Constant 0.099   0.185 ** 0.022    -0.251   0.119   
F-statistic 15.920 *** - 
 
2.410 *** 
  
- 
 Chi2  - 
 
392.50 *** - 
 
509.35 *** 662.56 *** 
Hausman Test - 
 
27.000 
 
27.000 
 
- 
 
- 
 N 1743   1743   1743   1725    1743   
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Table 2.11: (Cont’d …) 
 Panel C: Dependent Variable – Total Leverage 
 
OLS RE FE GMM SUR 
Earnings Volatility -0.168 ** -0.046 
 
0.006 
 
0.184 
 
-0.172 
 Firm Size 0.039 
 
0.053 
 
0.226 
 
0.223 
 
0.040 
 Profitability 0.584 
 
-0.014 
 
0.153 
 
-1.869 
 
0.656 
 Growth Opportunities -0.609 
 
-0.371 
 
-0.686 
 
-0.549 
 
-0.661 
 Asset Tangibility -0.055 
 
0.374 * 0.496 ** 0.847 
 
-0.054 
 Dividend Payout -0.035 *** -0.009 
 
0.002 
 
0.005 
 
-0.031 * 
Tax Shield -0.083 
 
-0.576 
 
-5.160 
 
-5.796 
 
-0.109 
 
Non-durables  -0.020   -0.016   -    -0.087  * -0.020   
Durables  0.005 
 
0.045 
 
- 
 
-0.065 
 
0.005 
 Oil and Gas  -0.015 
 
0.001 
 
- 
 
-0.002 
 
-0.016 
 Chem. & Construction  0.078 ** 0.074 ** - 
 
-0.030 
 
0.078 *** 
Business Equipment  0.009 
 
0.040 
 
- 
 
-0.058 
 
0.007 
 Regulated  0.073 
 
0.105 ** - 
 
-0.026 
 
0.074 *** 
Wholesale & Retail 0.043 
 
0.055 * - 
 
0.092 * 0.044 ** 
Health -0.005 
 
0.024 
 
- 
 
-0.070 
 
-0.006 
 Service & etc -0.047   -0.014   -    -0.003  * -0.045 ** 
Common 0.046 
 
0.214 
 
- 
 
1.205 
 
0.050 
 Dev2 -0.163 
 
0.093 
 
- 
 
1.391 
 
-0.164 
 Dev3 0.222 
 
0.299 * - 
 
0.324 * 0.222 * 
Common*Profitability -0.681 
 
0.036 
 
-0.183 
 
1.789 
 
-0.753 
 Common*Asset Tangibility 0.115 
 
-0.286 
 
-0.319 
 
-0.701 
 
0.113 
 Common*Tax Shield 0.325 
 
0.271 
 
4.670 
 
4.825 
 
0.317 
 Common*Growth Opport. 0.796 * 0.372 
 
0.649 
 
0.517 
 
0.863 
 Common*Earnings Vol. 0.096 
 
0.034 
 
0.005 
 
-0.295 
 
0.105 
 Common*Firm Size -0.024 
 
-0.015 
 
-0.047 
 
-0.175 
 
-0.024 
 Dev2*Earnings Vol. 0.210 ** 0.046 
 
-0.007 
 
-0.260 
 
0.210 
 Dev3*Earnings Vol.  0.089 
 
0.016 
 
0.031 
 
0.050 
 
0.086 
 Dev2*Div. Payout 0.009 
 
0.004 
 
-0.006 
 
0.010 
 
0.005 
 DEV3*Div. Payout 0.048 *** 0.010 
 
-0.007 
 
-0.018 
 
0.044 * 
Dev2*Growth Opport. 0.623 
 
0.377 
 
0.662 
 
0.592 
 
0.671 
 DEV3*Growth Opport. -0.321 
 
-0.056 
 
-0.011 
 
0.179 
 
-0.347 ** 
Dev2*Firm Size 0.018 
 
0.010 
 
-0.097 
 
-0.184 
 
0.019 
 DEV3*Firm Size -0.019 
 
-0.030 
 
0.006 
 
-0.045 
 
-0.018 
 DEV2*Profitability -0.907 * -0.381 
 
-0.560 
 
1.565 
 
-0.970 
 DEV3*Profitability 0.077 
 
-0.205 
 
-0.244 
 
-0.040 
 
0.078 
 DEV2*Asset Tangibility -0.030 
 
-0.365 * -0.425 
 
-0.908 
 
-0.031 
 DEV3*Asset Tangibility -0.069 
 
-0.074 
 
-0.168 
 
-0.203 
 
-0.067 
 DEV2*Tax Shield 0.185 
 
-0.028 
 
4.410 
 
4.930 
 
0.227 
 DEV3*Tax Shield -1.330 
 
-0.872 
 
-0.539 
 
0.823 
 
-1.320 
 Constant 0.346 ** 0.115 
 
-0.289 * -1.127 
 
0.328 
 F-statistic 5.120 *** - 
 
2.700 *** 
  
- 
 Chi2  - 
 
67478 *** - 
 
524.24 *** 368.01 *** 
Hausman Test - 
 
45.850 * 45.850 * 
  
- 
 N 1696   1696   1696   1664    1696   
Notes: The table reports the regression results for short-term, long-term and total leverage using Ordinary Least Square (OLS), 
Random Effects (RE), Fixed Effects (FE), system Generalized Method of Moments (GMM) and Seemingly Unrelated 
Regression (SUR). The parameter estimates that are significantly different from zero at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level are marked 
with ***, **, and *, respectively. The exact definition of the variables is as presented in Table 2.3.  
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Table 2.12: Firm, industry, institutional and macroeconomic factors and capital structure 
 
 Panel A: Dependent Variable – Short term Leverage 
 
Model A Model B Model C Model D   Model E 
Earnings Volatility -0.012   -0.046   -0.010   -0.008   -0.0114   
Firm Size 0.030 *** 0.027 ** 0.033 *** 0.031 *** 0.0306 *** 
Profitability -0.096 
 
-0.067 
 
-0.073 
 
-0.087 
 
-0.0910 
 Growth Opt. 0.015 
 
0.001 
 
0.014 
 
0.020 
 
0.0199 
 Asset Tangibility -0.265 *** -0.247 *** -0.264 *** -0.258 *** -0.2650 *** 
Dividend Payout -0.002 
 
-0.003 
 
-0.005 
 
-0.004 
 
-0.0046 
 Tax Shield -0.099   -0.242   -0.070   -0.208   -0.0767   
Non-durables  -0.005 
 
-0.024 
 
-0.002 
 
-0.004 
 
-0.0054 
 Durables  0.015 
 
0.028 
 
0.019 
 
0.013 
 
0.0187 
 Oil and Gas  0.003 
 
-0.039 
 
0.019 
 
-0.002 
 
0.0092 
 Chemicals & Const. 0.068 ** 0.069 ** 0.068 ** 0.068 ** 0.0689 ** 
Business Equip.  0.035 
 
0.007 
 
0.043 
 
0.024 
 
0.0452 
 Regulated  0.009 
 
0.005 
 
0.011 
 
0.007 
 
0.0059 
 Wholesale & Retail 0.065 ** 0.022 
 
0.064 ** 0.051 
 
0.0648 ** 
Health -0.004 
 
-0.017 
 
-0.005 
 
-0.003 
 
-0.0001 
 Service & etc -0.032 
 
-0.055 * -0.034 
 
-0.034 
 
-0.0326   
Economic Growth 0.001   -0.004   0.007   0.002   
  Shareholder Rights 0.017 * 
    
0.012 
   Rule of Law -0.082 ***  
       Taxation 
  
0.002 
       Stock Market Liq.  
 
-0.098 
       Inflation 
    
0.010 ***  
   Stock Market Size  
   
-0.006 
     Banking Sector Size  
     
-0.131 ***  
 Creditor Rights 
        
0.0195 ** 
Size of Economy 
        
-0.1010 *** 
Constant  0.164   0.201   0.159 * 0.260 * 0.0000   
Chi-sqare Statisitc 400.68 *** 152.320 *** 391.800 *** 380.560 *** 6185.04 *** 
Test for time effect 10.68 * 4.77 
 
21.700 *** 13.940 * 10.8800 
 R-square 0.219 
 
0.215 
 
0.211 
 
0.207 
 
0.215 
 No. of Obs. 1432   556   1462   1456   1462   
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Table 2.12: (Cont’d . . .) 
 
 Panel B: Dependent Variable – Long term Leverage 
 
Model A Model B Model C Model D  Model E 
Earnings Volatility 0.036 ** 0.063 *** 0.045 *** 0.047 *** 0.042 ** 
Firm Size 0.007 
 
0.006 
 
0.006 
 
0.006 
 
0.003 
 Profitability -0.126 *** -0.150 *** -0.124 *** -0.131 *** -0.146 *** 
Growth Opt. 0.006 
 
-0.009 
 
0.001 
 
-0.001 
 
0.001 
 Asset Tangibility 0.191 *** 0.151 *** 0.187 *** 0.178 *** 0.178 *** 
Dividend Payout -0.019 *** -0.022 *** -0.017 *** -0.016 *** -0.017 *** 
Tax Shield 0.234   0.589 * 0.233   0.272   0.316   
Non-durables  0.005 
 
0.005 
 
0.006 
 
0.005 
 
0.004 
 Durables  -0.006 
 
-0.010 
 
-0.006 
 
-0.007 
 
-0.005 
 Oil and Gas  0.030 
 
0.021 
 
0.034 * 0.034 * 0.032 
 Chemicals & Const. 0.017 
 
0.011 
 
0.016 
 
0.016 
 
0.016 
 Business Equip.  -0.017 
 
-0.041 * -0.016 
 
-0.022 
 
-0.007 
 Regulated  0.088 *** 0.072 *** 0.088 *** 0.088 *** 0.083 *** 
Wholesale & Retail 0.012 
 
-0.001 
 
0.020 
 
0.008 
 
0.014 
 Health 0.001 
 
0.024 
 
0.003 
 
0.002 
 
0.005 
 Service & etc -0.017 
 
-0.015 
 
-0.012 
 
-0.016 
 
-0.017 
 Economic Growth -0.003   -0.016 *** 0.002   -0.002       
Shareholder Rights 0.024 ***  
   
0.022 ***  
 Rule of Law -0.017 
         Taxation 
  
-0.001 
       Stock Market Liq.  
 
0.113 * 
      Inflation 
    
0.002 
     Stock Market Size  
   
0.028 ***  
   Banking Sector Size  
     
-0.059 ** 
  Creditor Rights 
        
0.031 *** 
Size of Economy 
        
0.052 ** 
Constant  0.000   0.000   -0.087   -0.175 * -0.335 * 
Chi-sqare Statisitc 1324.810 *** 578.020 *** 388.870 *** 424.900 *** 436.260 *** 
Test for time effect 21.740 *** 25.350 *** 11.010 
 
35.210 *** 30.700 *** 
R-square 0.224 
 
0.238 
 
0.205 
 
0.220 
 
0.224 
 No. of Obs. 1462   583   1510   1504   1510   
 
89 
 
Table 2.12: (Cont’d . . .) 
 
 Panel B: Dependent Variable – Total Leverage 
 
Model A Model B Model C Model D  Model E 
Earnings Volatility 0.025   0.014   0.033   0.038   0.030   
Firm Size 0.040 *** 0.040 *** 0.044 *** 0.042 *** 0.039 *** 
Profitability -0.195 ** -0.200 *** -0.168 * -0.185 ** -0.206 ** 
Growth Opt. 0.017 
 
0.045 
 
0.006 
 
0.001 
 
0.012 
 Asset Tang/Maturity -0.052 
 
-0.073 
 
-0.056 
 
-0.051 
 
-0.062 
 Dividend Payout -0.021 *** -0.024 *** -0.022 *** -0.021 *** -0.021 *** 
Tax Shield 0.027   0.254   0.072   -0.105   0.108   
Non-durables  -0.002 
 
-0.021 
 
0.002 
 
-0.002 
 
-0.004 
 Durables  0.014 
 
0.025 
 
0.019 
 
0.011 
 
0.019 
 Oil and Gas  0.029 
 
-0.015 
 
0.052 
 
0.025 
 
0.037 
 Chemicals & Const. 0.090 ** 0.089 ** 0.089 ** 0.091 *** 0.090 ** 
Business Equip.  0.027 
 
-0.015 
 
0.038 
 
0.010 
 
0.048 
 Regulated  0.096 ** 0.094 ** 0.099 ** 0.095 ** 0.088 * 
Wholesale & Retail 0.071 ** 0.008 
 
0.075 ** 0.047 
 
0.071 * 
Health -0.001 
 
0.015 
 
-0.001 
 
0.001 
 
0.006 
 Service & etc -0.053 * -0.075 ** -0.052 
 
-0.056 * -0.055 * 
Economic Growth -0.004   -0.024 ** 0.007   -0.009       
Shareholder Rights 0.041 ***  
   
0.035 *** 
  Rule of Law -0.108 ***  
       Taxation 
  
0.001 
       Stock Market Liq.  
 
-0.019 
       Inflation 
    
0.013 ***  
   Stock Market Size  
   
0.016 
     Banking Sector Size  
     
-0.220 ***  
 Creditor Rights 
        
0.049 *** 
Size of Economy 
        
-0.067 * 
Constant  0.000   0.206   -0.010   0.218 * 0.000   
Chi-square  7237.500 *** 89.910 *** 225.870 *** 263.710 *** 7356.770 *** 
Test for time effect 4.680 
 
11.560 * 31.710 *** 8.530 
 
15.630 ** 
R-square 0.156 
 
0.139 
 
0.134 
 
0.153 
 
0.153 
 No. of Obs. 1433   556   1463   1457   1463   
Notes: The table reports the regression results for short-term, long-term and total leverage using Ordinary Least 
Square, Random Effects, Fixed Effects, Generalized Method of Moments and Seemingly Unrelated Regression. 
The parameter estimates that are significantly different from zero at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level are marked with 
***, **, and *, respectively. The exact definition of the variables is as presented in Table 2.3.  
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CHAPTER 3 
 
WHAT DETERMINES THE ADJUSTMENT SPEED OF CAPITAL STRUCTURE OF 
FIRMS TOWARD A TARGET?  
  
3.1 Introduction 
 
The issue of basic capital structure of a firm has engaged the attention of academics 
and practitioners alike for some time now. In Chapter 2, the thesis explored mainstream 
capital structure theories and empirical works to identify firm, industry, institutional and 
macroeconomic factors that determine basic capital structure. It extended the debate on 
capital structure a step further by empirically examining the role of institutional and 
macroeconomic contexts and firm- and industry-characteristics on capital structure decisions 
of firms within the African setting. The capital structure literature is inundated with similar 
endeavours that attempt to investigate the determinants of observed capital structure of a 
firm. While such studies certainly advance our understanding of a firm’s financing behaviour, 
they do not address whether firms rebalance their capital structure over time. This dimension 
of capital structure research was intentionally postponed to be addressed in the present 
chapter. 
A closer look at the mainstream capital structure theories indicates that while one 
camp suggests the existence of a target capital structure at firm level, others do not. For 
instance, the traditional trade-off theories that stress various costs and benefits of debt imply 
the existence of an optimal capital structure. According to this camp, when firms are 
perturbed from the optimum capital structure they respond by rebalancing their capital 
structure back to the optimal level. On the other hand, the market timing theory by Baker and 
Wurgler (2002) suggests a firm’s capital structure is a cumulative result of its historical 
efforts to time equity issuances with high market valuations than the result of a dynamic 
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optimizing strategy. Similarly, the inertia theory by Welch (2004) suggests that equity price 
shocks have a persistent effect on leverage which he takes as evidence against firms 
rebalancing their capital structures toward an optimum. Likewise, the pecking order theory of 
Myers (1984) and Myers and Majluf (1984) considers leverage to be primarily a result of a 
firms’ historical profitability and investment opportunities and hence firms have no strong 
tendencies to reverse shocks to capital structure caused by financing needs and earnings 
growth. Therefore, recent empirical capital structure researches attempt to discriminate 
between the capital structure theories by testing whether a target leverage ratio does exist.  
Recent empirical literature documents evidence that market imperfections and 
adjustment costs and/or benefits cause firms to be at a sub-optimal capital structure. It further 
suggests that, in perfect markets where there is no friction, the adjustment of capital structure 
towards a target is costless, and thus, a firm can instantly adjust its capital structure toward 
the optimum. However, in imperfect markets, the adjustment of capital structure toward the 
optimal is costly, and hence, a firm may not adjust its capital structure instantly, but adjust 
partially (e.g., Heshmati 2001; Leary and Roberts 2005; Drobetz and Wanzenried 2006). The 
literature’s attempt to empirically discriminate between trade-off and other competing 
theories by using dynamic trade-off theory framework and partial adjustment models has 
rather become promising (e.g., Elsas and Florysiak 2008). The findings, almost invariably, 
confirm the argument that there is a substantial dynamic component in a firm’s capital 
structure decisions and that the dynamism depends on firm, industry, macroeconomic and 
institutional factors (e.g., Drobetz and Wanzenried 2006; Drobetz et al. 2007; Flannery and 
Hankins 2007).  
In the context of Africa, there is no published work that investigates the dynamic 
partial adjustment of a firm’s capital structure. This chapter aims to fill this gap by 
investigating whether firms in our sample countries adjust their capital structures to a certain 
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target level and, if they do, how firm, industry, macroeconomic and institutional factors 
impact on the speed at which firms adjust their capital structure over time. The contribution 
of the study presented in this chapter is threefold. Firstly, it provides an “out-of-sample-test” 
for the theoretical and empirical literature documented within the context of advanced 
economies. Secondly, it helps identify the institutions and macroeconomic policies that are 
conducive for enhancing the convergence of capital structure of firms in sample countries to 
an optimum level. Thirdly, it helps policymakers and other stakeholders in crafting policies 
and legislations suitable to industry and firm-specific characteristics that enhance a firm’s 
ability to adjust to optimal capital structure.  
The chapter applies dynamic partial adjustment models on 10-years (1999-2008) data 
pertaining to 986 non-financial firms drawn from nine (9) African economies that have 
functioning stock exchanges. Model parameters are estimated using the system Generalized 
Method of Moments (GMM) estimator proposed by Blundell and Bond (1998). The main 
findings of the study are: (i) basic capital structure of firms in our sample countries does 
temporarily deviate from and partially adjusts to a target capital structure; (ii) effect of firm 
size, growth opportunities, and the gap between observed and target leverage of a firm on 
adjustment speed is dependent on how leverage is defined; (iii) firm profitability tends to 
have a robustly significant and positive effect on adjustment speed; (iv) adjustment speed is 
faster for firms in: (a) industries that have relatively higher risk; (b) countries with common 
law tradition; (c) countries with less developed stock markets; and (d) countries with weaker 
creditor rights protection. Finally, the evidence also indicates that adjustment speed generally 
tends to decrease with increase in per capita income level of countries in which the firm 
operates. 
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The remainder of the chapter proceeds as follows: section 2 presents a brief review of 
the literature on adjustment speed of firm’s capital structure. Section 3 presents the empirical 
setup for analyses. Section 4 presents the results and discussions and section 5 concludes.  
 
3.2 Literature Review 
 
Recent literature critiques studies on determinants of capital structure on the grounds 
that they do not take into account the typical rebalancing behaviour of firms as far as their 
capital structure is concerned. It draws on dynamic trade-off theory and develops a theory for 
dynamic capital structure (e.g., Flannery and Hankins 2006). We may group the literature on 
the study of dynamic capital structure into two succinct clusters: (i) those investigating 
whether firms adjust towards a target capital structure; and (ii) those investigating the factors 
that influence the pace at which firms adjust their capital structure. In what follows, we 
attempt to briefly review these two clusters of the literature. 
 
3.2.1 On the existence of a target capital structure 
 
The literature alludes that detection of target behaviour in the capital structure of a 
firm is, arguably, central to discriminating between the trade-off and alternative theories. 
Trade-off theories that stress various costs and benefits of debt imply the existence of a target 
capital structure, and assume that firms make financing choices that minimize the cost of 
deviating from its target (e.g., Chang and Dasgupta 2009). On the other hand, the alternative 
theories alluded to earlier suggest that firms do not have a target capital structure that they are 
adjusting to achieve. In a rebuttal of the trade-off view, Miller (1977) showed that there 
would be no optimum capital structure at firm level by pointing to the fact that bankruptcy 
costs are “trivial” and also showing that the tax advantage of debt financing at the firm level 
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is exactly offset by the tax disadvantage of debt at the personal level
29
. Haugen and Senbet 
(1978) and Barnea, Haugen and Senbet (1980) also point out that bankruptcy “penalties” are 
too small to offset the effect of tax advantage of debt. Nonetheless, DeAngelo and Masulis 
(1980), Kim (1982) and Modigliani (1982) argue that bankruptcy costs are not the only costs 
against which the tax advantages of debt ought to be weighed. There are other costs of debt 
such as agency costs, loss of non-debt-related tax-shield, etc., that should be considered in the 
determination of optimal capital structure.   
Considerable research efforts note that firm’s capital structure decisions reflect not 
only the optimal leverage ratio but also rebalancing exercises toward the optimum. Myers’ 
(1984) view that trade-off theory suggests a target capital structure was corroborated in 
research efforts as early as Jalilvand and Harris (1984) which report that a firm’s financial 
behaviour is characterised by partial adjustment to long-run financial targets. However, 
Jalilvand and Harris’ work was criticized for exogenously specifying the long-run financial 
target to which firms adjust. After seventeen years, De Miguel and Pindado (2001) attempted 
to improve on Jalilvand and Harris’ work by endogenizing the target capital structure in their 
model and conclude that firms adjust their capital structure toward an optimum. De Miguel 
and Pindado’s model estimates a time-invarying adjustment speed though. At about the same 
time, through a survey of corporate finance practices of firms, Graham and Harvey (2001) 
show that 81 per cent of the CFOs in their sample responded to having either a target range of 
debt ratio or a “strict” target debt ratio.  
Rather recently, Fama and French (2002), note that firm’s debt ratio adjust slowly 
toward their targets. This observation is consistent with the suggestion by Myer (1984) that 
firm’s may take long time to return to their target capital structure in the presence of costs of 
adjustment. In a rebuttal of the works of Baker and Wurgler (2002) and Welch (2004), Leary 
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 See Haugen and Senbet (1978); Barnea, Haugen and Senbet (1980); DeAngelo and Masulis (1980); Kim 
(1982); and Modigliani (1982) for elaborate discussion on the [ir]relevance of bankruptcy costs to capital 
structure decisions. 
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and Roberts (2005) show that firms actively rebalance their leverage to stay within the 
optimal range. In a further push, more recent literature, employing models and procedures 
that are more robust, confirms not only that firms adjust their capital structure but also 
identify that adjustment costs and benefits enhance or mitigate the speed at which firms 
adjust their capital structure toward the optimum (e.g., Banerjee, Heshmati and Wihlborg 
2004; Gaud, Jani, Hoesli and Bender 2005; Leary and Roberts 2005; Drobetz and 
Wanzenried 2006; Flannery and Rangan 2006; Frank and Goyal 2007b; Huang and Ritter 
2009; Fualkendar, Flannery, Hankins and Smith 2011).  
Although copious empirical studies endeavour to investigate adjustment speed of 
capital structure, Shyam-Sunder and Myers (1999) and Chen and Zhao (2007) caution against 
overly interpreting adjustment coefficients by pointing to the possibility that “firm’s leverage 
ratios tend to revert to mean mechanically regardless of the firm’s financing preferences”. 
However, a number of other widely employed tests are also susceptible to mechanical effects 
that could arise when firms do not follow target behaviour (e.g., Chang and Dasgupta 2009).  
 
3.2.2 On the determinants of adjustment speed of capital structure 
 
In a recent paper, Faulkender et al. (2011) re-iterate a contemporary question in 
capital structure research: whether firms have a target level of leverage, and if so, what 
factors enhance (or hinder) the speed with which firms adjust their capital structure towards a 
target? Various endeavours to obtain answers for the above question suggest that the speed at 
which firms adjust their capital structure toward a target varies from study to study. Part of 
the dissention has to do with the econometric procedures employed and part of it could also 
be ascribed to differences in adjustment costs and/or benefits. The later view was reflected in 
Flannery and Hankins (2007) who remark that capital structure decisions reflect not only the 
level of the optimal leverage ratio but also both the costs of deviating from the target and the 
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costs of adjusting toward that target. According to them, whilst adjustment costs hinge on 
external financing expenses, stock price movements and financial constraints adjustment 
benefits depend on potential costs of distress and the value of tax shields. In what follows, we 
present a synthesis of the influence of firm-, industry-, and country-characteristics on 
adjustment costs and benefits, and thereby, on adjustment speed. 
 
3.2.2.1 Inter-firm heterogeneity in adjustment speed of basic capital structure 
 
As the adjustment costs and/or benefits are likely to vary from firm to firm, so does 
the optimal capital structure adjustment process (e.g., Flannery and Hankins 2007). Studies as 
early as Fischer, Heinkel and Zechner (1989) propose a model of dynamic capital structure 
choice in the presence of adjustment costs and show that the swings in capital structure are 
functions of firm-specific factors. The following paragraphs present synthesis of the 
relationship between firm characteristics and adjustment speed by using adjustment costs 
and/or benefits as a framework.   
The capital structure literature customarily suggests that larger firms tend to have 
lower information asymmetry which enables them to have lower financing costs as they are 
likely to enjoy better access to external finance. As alluded to earlier, the lower the financing 
cost of a firm is the lower its capital structure adjustment cost. Thus, we expect larger firms 
to have smaller adjustment costs and faster adjustment speed (e.g., Banerjee et al. 2004; 
Drobetz and Wanzenried 2006; Flannery and Hankins 2007). On the other hand, one might 
argue that larger firms tend to have less cash flow volatility, which reduces the potential costs 
of distress (e.g., Flannery and Rangan 2006). A reduction in potential cost of distress in turn 
reduces a firm’s benefit of adjusting toward a target capital thereby reducing the adjustment 
speed (e.g., Flannery and Hankins 2007). Although Flannery and Hankins (2007) report a 
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positive relationship between firm size and adjustment speed, Haas and Peeters (2006) and 
Banerjee et al. (2004) observe an inverse relationship between the two variables. 
According to Flannery and Hankins (2007), profitability impacts both the costs and/or 
benefits of capital structure adjustment of a firm. A more profitable firm is likely to have 
more flexibility (i.e., lesser constraints) in financing decisions and also likely to enjoy 
issuance of securities at more attractive rates (i.e., lower cost of external financing). This 
signifies that more profitable firms are likely to experience lesser costs of rebalancing their 
capital structure toward a target. In addition, higher profit may also increase the value of debt 
tax-shields or minimize asset substitution concerns (i.e., increase benefits of adjustment); 
especially if the firm is under-leveraged (see Flannery and Hankins 2007). Thus, we 
conjecture the profitability of a firm to positively influence the pace at which a firm adjusts 
its capital structure to a target.  
Both Banerjee et al. (2004) and Drobetz and Wanzenried (2006) suggest that growing 
firms tend to have more flexibility in choosing the sources of finance than no-growth firm 
which can only change their capital structure by swapping debt against equity. This in turn 
implies that growing firms are likely to enjoy lesser financing constraints and hence are likely 
to more rapidly rebalance their capital structure toward a target level. Although Drobetz and 
Wanzenried’s (2006) empirical results corroborate this conjecture, Banerjee et al.’s (2004) 
results indicate that firms with higher growth opportunity adjust more slowly towards the 
optimal capital structure. The inconsistent result obtained by Banerjee et al. (2004) could 
partly be due to the non-linear least square estimation technique they used to analyze the data 
which usually leads to biased and inconsistent estimators (Drobetz and Wanzenried 2006). 
The theoretical predictions regarding the relationship between the magnitude of the 
distance between target and observed capital structures of a firm (i.e., the distance variable) 
and adjustment speed are indeterminate. If fixed costs (e.g., legal fees and investment bank 
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fees) constitute a major portion of the rebalancing cost, only firms which moved significantly 
far away from the optimal capital structure will change their capital structure. Hence, we 
expect a positive relationship between adjustment speed and the distance variable (e.g., 
Banerjee et al. 2004; Drobetz and Wanzenried 2006)
30
. On the other hand, if the fixed costs 
of adjustment are prohibitively high, firms may avoid using capital markets to raise funds and 
manoeuvre their dividend policy to rebalance their capital structure. In this case, cost of 
adjustment tends to be increasing with increase in the distance variable implying slower 
adjustment speed. While Drobetz and Wanzenried (2006) report a statistically weak but 
positive relationship, Banerjee et al. (2004) report mostly insignificant (but significantly 
negative for UK) relationship between the two variables. Finally, a recent strand of research 
also reports links between cash flows and adjustment speed. Both Byoun (2008) and 
Faulkender et al. (2011) note that a firm’s financial need is a critical determinant of the pace 
at which they adjust their capital structure toward a target.  
 
3.2.2.2 Inter-industry heterogeneity in adjustment speed of basic capital structure 
 
Empirical researches that explicitly examine inter-industry heterogeneity in 
adjustment speeds are scant. However, some studies control for industry effects (e.g., 
Hovakimian, Hovakimian and Tehranian 2004; Flannery and Rangan 2006) to account for 
inter-industry differences in adjustment speeds. Roberts (2002) analysed capital structure 
dynamics using a system of stochastic differential equations and showed that the speed at 
which firms revert back to their target capital structures varies dramatically across industries 
suggesting the existence of significant inter-industry variation in adjustment costs and/or 
benefits. Likewise, by employing a dynamic adjustment model, Banerjee et al. (2004) 
compare the adjustment speed of firms in various industries and report that there are 
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 Leary and Roberts (2007) provides an elaborate discussion on the implication of the structure of adjustment 
cost on capital structure adjustment speed. 
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substantial differences in adjustment speeds across industries in the US and UK. In a similar 
vein, Smith, Chen and Anderson (2010) estimate adjustment speeds of capital structure of 15 
industries within the New Zealand milieu and show that firms within the agriculture and 
fisheries, mining, forestry, media and communications, and investment industries move 
toward their target capital structure relatively rapidly, in comparison to other industries. They 
suggest that risk characteristics of the industry in which a firm operates might be the 
underlying factor explaining inter-industry differences in adjustment speeds. In a similar 
vein, Stoja and Tucker (2007) classify industries into “new economy” group which include 
biotechnology, IT and leisure industries and “old economy” group which includes oil and 
mining, construction, textiles and real estate industries. The authors propose that adjustment 
costs for firms in “old economy” industries are likely to be higher as they are fixed assets 
intensive with low level of service element whereas firms in “new economy’ industries are 
likely to adjust faster since they are R&D intensive with high levels of service element. Thus, 
we expect that in as much as industry characteristics influence a firm’s capital structures, so 
might they influence the costs and/or benefits of adjusting to (or deviating from) a target 
capital structure.  
 
3.2.2.3 Cross-country heterogeneity in adjustment speed of capital basic structure  
 
Most of the prior empirical evidence that firms partially adjust toward a target capital 
structure is based on single-country data. However, the speeds of adjustment reported vary 
considerably around the world. While a number of papers find evidence of relatively slow 
adjustment speeds, others report faster speeds. Studies which report low adjustment speeds 
include Fama and French (2002) who report that US firms move towards target debt ratios at 
speeds ranging from 7 to 18 per cent each year. Similarly, Hovakimian and Li (2009), using 
various target proxies and modifications to the standard methodologies, estimate adjustment 
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speeds ranging from 5 to 13 per cent. Consistent with faster speeds reported in earlier studies 
such as Jalilvand and Harris (1984), Shyam-Sunder and Myer (1999) and Flannery and 
Rangan (2006) report adjustment speeds of 41 per cent and 34 per cent, respectively, for 
firms in the US. According to Ozkan (2001), the adjustment speed of capital structure of UK 
firms is in the vicinity of 43 per cent. There are also studies [e.g., De Miguel and Pindado 
(2001) and Gaud et al. (2005) for Swiss firms and Lemmon, Roberts and Zender (2008) and 
Huang and Ritter (2009) for US firms] which report adjustment speeds that lie at the middle 
of the spectrum. Part of the dissension in the adjustment speeds stems from econometric 
issues. But econometric issues may not explain all of the variation in the speed of adjustment. 
This variation in the observed adjustment speeds in different countries opened a further 
research direction in which many researchers attempted to examine the nexus between 
country characteristics and the pace at which firms adjust their capital structure.  
In a series of influential works on the association between law and finance, La Porta 
et al. (e.g., 1996; 1997; 1998; 1999) document that the legal rules and the quality of their 
enforcement are important determinants of the shape and complexity of financial contracts 
pertaining to debt and equity. At the heart of their argument is the legal protection afforded 
by legal systems to mitigate agency problems between insiders and outsiders to the firm. 
Investors’ disposition towards providing funding for firms partly depends on the protection 
they receive from the legal system. The authors show that legal systems based on the English 
common law provide a stronger protection to investors (i.e., shareholders and creditors) than 
those based on the French civil law. The empirical literature seems to confirm this prediction. 
Thus, firms in countries with legal systems based on the English common law tend to have 
lesser agency-associated problems compared to those in countries with legal systems based 
on the French civil law. Therefore, we expect firms in the first group of countries to more 
quickly adjust their capital structure to a target than those in the latter group. Following Clark 
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et al. (2009) and Wanzenried (2006), we also anticipate that firms located in countries with 
strong creditor and shareholder rights and relatively high levels of contract enforcement 
efficiency would adjust their capital structures more quickly than firms located in countries 
characterized by lower levels of creditor and shareholder rights and less efficient means of 
enforcing contracts. 
Prior literature also attempts to explain variations in adjustment speeds by invoking 
cross-country divergence in financial systems. Developed stock markets and banking sector 
makes it easier for firms to raise capital. The likely smaller transaction costs and reduced 
agency costs associated with developed stock markets and banking sector would mean that 
firms find it easier to adjust their capital structure to the target (e.g., Grossman and Stiglitz 
1980; Demirgüç-Kunt and Maksimovic 1999; Wanzenried 2006; Clark et al. 2009). Hence, 
we conjecture that the size and liquidity of stock markets and the size of banking sector have 
positive effects on the speed at which firms adjust their capital structure to a target.  
To test the impact of macroeconomic conditions on the speed of capital structure 
adjustment, prior empirical literature employs such factors as overall size of the economy, 
GDP growth rate, inflation rate, and taxation that define macroeconomic conditions. The 
GDP growth rate is usually considered as an indicator of financing needs of firms (e.g., 
Demirgüç-Kunt and Maksimovic 1999). Thus, in line with Cook and Tang (2010), Drobetz 
and Wanzenried (2006), and Wanzenried (2006), we expect firms to adjust their capital 
structure to a target at a faster rate as the economy goes through higher GDP growth.  
According to Mills (1996), higher inflation rate increases the cost of capital and 
changes in the cost of capital are paid closer attention by firms so that they can optimize their 
capital structure. Hence, consistent with Wanzenried (2006), we expect higher inflation rates 
to have a positive influence on adjustment speed. The dynamic trade-off theory predicts that 
adjustment speed is positively related to the benefits of being at a target capital structure. 
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Thus, the higher the benefit resulting from untapped tax benefits, the faster the pace at which 
a firm adjusts its capital structure (e.g., Clark et al. 2009). As in the legal institutions, we 
examine the effect of macroeconomic conditions on the speed of adjustment in two stages. 
We first examine if there are variation in adjustment speeds across broadly defined income 
groups (i.e., upper-middle-income; lower middle income, and low-income countries) to 
which the country belongs. Second, we examine the effect of more narrowly defined 
macroeconomic variables (i.e., taxation, inflation, size of economy, and growth rate of GDP) 
on adjustment speed.  
 
3.3 The Empirical Framework 
 
Prior empirical works indicate that firm, industry, and country-level factors impact on 
firm’s capital structure decisions (e.g., Rajan and Zingales 1995; Demirgüç-Kunt and 
Maksimovic 1999; Booth et al. 2001). Nonetheless, until recently, international work on 
capital structure imposes the implicit, but unrealistic, assumption that firms are always at 
their target capital structure. In an imperfect environment where there are a set of adjustment 
costs and/or benefits, a firm’s capital structure may not necessarily be at a target level. In an 
effort to properly account for the dynamic nature of capital structure, recent literature adopted 
a dynamic partial adjustment model which allows target capital structure to vary across firms 
and over time (e.g., Fischer et al. 1989; Hovakimian, Opler and Titman 2001; Drobetz and 
Wanzenried 2006). The pace at which firms adjust their capital structure towards a target is 
the main stay of this chapter. 
The literature also documents that adjustment speed measure is very sensitive to the 
econometric design. Econometric challenges include, among others, problems of model 
specification, unobservable variables, heterogeneous panel data, short panel biases, 
autocorrelation and unbalanced panels (e.g., Zhao and Susmel 2008). Two distinct strands of 
103 
 
econometric modelling approaches stand out in the study of adjustment speed of capital 
structure: the two-stage and integrated dynamic partial adjustment capital structure models 
(e.g., Cook and Tang 2010). Although both approaches are widely used, Flannery and 
Rangan (2006) convincingly shows that the two-stage dynamic panel adjustment model 
results in abnormally smaller estimates of adjustment speed than theory would predict. 
Further, this approach does not allow us to examine the determinants of adjustment speed 
while the integrated approach enables us to jointly determine the adjustment speed along with 
its determinants. Hence, this chapter adopts the integrated dynamic partial adjustment model. 
 
3.3.1 Model specification 
 
In line with De Miguel and Pindado (2001) and Hovakimian et al. (2001), we define 
target capital structure as a leverage ratio that a firm would desire to have in a frictionless 
environment. To analyse the impact of firm, industry and country characteristics, taking a cue 
from Drobetz and Wanzenried (2006) and Öztekin and Flannery (2008), we specify target 
capital structure using a dynamic capital structure model.  Let the optimal or target capital 
structure of firm i in period t, labelled as       
 , be a linear function of a set of N explanatory 
variables,        (where j = 1,2, 3, ....N) that have been used in past cross-sectional studies of 
capital structure:  
 
       
   ∑         
 
                (1) 
 
where    denotes a column vector containing the coefficients of explanatory variables. 
Since factors that determine a firm’s optimal capital structure may vary across firms 
and change over time, it is likely that the optimal capital structure itself may vary across 
firms and change over time. Hence, the dynamic set up in Equation (1) allows target capital 
structure across firms and over time.  
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In a frictionless environment where information asymmetries, transaction costs and 
other adjustment costs and/or benefits are absent, firms may instantly adjust their capital 
structure to a target. Hence, in such an environment, observed capital structure          is 
expected to be the same as target capital structure       
  . In other words, in a perfect 
environment, the difference between the current and the previous periods’ observed leverage 
should be the same as the difference between target leverage and the pervious period’s 
leverage. That is,                 should be equal to       
          . However, in the 
presence of all sorts of adjustment costs and/or benefits (which is more likely in the real 
world),        is not necessarily the same as       
 . That is, firms may not fully adjust their 
capital structure to the target capital structure. They may rather adjust partially. Thus, the 
equality is disrupted and a more realistic partial adjustment model may be specified as:  
 
                               
                           |    |       (2) 
 
where      denotes the adjustment parameter representing the magnitude of adjustment toward 
a target capital structure between two consecutive periods,          represents capital 
structure of firm i, in period t-1, and      denotes the idiosyncratic error term. Rearranging the 
terms in Equation (2), we obtain: 
 
                                     
                 |    |   (3) 
 
Our model follows Drobetz and Wanzenried (2006) and Hovakimian et al. (2001), 
where firms adjust their capital structure to an endogenously determined capital strucure as 
specificed in Equation (1). Taking cues from prior empirical work (e.g., Drobetz and 
Wanzenried 2006; Flannery and Rangan 2006; Cook and Tang 2010), we specify adjustment 
speed        as a linear function of factors affecting the costs and benefits of adjustment and 
the unobserved firms-specific effects as follows: 
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                                 (4) 
 
When firm-specific variables are used to explain the speed of adjustment,      has both time 
and cross-sectional dimensions. In contrast, in the case of macro-economic variables,      has 
only time dimension as macroeconomic variables do not vary across firms. 
Substituting Equation (4) and Equation (1) in Equation (3), we obtain: 
 
                                          ∑   
 
                   (5) 
 
Partly multiplying Equation (5) out, we obtain: 
 
                                       ∑         
 
      ∑         
 
            (6) 
 
When Equation (6) is estimated, interest is mainly in    which is the coefficient of 
the interaction term between the determinant variable of adjustment speed,     , and the 
lagged leverage,         . Following precedence, we formulate the null hypothesis that 
    , i.e., the speed of adjustment is independent from firm, industry, and/or country 
characteristics.  
 
3.3.2 A brief comment on the estimation procedures 
 
We observe in the literature that varying econometric procedures are used to estimate 
Equation 6 and results are non-robust to econometric procedures (e.g., Frank and Goyal 
2007b). Estimating Equation (6) using OLS would result in biased estimates of coefficients as 
it ignores fixed effects (e.g., Frank and Goyal 2007b; Antoniou et al. 2008). If the only 
problem surrounding the estimation was the fixed effect, consideration of either fixed or 
random effects estimation procedure would have mitigated the problem. In fact, Flannery and 
Rangan (2006) used fixed effects estimation procedure to estimate capital structure 
adjustment speed. However, endogeneity is another common problem that plagues 
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researchers in capital structure research (e.g., Parsons and Titman 2007; Getzmann, Lang and 
Spremann 2010). To overcome the problem of endogeneity, Anderson and Hsiao (1982) 
propose the use of an instrumental variables (IV) technique in which two-period lagged 
dependent variables are used as instrument. However, Antoniou et al. (2008) note that this 
procedure is unlikely to provide efficient estimates since it doesn’t use all the related moment 
conditions and also doesn’t accounts for the differenced structure of the error term. Arellano 
and Bond (1991) suggest using a dynamic panel data estimator based on the GMM 
methodology that optimally exploits the linear moment restrictions implied by the dynamic 
panel model. GMM estimator uses both lagged values of all endogenous regressors and 
lagged and current values of all strictly exogenous regressors as instruments. Models can be 
estimated using the levels or the first differences of the variables. For the difference 
estimator, the variables are measured as first differences and their lagged values are used as 
appropriate instruments. However, one has to check that there is no second-order serial 
correlation in the first differences of the error term as the consistency of the GMM estimator 
requires that this condition be satisfied.  Further the validity of instruments is verified using 
the Sargan test of over identifying restrictions. 
According to Blundell and Bond (1998) lagged levels of variables are likely to be 
weak instruments for current differenced variables when the series are close to random walk. 
In these conditions, the differenced GMM estimates are likely to be biased and inefficient. 
The authors suggest the use of a more efficient system GMM estimator that combines the 
difference-equation and a levels-equation in which suitably lagged differenced variables are 
the appropriate instruments. The system GMM is consistent and more efficient than the 
difference estimator so long as there is no significant correlation between the differenced 
regressors and country fixed effects. Specifically, Antoniou et al. (2008) and Deesomsak et 
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al. (2009) demonstrate that system-GMM is the most appropriate method to estimate 
Equation (6). Hence, we use the system-GMM to obtain the parameter estimates.  
 
3.4 Results and Discussions31 
 
3.4.1 Descriptive Statistics 
 
The salient features of capital structures of sample firms over the study period were 
identified and discussed in Chapter 2. This section re-iterates some of those features which 
have a direct relevance to our forgoing discussion on capital structure adjustment speed. For 
the sake of convenience, Table 3.1 reproduces the summary statistics which were presented 
in Table 2.1. There are three important features of the capital structure of the sample firms 
which are worth mentioning at this stage. Firstly, independent of how leverage is defined, we 
note that the leverage ratios were varying over time. This could be considered as an initial 
suggestion that firms might be attempting to adjust their capital structure toward a target.   
Secondly, we observe an overall upward trend in all the three measures of leverage 
throughout the sample period. Total leverage, for instance, increased from 41.3 per cent in 
1999 to 47.6 per cent in 2008 while long-term leverage went from 9.9 per cent to 13.9 per 
cent over the same period. This could be ascribed to a confluence of increasing size and 
growth rate of the economies of sample countries (e.g., Booth et al. 2001; De Jong et al. 
2008); increasing size and liquidity of stock markets (e.g., Demirgüç-Kunt and Maksimovic 
1999; Wanzenried 2006); and increasing inflationary situations (e.g, Taggart 1985; Frank and 
Goyal 2007a) over the same period. This phenomenon could as well be due to the steady 
increase in profitability, growth opportunities, and dividend payout factors (e.g, Barclay and 
Smith 1999; Benito 2003; Deesomsak et al. 2004; Mazur 2007; Antoniou et al. 2008). 
 
(Insert table 3.1 about here) 
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 We used the same dataset as in Chapter 2 for the analysis in this Chapter. 
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Thirdly, short-term leverage was on the decline over the second half of the sample 
period. This may be due to the increase in the size and liquidity of stock markets over the 
sample period which may have enticed quoted firms to switch to using more long-term than 
short-term debt (e.g, Deesomsak et al. 2009). It could as well be owing to the observed 
increase in firm-specific factors such as size, profitability, and growth opportunities over the 
sample period (e.g., Smith and Warner 1979; Barclay and Smith Jr 1995; Ozkan 2002; 
Antoniou et al. 2006; Deesomsak et al. 2009). Overall, the three salient features identified 
signify that the capital structure of the sample firms exhibited a dynamic behaviour during the 
period under study. 
In the pairwise correlation matrices reported in Chapter 2 (i.e., Table 2.2), it was 
noted, for our sample firms, that the correlations between all the three measures of leverage 
and firm- and country-characteristics are in sync with main stream capital structure theories 
and most empirical findings. It was also noted that the correlation coefficients between 
country-specific determinants of speed of capital structure adjustment are very high. To keep 
the estimation problem tractable and avoid problems of multicollinearity when estimating 
Equation (6) in the presence of high correlations, we develop slightly different specifications 
of Equation (6) by excluding highly correlated variables
32
. 
The estimation of the dynamic model in Equation (6) crucially hinges on the correct 
specification of the model for target capital structure. Findings reported using a series of 
models in Chapter 2 indicate that the relationship between the firm- and country-specific 
variables and the various measures of leverage are broadly in tandem with main stream 
capital structure theories. They also sit well in the ‘club of many other efforts’ within the 
context of developed and developing countries. Furthermore, all of the model fit tests (see the 
F-statistic and the Chi-square statistic in Tables 2.8, 2.9, 2.10, 2.11 and 2.12) showed that the 
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 The reader is kindly reminded that an extended discussion on correlation between firm- and country-level 
variables and a firm’s capital structure is available in chapter 2. 
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independent variables adequately explain the dependent variables. In summary, our results 
are comparable to those in other similar studies and they indicate that the explanatory 
variables are appropriate to model a time varying target leverage ratio in a dynamic 
adjustment model.  
 
3.4.2 Determinants of adjustment speed of basic capital structure 
 
In this section, we report dynamic panel estimation results from Equation (6). 
Dynamic panel estimation using system-GMM allows estimation of all coefficients in 
Equation (6) simultaneously. We begin our analysis by perusing the results for our baseline 
regression model (Model 1) which specifies only firm-specific factors as the independent 
variables. Table 3.2 presents the system GMM estimate of Model 1.  
 
(Insert table 3.2 about here) 
 
As indicated in an earlier section, our focus is on the estimates of        and   . 
While        shows the movement of leverage to its target,    indicates whether the speed 
of adjustment is independent of firm- and country-specific factors. The estimates of        
for short-term, long-term, and total leverage were 0.461, 0.410, and 0.606, respectively. This 
implies that firms in our sample countries close by 53.9 (1-0.461), 59 (1-0.410), and 39.4 (1-
0.606) per cent the gap between current and target short-term, long-term, and total-leverage, 
respectively, within one year. At these rates, a firm takes roughly two years to reach its target 
capital structure. Such a rapid adjustment towards a target capital structure suggests the 
existence of trade-off theory and rules out the dominance of rival theories proposed by Baker 
and Wurgler (2002) and Welch (2004). It also suggests the presence of costly and non-
instantaneous adjustment towards target capital structure (e.g., Leary and Roberts 2005; 
Flannery and Hankins 2007). Our results are consistent with the relatively faster adjustment 
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speeds reported in Shyam-Sunder and Myer (1999), Flannery and Rangan (2006) for firms in 
the US and Mukherjee and Mahakud (2010) for Indian companies.  
 
3.4.2.1 Firm-specific determinants of adjustment speed of basic capital structure 
 
A perusal of the estimates of    in Table 3.2 reveals that the nexus the between 
distance variable (Disti,t) and speed of adjustment is dependent on how leverage is defined. 
The further the observed short-term and total leverage ratios are from the target, the faster 
their speeds of adjustment. These results confirm the idea that a firm’s cost of maintaining a 
sub-optimal capital structure is higher than the cost of adjustment and the fixed costs of 
adjustment are not significant. We observe that Drobetz and Wanzenried (2006) and 
Mukherjee and Mahakud (2010) reported similar results. On the other hand, the negative 
relationship between adjustment speed of long-term leverage and the Disti,t variable suggests 
that adjustment costs (i.e., cost of external financing, transaction costs, etc.) were 
prohibitively high for our sample firms that they were avoiding accessing capital markets and 
rather were changing their dividend policy to rebalance their capital structure. In situations 
where firms sidestep capital markets to adjust their capital structure, they may take “extended 
excursions away from the optimal capital structure” and only adjust their capital structure 
slowly as part of their normal operation while larger adjustments require new issues of 
securities (e.g., Loof 2004)
33
. 
Further, the estimated coefficients of profitability (Table 3.2) are all negative, 
indicating a positive association between firm profitability and the pace at which a firm 
adjusts its capital structure to the optimum. This is consistent with the conjecture that more 
profitable firms have the financial flexibility and better access to raising external finance and 
                                                          
33
 Note that Equation (6) specifies a negative sign on   , and therefore the signs of the estimated coefficients on 
the respective interaction terms must be interpreted accordingly. 
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hence adjust their capital structure more rapidly than less profitable firms. Similar results 
were reported in Flannery and Rangan (2006) and Song and Philippatos (2004). 
We observe that the nexus between firm size and adjustment speed is sensitive to how 
leverage is defined (Table 3.2); it is positive for short-term and total-leverage and negative 
for long-term leverage. This shows that firm size enhances adjustment speed of long-term 
capital structure while it deters the adjustment speed of short-term and total leverage. This 
implies that larger firms adjust their long-term leverage more rapidly than smaller firms. This 
could be ascribed to the relatively smaller transaction costs of capital market transactions that 
larger firms incur as compared to smaller firms.  
Also evident in Table 3.2 is that the growth opportunities variable has a statistically 
weak and definitionally sensitive relationship with adjustment. This result is in contrast to 
what was reported in Drobetz and Wanzenried (2006) and doesn’t allow for further 
interpretation. Specifically, the finding in Drobetz and Wanzenried (2006) and Mukherjee 
and Mahakud (2010) that growing firms adjust faster than no-growth firms couldn’t be 
confirmed.  
 
3.4.2.2 Inter-industry heterogeneity of adjustment speed 
 
We now attempt to examine whether the adjustment speeds indicated in Table 3.2 
persist when we estimate Model 1 on an industry-by-industry basis. System GMM regression 
estimation results for each industry are reported in Table 3.3 - Panel A. For reasons of 
brevity, we report only coefficients of lagged leverage along with the corresponding robust 
standard errors and number of observations.  
 
(Insert table 3.3 about here) 
 
The results of industry-by-industry analysis for the 10 industries indicate that 
adjustment speeds vary across industries regardless of how leverage is defined. On a short-
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term leverage basis, firms within the Durables and Chemicals & Construction industries 
move toward their target capital structures relatively rapidly than is the case in other 
industries. The adjustment speed of short-term capital structure for these industries is about 
57.5 per cent per year. On a long-term leverage basis, firms within the Health, Oil & Gas, and 
Regulated industries move toward their target capital structures relatively rapidly than is the 
case in other industries. The adjustment speeds of long-term capital structure for these 
industries range between 66.7 and 91.6 per cent per year. These industries generally have 
high levels of leverage (Table 3.3 - Panel B), which may indicate that they are of higher 
default risk than the other industries. When firms in these industries deviate from their target 
capital structure, in particular take on additional debt, they may increase their default risk 
even further. Consequently, they may try to adjust back towards their target capital structure 
faster than firms in comparatively less risky industries (e.g, Smith et al. 2010).  
In contrast, on a short-term leverage basis, firms within the Business Equipment, 
Wholesale & Retail and Health industries adjust their capital structures relatively slowly 
toward their target (Table 3.3 - Panel A). On a long-term leverage basis, on the other hand, 
firms within the Durables, Service and Wholesale & Retail industries adjust their capital 
structures relatively slowly toward their target. While firms within the Health industries have 
low short-term leverage, those in Wholesale & Retail industries have low long-term leverages 
(Table 3.3 - Panel B). This points out that these industries exhibit relatively less default risk. 
Therefore, when firms in these industries deviate from their target capital structure, and in 
particular take on additional debt, they may feel less pressure to adjust back to the target 
quickly (e.g., Smith et al. 2010).  
Broadly speaking, we observe that majority of the industries in our sample exhibit an 
inverse relationship between leverage (i.e., default risk) and speed of adjustment. Taking a 
cue from Smith et al. (2010), these findings indicate that an industry’s default risk could be 
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the underlying factor determining adjustment speed. That is, firms in industries that have 
relatively high default risk tend to revert more quickly to their target capital structure than is 
the case in industries that have relatively low [default] risk.  
 
3.4.2.3 Cross-country heterogeneity of adjustment speed of basic capital structure 
 
To gain an idea about cross-country variations in adjustment speeds, we estimate 
Model 1 using system GMM for each of the countries included in our sample. For reasons of 
brevity, we report only coefficients of lagged leverage ratios
34
. On a short-term leverage 
basis, our results (Table 3.4 - Panel A) show that firms in Kenya adjust at the fastest rate (1 - 
0.349 = 0.651) while those in South Africa adjust at the slowest rate (1 – 0.816 = 0.184). On 
a long-term leverage basis, we observe that firms in Tunisia adjust at the fastest rate (1 – 
0.131 = 0.869) while those in Morocco adjust at the slowest rate (1 – 0.949 = 0.051). Thus, as 
in the inter-industry analyses, the results of our country-by-country analyses indicate that 
there is, indeed, a cross-country variation in capital structure adjustment speeds independent 
of how capital structure is defined
35
. These cross-country variations in adjustment speeds 
could be attributed to some country-level factors that explain capital structure dynamics 
beyond those explained by firm- and industry-specific characteristics.  
 
(Insert table 3.4 about here) 
 
Earlier, we hypothesized that legal institutions should determine the adjustment speed 
of basic capital structure of firms. To this end, we examine the dynamics by splitting our 
sample into firms from countries with common law and civil law traditions
36
. We estimate 
Model 1 using system GMM for firms in each sub-sample. Table 3.5 reports the adjustment 
                                                          
34
 The figures in parenthesis are robust standard errors. 
35
 The results of the other four countries including Botswana, Ghana, Mauritius, and Nigeria were not reported 
owing to sample size issues. 
36
 While Botswana, Ghana, Kenya, Nigeria, and South Africa have common law legal systems, Egypt, 
Mauritius, Morocco, and Tunisia have civil law legal systems (La Port et al. 1997). 
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speeds for each sub-sample. As in the previous analyses, we report only coefficients of 
lagged leverage ratios.  
 
(Insert table 3.5 about here) 
 
La Porta et al. (1997; 1998) demonstrate that countries with common law origin 
provide the strongest institutions and legal protections to investors (both shareholders and 
creditors), while countries with civil law origin provide the weakest protection and 
institutions. Accordingly, adjustment costs should be lower and/or adjustment benefits higher 
in common law origin countries, leading to faster adjustment. Consistent with this conjecture, 
we observe that firms in the common law sub-sample adjust to target capital structures at a 
relatively faster speed than those in civil law sub-sample. Interestingly, the difference in the 
adjustment speeds is more vivid when one considers short- and long-term leverages 
separately than total-leverage. Similar results were reported in other studies (e.g., Öztekin and 
Flannery 2008). These variations in adjustment speeds do strengthen the hypothesis that the 
legal institutions influence the adjustment costs and/or benefits, and hence, the adjustment 
speed of capital structure of firms. 
We further examine capital structure adjustment speeds by trifurcating our sample 
into sub-samples of income groups: upper-middle-income countries; lower-middle-income 
countries; and low-income countries
37
. We consider these sub-samples because the results 
may reveal the influence that economic development has on basic capital structure dynamics 
that we couldn’t capture through other variables. We carry out separate estimates of Model 1 
for each sub-sample using system GMM. Table 3.6 reports the variation in adjustment speed 
of capital structure of firms in all the three sub-samples. For reasons of brevity, only 
coefficients of the lagged leverage variable are reported.  
                                                          
37
 The classification of countries by income groups is a contentious issue and surrounded by fierce debate. 
Different institutions (e.g., the World Bank, IMF, the economist, CIA, etc.) use different criteria for different 
purposes to classify countries. We use World Bank’s classification based on per capita income levels. 
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Our results show that adjustment speeds vary across income groups independent of 
how leverage is defined. Specifically, on a short-term leverage basis, firms in richer countries 
tend to have a slower adjustment speed of capital structure than is the case in poorer 
countries. We observe similar results for total leverage (Table 3.6).  
 
(Insert table 3.6 about here) 
 
These differences in the speed of adjustment are consistent with the view that the 
relative costs and/or benefits of deviating from target capital structure varies across income 
levels. Hence, the (net) adjustment cost, based on Table 3.6, is highest for upper-middle-
income countries, followed by lower-middle-income countries and low-income countries. 
These differences in the speed of adjustment do strengthen the idea that macroeconomic 
factors influence the speed of adjustment (e.g., Hackbarth, Miao and Morellec 2006; 
Wanzenried 2006). In contrast, this finding doesn’t sit well with the proposition that firms in 
less developed countries actually adjust their capital structure at a slower rate than those in 
more developed countries.  
We now proceed to examine the nexus between more-narrowly defined features of 
each country’s macroeconomic and institutional environment by introducing a set of more-
narrowly defined legal, financial, macroeconomic variables into Equation (6) – Model 2. In 
particular, in Model 2, we include such variables as size of the overall economy, growth rate 
of the economy, corporate tax rate, inflation, stock market size, stock market liquidity, size of 
banking sector, creditor rights protection, shareholder rights protection and rule of law. Most 
of these country-level variables were severely correlated that putting all of them into one 
model would result in multicollinearity problem.
38
 To avoid problem of multicollinearity and 
also keep the estimation problem tractable, we develop variants of Model 2 (i.e., Model 2a, 
Model 2b, . . . ., Model 2g) each of which encompass only less severely correlated 
                                                          
38
 See the correlation matrices in Table 2.3 
116 
 
independent variables. Table 3.7 presents the parameter estimates and related test statistic 
using system GMM for each of the measures of leverage.  
 
(Insert table 3.7 about here) 
 
The estimated coefficient on the interaction term with the marginal corporate tax rate 
indicates that firms in countries with higher marginal corporate tax rates adjust faster towards 
their target leverage rate implying that higher untapped tax benefits enhance the pace at 
which firms adjust to their target capital structure. Empirical works by Öztekin and Flannery 
(2008) and Clark et al. (2009) report similar results. In line with the predictions by Mills 
(1996), our results indicate a statistically weak but positive relationship between inflation and 
speed of capital structure (Table 3.7). This confirms the hypothesis that inflationary situations 
lead to increased cost of capital for sub-optimal capital structure, and hence lead, to higher 
adjustment speed towards an optimal capital structure. This result is in sync with the findings 
reported in Wanzenried (2006) in a study of four European countries.  
Our results show that the nexus between the overall size of the economy and its 
growth rate, on the one hand, and leverage, on the other, is a function of how one defines 
leverage. In particular, we observe a negative but weak relationship between GDP per capita 
growth rate and adjustment speed of short-term leverage and a positive relationship for long-
term and total leverage (Table 3.7). This partially confirms Hackbarth et al.’s (2006) 
argument that lower restructuring thresholds during periods of high GDP per capita growth 
lead to faster capital structure adjustment speeds. In a study of firms drawn from four 
European countries, Wanzenried (2006) reports similar results. Also, we note that overall size 
of the economy impacts adjustment speed of short-term leverage negatively while it 
positively impacts the adjustment speed of long-term leverage (Table 3.7). 
Dependable legal systems, which assure investors that they receive promised cash 
flows, enhance capital market transactions (e.g., Öztekin and Flannery 2008). Although 
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statistically weak, we find that adjustment speeds of both short-term and long-term leverage 
are faster in countries with stronger shareholder rights protection. However, an opposite 
relationship emerges when total leverage is considered (Table 3.7). This partially confirm the 
hypothesis that firms in countries with better protection to shareholder rights exhibit faster 
capital structure adjustment speed than is the case in countries with poor shareholder rights 
protection. 
In contrast to Öztekin and Flannery (2008) and Clark et al. (2009), a negative 
relationship is revealed between the adjustment speeds of short-term and total-leverage and 
creditor rights protection (Table 3.7). On the other hand, although statistically weak, we 
observe that creditor rights protection positively influences the adjustment speed of long-term 
leverage. The statistically significant negative relationship does not support our hypothesis 
that a stronger protection of creditor rights leads to a faster capital structure adjustment speed. 
In addition, albeit statistically weak, we observe that better law enforcement tends to 
positively impact on the adjustment speed of capital structure independent of how leverage is 
defined (Table 3.7). This is in sync with the theory that better law enforcement positively 
affects adjustment speed of capital structure and also in agreement with results reported in 
Öztekin and Flannery (2008) and Clark et al. (2009). 
We observe that stock market size has a statistically strong but definitionally sensitive 
influence on adjustment speed. To be exact, it has a negative influence on adjustment speed 
of short-term and total-leverage while it has a positive influence on the adjustment speed of 
long-term leverage. We observe, more or less, similar results for the stock market liquidity 
variable. These results vindicate Deesomsak et al. (2009) who argue that developed stock 
markets, by reducing information asymmetry, may trigger firms to switch to long-term 
leverage. As such, firms may rapidly adjust their long-term than short-term leverage in 
countries with bigger and developed stock markets.  
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In line with extant literature (e.g., Öztekin and Flannery 2008), our results show a 
statistically weak but positive relationship between relative size of banking sector and capital 
structure adjustment speed independent of how leverage is defined. Thus, our result supports 
the proposition that firms in countries with more developed banking sector adjust their capital 
structure more rapidly than those in countries with less developed banking sector.  
 
3.5 Conclusions  
 
In this chapter, we further extended the debate on basic capital structure decisions of 
firms in Africa along the lines of empirical endeavours elsewhere. We contended that capital 
structure of firms in Africa displays target behaviour and the pace at which they adjust their 
capital structure to a target is a function of not only firm characteristics but also of industrial, 
institutional and macroeconomic factors. We examined the data using system-GMM panel 
data estimator which is robust to firm heterogeneity and data endogeneity problems.  
The chapter presented evidence that capital structure of firms in Africa not only 
converges to a target but also that it faces varying degrees of adjustment costs and/or benefits 
in doing so. This suggests not only that dynamic trade-off theory explains capital structure 
decisions of firms in our sample countries but also rules out the dominance of information 
asymmetry based theories within the context of firms in Africa. 
Also, the chapter established that the extent of costs and/or benefits of adjustment that 
firms in Africa face is determined, inter alia, by firm-specific factors such as firm 
profitability, size, growth opportunities, and the gap between observed and target capital 
structure. Furthermore, except for firm profitability which positively influences adjustment 
speed, we observe that the nature of influence that firm-specific characteristics exert on 
adjustment costs and/or benefits is a function of how leverage is defined. The role that firm-
specific characteristics play in the determination of adjustment speed suggests that financing 
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costs, financial flexibility, access to external finance, the potential cost of distress and the 
value of debt-related tax-shields are at play in aggravating or mitigating adjustment costs 
and/or benefits. 
In terms of inter-industry differences in adjustment costs and/or benefits, we note that 
the relationships are sensitive to how one defines capital structure. On a short-term leverage 
basis, firms within the Durables and Chemicals & Construction industries move toward their 
target capital structures relatively rapidly than is the case in other industries. In contrast, on a 
long-term leverage basis, firms within the Health, Oil & Gas, and Regulated industries move 
towards their target capital structures relatively rapidly compared to those in other industries. 
A further investigation shows that firms in industries with higher default risk tend to adjust 
faster than those industries with lesser default risk implying that probability of bankruptcy 
has important place in determining adjustment costs and/or benefits of a firm in our sample 
countries.   
In addition, consistent with the view that adjustment costs should be lower and /or 
adjustment benefits should be higher in common law origin countries; we observe that firms 
in countries with common law tradition tend to more rapidly adjust their capital structure than 
is the case in countries with civil law system. In terms of more-narrowly-defined institutional 
variables, we observe that shareholder rights protection and rule of law, in contrast to creditor 
rights protection, have positive influence on capital structure adjustment speed of firms. The 
implication of these findings is that investor protection and contract enforceability are 
important matters in the determination of adjustment costs and/or benefits of a firm in the 
sample countries. 
The chapter also proffers evidence that a more developed banking sector and stock 
market negatively influence speed of adjustment of short-term and total leverage. Contrary to 
expectation, adjustment speeds of short-term and long-term leverages are slower in richer 
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countries than is the case in poorer countries. Furthermore, firms in countries which have 
higher marginal corporate tax rate and inflation tend to have faster adjustment speed. Put 
together, the evidences again suggest that access to external finance and tax issues are central 
to the determination of adjustment costs and/or benefits of a firm in our sample.  
Although there has been an avalanche of theoretical and empirical endeavours to 
enhance our understanding about the dynamics of basic capital structure, similar researches 
on the maturity structure of debt are scarce; especially within the African setting. In Chapter 
4, the thesis examines the role that firm, industry, institutional and macroeconomic factors 
play in the determination of a firm’s debt maturity structure. 
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Table 3.1  Evolution of firm and country characteristics  
 
Panel A: Descriptive statistics of firm characteristics 
Year 
Distance 
- STL 
Distance 
- LTL 
Distance 
- TL 
Firm  
Size 
Earnings  
Volatility Profitability 
Growth  
Opportunities 
Asset  
Tangibility 
Dividend  
Payout 
Tax  
shield 
1999 0.069 0.139 0.096 5.221 0.244 0.274 0.024 0.543 0.293 0.031 
2000 0.161 0.170 0.092 5.108 0.270 0.059 0.034 0.457 0.634 0.030 
2001 0.142 0.171 0.097 5.150 0.274 0.124 0.058 0.390 0.553 0.038 
2002 0.142 0.179 0.112 4.968 0.216 0.086 0.029 0.369 0.675 0.036 
2003 0.157 0.187 0.091 4.961 0.235 0.094 0.056 0.362 0.687 0.036 
2004 0.156 0.176 0.089 4.973 0.219 0.106 0.053 0.348 0.632 0.034 
2005 0.159 0.174 0.090 5.067 0.234 0.118 0.035 0.337 0.584 0.033 
2006 0.150 0.168 0.082 5.170 0.208 0.114 0.078 0.326 0.601 0.031 
2007 0.148 0.165 0.087 5.321 0.225 0.130 0.086 0.322 0.614 0.031 
2008 0.140 0.167 0.086 5.417 0.209 0.122 0.075 0.325 0.613 0.033 
Overall 0.151 0.172 0.089 5.116 0.224 0.112 0.059 0.350 0.619 0.034 
 
Notes:  Distance-STL refers to the difference between the observed short-term leverage and the fitted values from a fixed effects (two way error component) regression of the 
short-term leverage on the eight capital structure determinants; Distance-LTL refers to the difference between the observed long-term leverage and the fitted values 
from a fixed effects (two way error component) regression of the long-term leverage on the eight capital structure determinants; Distance-TL refers to the difference 
between the observed total leverage and the fitted values from a fixed effects (two way error component) regression of the total leverage on the eight capital structure 
determinants. The exact definition of the other variables in the table is as indicated in Table 2.3 in Chapter 2. 
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Table 3. 1: (con’d …)  
 
 
Panel B: Descriptive statistics of institutional and macroeconomics characteristics 
Year 
Total 
Leverage 
Long-
term 
Leverage  
Short-
term  
Leverage Taxation Inflation 
Size of 
Economy 
Growth 
of 
Economy 
Size of 
Stock 
Market 
Liquidity of 
Stock 
Market 
Size of  
Banking 
Sector 
Creditor 
Rights 
Shareholder 
Rights 
Rule of 
Law 
1999 0.413 0.099 0.314 35.108 4.098 3.188 2.332 73.484 26.960 0.660 2.384 3.550          . 
2000 0.448 0.100 0.348 34.985 4.213 3.199 2.621 58.206 28.824 0.657 2.384 3.550 -0.077 
2001 0.488 0.121 0.367 34.985 4.821 3.206 1.677 46.577 18.948 0.691 2.384 3.550       . 
2002 0.501 0.115 0.386 34.985 5.363 3.210 1.034 61.606 30.713 0.702 2.384 3.550 -0.102 
2003 0.500 0.109 0.392 34.863 5.797 3.220 2.206 62.971 20.428 0.699 2.384 3.550 -0.125 
2004 0.500 0.112 0.388 34.863 8.252 3.233 3.202 85.285 23.278 0.705 2.384 3.550 -0.036 
2005 0.499 0.115 0.384 34.863 5.530 3.246 2.980 112.525 35.167 0.709 2.384 3.550 -0.030 
2006 0.498 0.121 0.377 34.531 7.001 3.266 4.609 125.792 44.854 0.691 2.384 3.550 -0.099 
2007 0.490 0.131 0.359 23.404 8.021 3.285 4.592 144.504 42.829 0.679 2.384 3.550 -0.119 
2008 0.476 0.139 0.337 23.404 NA NA NA NA 51.166 . 2.384 3.550 -0.100 
Overall 0.493 0.118 0.375 32.599 5.899 3.228 2.806 85.661 32.317 0.688 2.384 3.550 -0.086 
 
Notes: The exact definition of the variables is indicated in Table 2.3 in Chapter 2.  
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Table 3.2: Firm-specific factors and capital structure adjustment – Model 1 
Dependent Variable Short-term leverage Long-term leverage Total leverage 
LVi,t-1 0.461 *** 0.410 *** 0.606 *** 
 
(0.086) 
 
(0.097) 
 
(0.086) 
 LVi,t-1 x Sizei,t  0.033 
 
-0.116 * 0.062 ** 
 
(0.022) 
 
(0.062) 
 
(0.025) 
 LVi,t-1 x Profiti,t  -0.810 ** -0.453 
 
-0.767 * * 
 
(0.403) 
 
(0.944) 
 
(0.359) 
 LVi,t-1 x Grwthti,t 0.164 
 
-0.257 
 
0.048  
 
(0.185) 
 
(0.528) 
 
(0.231) 
 LVi,t-1 x Disti,t  -0.128 
 
8.038 *** -0.814 ** 
 
(0.361) 
 
(1.231) 
 
(0.354) 
 Constant 0.150 ** 0.042 
 
0.095 
   (0.062)   (0.031)  (0.062)  
Wald Test 49.21 *** 317.18 *** 386.16 ***  
Z2 1.148 
 
-0.974 
 
0.753 
 Sargan Test 96.738 
(107) 
 
127.715 
(113) 
 
100.641 
(107) 
 N 1067 
 
1130 
 
1070  
Notes:  The table reports the results of estimating Equation (6) using system GMM estimator proposed by Blundell 
and Bond (1998). Variations in sample size are due to data limitations. The table shows the coefficients on 
the lagged leverage ratio and on the interaction term of the determinant of adjustment speed with the 
lagged leverage ratio. Coefficients significantly different from zero at 1%, 5%, and 10% level are marked 
***, **, and *, respectively. Robust standard errors are in brackets.  The Wald test statistic refers to the 
null hypothesis that all coefficients on the determinants of target leverage ratio are jointly equal to zero. 
The test statistic Z2 tests the null hypothesis of no second order correlation in the residuals. The Sargan test 
statistic refers to the null hypothesis that the overidentifying restrictions are valid and uses the Blundell and 
Bond (1998) system GMM estimator. In parenthesis are the chi-squares. Sizei,t refers to size of firm i at 
time t. Profiti,t refers to profitability of firm i at time t. Grwthti,t refers to growth opportunities of firm i at 
time t. Disti,t refers to the value of the distance variable (as defined in Table 3.1) of frim i at time t. The 
exact definition of the variables is as presented in Table 2.3 in Chapter 2. 
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Table 3.3 - Capital structure and its adjustment speed by industry  
 
Panel A: Inter-industry heterogeneity in adjustment speeds of basic capital structure 
Dependent Variable Short-term leverage  Long-term leverage Total leverage  
Non-durable Industry 0.616 *** 0.549 ** 0.725 *** 
 
(0.165) 
 
(0.259) 
 
(0.141) 
 
 
1006 
 
1055 
 
1011 
    Durable Industry 0.424 * 0.929 ** 0.686 *** 
 
(0.284) 
 
(0.408) 
 
(0.192) 
 
 
167 
 
170 
 
167 
      Manufacturing Industry  0.563 *** 0.564 *** 0.662 *** 
 
(0.134) 
 
(0.162) 
 
(0.102) 
 
 
921 
 
958 
 
922 
      Oil and Gas Industry  0.523 
 
0.255 
 
0.208 
 
 
(0.386) 
 
(1.414) 
 
(1.302) 
 
 
385 
 
383 
 
386 
       Chemicals & Construction Industry 0.426 
 
0.370 *** 0.550 *** 
 
(0.852) 
 
(0.131) 
 
(0.174) 
 
 
523 
 
536 
 
523 
       Business Equipment Industry 0.902 ** 0.537 
 
0.865 *** 
 
(0.387) 
 
(0.894) 
 
(0.223) 
 346 350 346  
       
Regulated Industry  0.728  0.333 ** 0.839  
 (2.279)  (0.152)  (1.494)  
 304  310  305  
       
Wholesale & Retail Industry 0.764  0.592 *** 0.841  
 (0.882)  (0.138)  (0.819)  
 697  748  705  
       
Health Industry 0.739  0.084  0.467  
 (0.503)  (3.134)  (0.791)  
 283  294  283  
       
Service Industry  0.453 *** 0.643 *** 0.649 *** 
 (0.199)  (0.208)  (0.156)  
 814  862  814  
Notes: The table reports the parameter estimates of the one-period lagged dependent variable and the corresponding robust 
standard errors and number of observations. Equation (6) was estimated using system GMM estimator proposed by 
Blundell and Bond (1998) for each industry in the sample. For reasons of brevity, we do not report parameter estimates and 
related details of firm-specific variables included in the model. Coefficients significantly different from zero at 1%, 5%, 
and 10% level are marked ***, **, and *, respectively. Robust standard errors are in brackets.  And the figure in a third 
raw is the number of observations. The exact definition of the industries is as reported in Table 2.2 in Chapter 3. 
 
 
Panel B: Summary Statistics of Leverage by Industry 
 
Short-term leverage 
 
Long-term leverage 
 
Total leverage 
 
Mean SD* Obs# 
 
Mean SD* Obs# 
 
Mean SD* Obs# 
Non-durables 0.345 0.209 1006 
 
0.109 0.159 1055 
 
0.467 0.288 1011 
Durables 0.342 0.178 167 
 
0.088 0.115 170 
 
0.432 0.212 167 
Manufacturing  0.357 0.194 921 
 
0.124 0.176 958 
 
0.482 0.245 922 
Oil & Gas 0.265 0.233 385 
 
0.197 0.206 383 
 
0.477 0.321 386 
Chem. & Construction 0.445 0.224 523 
 
0.108 0.164 536 
 
0.555 0.230 523 
Business  Equipment 0.429 0.243 346 
 
0.078 0.105 350 
 
0.526 0.316 346 
Regulated  0.367 0.200 304 
 
0.182 0.194 310 
 
0.546 0.226 305 
Wholesale & Retail 0.428 0.229 697 
 
0.095 0.119 748 
 
0.545 0.309 705 
Health 0.352 0.189 283 
 
0.074 0.138 294 
 
0.435 0.232 283 
Service & Others 0.318 0.226 814 
 
0.132 0.160 862 
 
0.462 0.293 814 
Notes: SD = Standard deviation; Obs = Number of observations. The exact definition of the industries is as reported in 
Table 2.2 in Chapter 2. 
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Table 3.4: Cross-country heterogeneity in adjustment speed of basic capital structure 
Dependent Variable Short-term leverage  Long-term leverage Total leverage  
Egypt 0.531 *** 0.442 *** 0.658 *** 
 
(0.096) 
 
(0.098) 
 
(0.133) 
 
 
2685 
 
2702 
 
2697 
    South Africa 0.816 
 
0.178 
 
0.773 *** 
 
(0.853) 
 
(0.645) 
 
(0.136) 
 
 
1664 
 
1663 
 
1665 
     Kenya  0.349 *** 0.178 *** 0.022 
 
 
(0.135) 
 
(0.056) 
 
(0.092) 
 
 
150 
 
163 
 
151 
     Morocco  0.750 
 
0.949 *** 0.647 *** 
 
(0.833) 
 
(0.141) 
 
(0.318) 
 
 
288 
 
289 
 
288 
      Tunisia 0.539 *** 0.131 
 
0.360 
 
 
(0.179) 
 
(0.181) 
 
(0.452) 
 
 
176 
 
177 
 
176 
 Notes: The table reports parameter estimates of the one-period lagged dependent variable and the corresponding robust 
standard errors and number of observations. Equation (6) was estimated using system GMM estimator proposed by 
Blundell and Bond (1998) for each country in the sample. The results of four countries including Botswana, Ghana, 
Mauritius, and Nigeria were not included owing to sample size issues. For reasons of brevity, we do not report 
parameter estimates and related details of firm-specific variables included in the model. Coefficients significantly 
different from zero at 1%, 5%, and 10% level are marked ***, **, and *, respectively. Robust standard errors are in 
brackets. And the figure in a third raw is the number of observations.  
 
Table 3.5: Heterogeneity in Adjustment Speeds across Legal Origin 
Dependent Variable Short-term leverage  Long-term leverage Total leverage  
Common Law 0.430 *** 0.282 
 
0.619 ** 
 
(0.151) 
 
(1.309) 
 
(0.291) 
 
 
3322 
 
3341 
 
3334 
    French Law 0.527 *** 0.469 *** 0.641 *** 
 
(0.086) 
 
(0.100) 
 
(0.080) 
 
 
2122 
 
2325 
 
2128 
 Notes: The table reports parameter estimates of the one-period lagged dependent variable and the corresponding robust 
standard errors and number of observations. Equation (6) was estimated using system GMM estimator proposed by 
Blundell and Bond (1998) for each legal family. For reasons of brevity, we do not report parameter estimates and 
related details of firm-specific variables included in the model. Coefficients significantly different from zero at 1%, 
5%, and 10% level are marked ***, **, and *, respectively. Robust standard errors are in brackets. And the figure 
in a third raw is the number of observations.  
 
Table 3.6: Heterogeneity in Adjustment Speeds across Income Groups 
Dependent Variable Short-term leverage  Long-term leverage Total leverage  
Upper middle income countries 0.802 
 
0.099 
 
0.775 *** 
 
(0.618) 
 
(0.221) 
 
(1.379) 
 
 
1911 
 
1910 
 
1912 
    Lower middle income countries 0.539 *** 0.471 *** 0.648 *** 
 
(0.136) 
 
(0.105) 
 
(0.081) 
 
 
3149 
 
3168 
 
3161 
    Low income countries 0.190  0.310 *** 0.533  
 (0.432)  (0.080)  (0.597)  
 388  588  389  
Notes: The table reports parameter estimates of the one-period lagged dependent variable and the corresponding robust 
standard errors and number of observations. Equation (6) was estimated using system GMM estimator proposed by 
Blundell and Bond (1998) for each income group family. For reasons of brevity, we do not report parameter 
estimates and related details of firm-specific variables included in the model. Coefficients significantly different 
from zero at 1%, 5%, and 10% level are marked ***, **, and *, respectively. Robust standard errors are in brackets. 
And the figure in a third raw is the number of observations.  
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Table 3.7 Determinants of adjustment speed of capital structure – Model 2 
 
Panel A: Dependent variable – Short term leverage 
 Model 2 (a) Model 2 (b) Model 2 (c) Model 2 (d) Model 2 (e) Model 2 (f) Model 2 (g) 
LVi,t-1 
 
0.456 
(0.093) 
*** 
 
0.452 
(0.083) 
*** 0.521 
(0.100) 
*** 
 
0.462 
(0.097) 
*** 0.469 
(0.087) 
*** 
 
0.498 
(0.112) 
*** 0.480 
(0.105) 
*** 
LVi,t-1 x Profiti,t  
 
-0.609 
(0.343) 
* 
 
-0.626 
(0.337) 
* -0.906 
(404) 
** 
 
-0.458 
(0.384) 
 
 
-0.537 
(0.380) 
 
-0.626 
(0.411) 
 -0.455 
(0.349) 
 
LVi,t-1 x Grwthti,t 
 
0.251 
(0.186) 
 
0.123 
(0.178) 
 0.143 
(0.219) 
 
 
0.129 
(0.204) 
 0.226 
(0.209) 
 
0.198 
(0213) 
 0.231 
(0.213) 
 
LVi,t-1 x Disti,t  
 
0.440 
(0.388) 
 
0.061 
(0.286) 
 0.176 
(0.348) 
 
 
0.213 
(0.462) 
 0.392 
(0.421) 
 
0.150 
(0.449) 
 0.432 
(0.353) 
 
LVi,t-1 x GDPGi,t  
 
0.003 
(0.010) 
 
  
  
  
  
    
LVi,t-1 x SRi,t  
 
 
 
 
  
  
  
  
  -0.077 
(0.052) 
 
LVi,t-1 x RULi,t  
 
-0.055 
(0.084) 
 
  
  
  -0.075
(0.094) 
 
  -0.105 
(0.090) 
 
LVi,t-1 x TAXi,t  
 
 
 
 
-0.001 
(0.001) 
 
  
  
  
    
LVi,t-1 x STKLIQi,t  
 
 
 
 
  
  
  
  
0.050 
(0.135) 
   
LVi,t-1 x INFLi,t  
 
 
 
 
  -0.001
(0.004) 
 
  
  
0.001 
(0.004) 
   
LVi,t-1 x STKSIZi,t  
 
 
 
 
  0.097 
(0.048) 
**   
  
    
LVi,t-1 x BNKSIZi,t  
 
 
 
 
  
  
-0.169 
(0.181) 
 
  
    
LVi,t-1 x CRi,t 
 
 
 
 
  
  
0.080 
(0.048) 
* 
 
  
    
LVi,t-1 x LOGGDPi,t 
 
 
 
 
  
  
  0.015
(0.070) 
 
    
Constant 
0.170 
(0.047) 
*** 0.204 
(0.046) 
*** 0.168
(0.051) 
*** 0.161 
(0.063) 
** 0.154 
(0.086) 
* 0.174 
(0.072) 
** 0.229 
(0.079) 
*** 
Wald Test 42.99 *** 43.68 *** 58.28 *** 41.35 *** 37.99 *** 31.21 *** 54.09 *** 
Z2 0.155 
 
1.471  0.295 
 
0.483  0.264 
 
0.262  1.184  
Sargan Test 82.186 
 
103.280  90.687 
 
80.335  85.404 
 
89.233  110.194  
N 5444 
 
5441  5435 
 
5440  5429 
 
5437  5428  
Notes:  GDPGi,t refers to the growth rate of real GDP of the country in which firm i operates at time t. SRi,t refers to the shareholder 
rights protection index of the country in which firm i operates at time t. RULi,t refers to the rule of law index of the country 
in which firm i operates at time t. TAXi,t refers to the highest corporate marginal tax rate of the country in which firm i 
operates at time t. STKLIQi,t refers to stock market liquidity of the country in which firm i operates at time t. INFi,t refers to 
inflation rate of the country in which firm i operates at time t. STKSIZi,t refers to stock market capitalization of the country 
in which firm i operates at time t. BNKSIZi,t refers to the relative size of banking sector of the country in which firm i 
operates at time t. CRi,t refers to creditor rights index the country in which firm i operates at time t. LOGGDPi,t refers to 
natural logarithm of the GDP of the country in which firm i operates at time t. The exact definition of the other variables is 
as presented in Tables 3.1 and 3.4. The table reports the results of estimating Equation (6) using system GMM estimator 
proposed by Blundell and Bond (1998). Variations in sample size are due to data limitations. The table shows the 
coefficients on the lagged leverage ratio and on the interaction term of the determinant of adjustment speed with the lagged 
leverage ratio. Coefficients significantly different from zero at 1%, 5%, and 10% level are marked ***, **, and *, 
respectively. Robust standard errors are in brackets.  The Wald test statistic refers to the null hypothesis that all coefficients 
on the determinants of target leverage ratio are jointly equal to zero. The test statistic Z2 tests the null hypothesis of no 
second order correlation in the residuals. The Sargan test statistic refers to the null hypothesis that the overidentifying 
restrictions are valid and uses the Blundell and Bond (1998) system GMM estimator. 
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Table 3.7 (con’d…) 
 
Panel B: Dependent Variable – Long term leverage 
 
 
Model 2 (a) Model 2 (b) Model 2 (c) Model 2 (d) Model 2 (e) Model 2 (f) Model 2 (g) 
LVi,t-1 
 
0.463 
(0.135) 
*** 
 
0.396 
(0.118) 
*** 0.476 
(0.152) 
*** 0.460 
(0.244) 
* 0.428 
(0.124) 
*** 
 
0.492 
(0.095) 
*** 0.413 
(0.095) 
*** 
LVi,t-1 x Profiti,t  
 
-1.188 
(1.197) 
 
-0.551 
(0.881) 
 -1.500 
(0.859) 
* -0.989 
(0.244) 
 -1.220 
(1.012) 
 
-1.360 
(0.740) 
* -0.692 
(0.834) 
 
LVi,t-1 x Grwthti,t 
 
-0.527 
(0.596) 
 
-0.615 
(0.391) 
 -0.471 
(0.494) 
 
-0.421 
(0.379) 
 -0.363 
(0.407) 
 
-0.331 
(0.378) 
 -0.555 
(0.453) 
 
LVi,t-1 x Disti,t  
 
6.460 
(1.461) 
*** 
 
8.109 
(1.424) 
*** 7.713 
(2.173) 
*** 
 
7.153 
(2.318) 
*** 7.334 
(1.597) 
*** 
 
6.750 
(1.404) 
*** 7.690 
(1.347) 
*** 
LVi,t-1 x GDPGi,t  
 
-0.001 
(0.021) 
 
  
  
  
  
    
LVi,t-1 x SRi,t  
 
  
  
  
  
  
  -0.095 
(0.101) 
 
LVi,t-1 x RULi,t  
 
-0.140
(0.165) 
 
  
  
  -0.074
(0.145) 
 
  -0.104 
(0.155) 
 
LVi,t-1 x TAXi,t  
 
  
-0.011 
(0.004) 
*** 
  
  
  
    
LVi,t-1 x STKLIQi,t  
 
  
  
  
  
  
-0.071 
(0.247) 
   
LVi,t-1 x INFLi,t  
 
  
  -0.013
(0.013) 
 
  
  
-0.003 
(0.017) 
   
LVi,t-1 x STKSIZi,t  
 
  
  0.276 
(0.133) 
**   
  
    
LVi,t-1 x BNKSIZi,t  
 
  
  
  
-0.575 
(0.595) 
 
  
    
LVi,t-1 x CRi,t 
 
  
  
  
-0.050 
(0.160) 
 
  
    
LVi,t-1 x LOGGDPi,t 
 
  
  
  
  -0.211
(0.131) 
* 
 
    
Constant 0.004
(0.026) 
 0.022 
(0.016) 
 -0.010
(0.011) 
 0.041 
(0.024) 
* 0.059 
(0.034) 
* 0.006 
(0.020) 
 0.023 
(0.022) 
 
Wald Test 294.04 *** 299.46 *** 331.24 *** 237.02 *** 241.09 *** 286.83 *** 371.00 *** 
Z2 -0.812 
 
-1.171  -0.787 
 
-1.034  -0.833 
 
-0.950  -0.986  
Sargan Test 97.645 
 
118.615  
105.800 
 
96.548  
102.111 
 
102.877  132.44
0 
 
N 5666 
 
5662  5645 
 
5658  5661 
 
5659  5652  
 
Notes:  The exact definition of the other variables is as presented in Tables 3.1, 3.4 and 3.9 (Panel A). The table reports the 
results of estimating Equation (6) using system GMM estimator proposed by Blundell and Bond (1998). 
Variations in sample size are due to data limitations. Disti,t is constructed as the fitted values from a fixed effects (two 
way error component) regression of the respective measures of leverage on the eight capital structure determinants. The 
exact definitions of all the other variables are presented in Appendix 1. The table shows the coefficients on the 
lagged leverage ratio and on the interaction term of the determinant of adjustment speed with the lagged leverage ratio. 
Coefficients significantly different from zero at 1%, 5%, and 10% level are marked ***, **, and *, respectively. Robust 
standard errors are in brackets.  The Wald test statistic refers to the null hypothesis that all coefficients on the determinants 
of target leverage ratio are jointly equal to zero. The test statistic Z2 tests the null hypothesis of no second order correlation 
in the residuals. The Sargan test statistic refers to the null hypothesis that the overidentifying restrictions are valid and uses 
the Blundell and Bond (1998) system GMM estimator. 
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Table 3.7: (Con’d …) 
 
Panel C: Dependent Variable – Total leverage 
 
 Model 2 (a) Model 2 (b) Model 2 (c) Model 2 (d) Model 2 (e) Model 2 (f) Model 2 (g) 
LVi,t-1 
 
0.612 
(0.096) 
*** 
 
0.634 
(0.101) 
*** 0.699 
(0.077) 
*** 0.568 
(0.109) 
*** 0.586 
(0.090) 
*** 
 
0.664 
(0.083) 
*** 0.620 
(0.076) 
*** 
LVi,t-1 x Profiti,t  
 
-0.594 
(0.309) 
* 
 
-0.553 
(0.366) 
 -0.799 
(0.393) 
** -0.610 
(0.300) 
** -0.766 
(0.446) 
* 
 
-0.630 
(0.355) 
* -0.740 
(0.434) 
* 
LVi,t-1 x Grwthti,t 
 
0.132 
(0.179) 
 
0.078 
(0.188) 
 0.064 
(0.201) 
 
0.076 
(0.132) 
 0.090 
(0.179) 
 
0.083 
(0.165) 
 0.086 
(0.162) 
 
LVi,t-1 x Disti,t  
 
-0.180 
(0.246) 
 
-0.449 
(0.251) 
* -0.256 
(0.236) 
 -0.320 
(0.257) 
 -0.516 
(0.285) 
* 
 
-0.280 
(0.206) 
 -0.435 
(0.307) 
 
LVi,t-1 x GDPGi,t  
 
-0.003 
(0.012) 
 
  
  
  
  
    
LVi,t-1 x SRi,t  
 
  
  
  
  
  
  0.008 
(0.031) 
 
LVi,t-1 x RULi,t  
 
-0.089
(0.089) 
 
  
  
  -0.070
(0.094) 
 
  -0.040 
(0.083) 
 
LVi,t-1 x TAXi,t  
 
  
-0.001 
(0.001) 
 
  
  
  
    
LVi,t-1 x STKLIQi,t  
 
  
  
  
  
  
-0.016 
(0.100) 
   
LVi,t-1 x INFLi,t  
 
  
  -0.001
(0.004) 
 
  
  
-0.001 
(0.003) 
   
LVi,t-1 x STKSIZi,t  
 
  
  0.073 
(0.030) 
**   
  
    
LVi,t-1 x BNKSIZi,t  
 
  
  
  
-0.216 
(0.151) 
 
  
    
LVi,t-1 x CRi,t 
 
  
  
  
0.124 
(0.055) 
** 
  
    
LVi,t-1 x LOGGDPi,t 
 
  
  
  
  0.050
(0.051) 
 
    
Constant 
 
0.201
(0.058) 
*** 0.221 
(0.061) 
*** 0.167
(0.050) 
*** 0.184 
(0.067) 
*** 0.168 
(0.083) 
** 0.185 
(0.065) 
*** 0.204 
(0.061) 
*** 
Wald Test 105.49 *** 104.08 *** 176.15 *** 196.97 *** 83.37 *** 125.91 *** 118.35 *** 
Z2 -0.288 
 
1.432  -0.347 
 
-0.102  -0.159 
 
-0.234  1.110  
Sargan Test 83.319 
 
109.630  85.574 
 
81.504  80.504 
 
82.596  116.237  
N 5462 
 
5448  5432 
 
5455  5461 
 
5460  5441  
 
Notes:  The exact definition of the other variables is as presented in Tables 3.1, 3.4 and 3.9 (Panel A). The table reports the 
results of estimating Eq.( 6) using system GMM estimator proposed by Blundell and Bond (1998). Variations 
in sample size are due to data limitations. Disti,t is constructed as the fitted values from a fixed effects (two way error 
component) regression of the respective measures of leverage on the eight capital structure determinants. The exact 
definitions of all the other variables are presented in Appendix1. The table shows the coefficients on the lagged 
leverage ratio and on the interaction term of the determinant of adjustment speed with the lagged leverage ratio. 
Coefficients significantly different from zero at 1%, 5%, and 10% level are marked ***, **, and *, respectively. Robust 
standard errors are in brackets.  The Wald test statistic refers to the null hypothesis that all coefficients on the determinants 
of target leverage ratio are jointly equal to zero. The test statistic Z2 tests the null hypothesis of no second order correlation 
in the residuals. The Sargan test statistic refers to the null hypothesis that the overidentifying restrictions are valid and uses 
the Blundell and Bond (1998) system GMM estimator. 
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CHAPTER 4 
 
DETERMINANTS OF DEBT MATURITY STRUCTURE  
 
4.1 Introduction 
 
Corporate finance theory has furthered our understanding of a range of financial 
decisions, inter alia, capital structure, debt maturity structure, and dividend policy. In 
Chapter 3, the thesis extended the debate on basic capital structure by empirically examining 
the role that institutions, macroeconomic conditions, firm-specific factors and industry 
characteristics play in capital structure rebalancing decisions of firms in the African setting. 
Although there has been a proliferation of studies on the subject of basic capital structure 
choice much less is known about debt maturity structure of firms (e.g., Schiantarelli and 
Sembenelli 1999; Antoniou, Guney and Paudyal 2006). However, debt maturity decisions are 
as important since they may be used to: (i) avoid liquidity risk by aligning a firm’s asset 
structure with its debt maturity structure; (ii) address agency problems; (iii) signal quality of 
earnings of a firm; or (iv) enhance flexibility in financing, reduce cost of financing, and 
refunding risk (Cai, Fairchild and Guney 2008)
39
. Thus, in this chapter, the thesis examines 
debt maturity structure of firms in the African setting. 
The earliest work on debt maturity structure was that of Morris’(1975) which focused on 
the determinants of debt maturity structure of U.S firms. Most subsequent empirical studies 
on debt maturity studies focused on North America (e.g., Mitchell 1993; Barclay and Smith 
Jr 1995; Stohs and Mauer 1996; Scherr and Hulburt 2001), Western Europe (e.g., Ozkan 
2000; 2002; Antoniou et al. 2006) and Japan (e.g., Cai et al. 1999). Lately, however, the 
literature has started witnessing a few research endeavours within the context of 
developing/emerging economies. The researches by Arslan and Karan (2006) on Turkish 
                                                          
39
 An exact definition of the phrase “debt maturity structure” as employed in this chapter and the debate 
surrounding an appropriate measure of debt maturity structure are documented in the section entitled 
“measuring debt maturity structure.” 
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firms; by Cai et al. (2008) on Chinese firms; by Gwatidzo (2009:149-222) on the choice of 
sources of debt on selected African countries, and Terra (2011) on Latin America are 
examples of the few researches that were carried out within the milieu of 
developing/emerging economies.  
The existing empirical work on debt maturity structure, nevertheless, has some 
limitations. First, it largely ignored how African firms make maturity decision although the 
institutional and macroeconomic setup of African economies is profoundly different from 
those in the developed world (e.g., Gwatidzo 2009:30). Second, except for a few studies (e.g., 
Antoniou et al. 2006; Fan et al. 2008; Terra 2011), most past researches deal with debt 
maturity structure within a single-country context. Although single-country studies enhance 
our understanding about a firm’s debt maturity decisions, they don’t help us explain cross-
country variations in debt maturity structure. Thirdly, although we anticipate inter-industry 
variations in debt maturity structure, there is no published work which examines inter-
industry variation in debt maturity structure. This chapter contributes to the literature since it 
is a first attempt to directly test the influence of institutional, macroeconomic, industry and 
firm-specific factors on debt maturity structure decisions of firms within the context of 
African countries.
40
 To that extent, it offers an ‘out of sample’ test for existing theories, 
primarily originating from US experience, by providing a comparative picture of nine major 
African economies.  
We drew a sample of 986 non-financial firms operating in nine African countries and 
analysed 10-year (1999 to 2008) data pertaining to these firms.  Taking a cue from Fan et al. 
(2008) and Song and Philippatos (2004) who use a sequential approach to modelling capital 
and debt maturity structure, we first examine the data using a baseline model (Model 1) 
which specifies debt maturity structure as a function of firm characteristics. Second, we 
                                                          
40
 Although Gwatidzo (2009) investigates determinants of debt choice in sub-Saharan Africa, his focus was to 
identify the factors influencing a firm’s choice of sources of debt finance, not debt maturity structure.  
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examine the data if the results in Model 1 persist after controlling for inter-industry 
differences (Model 2). Third, we consider cross-country variations in debt maturity structure 
by further including country dummies (Model 3). Fourth, we introduce some broadly-defined 
measures of cross country differences (i.e., legal system and level of development) that are 
known to impact on debt maturity structure (Model 4). Finally, we inject more specific and 
direct measures of institutional and macroeconomic conditions to see if such variables effect 
on debt maturity structure decisions of African firms (Model 5). 
In terms of firm-specific factors, we obtain evidence that earnings volatility, asset 
maturity, non-debt-related tax-shield and leverage variables have positive influence whilst 
profitability and dividend payout ratios have inverse influence on debt maturity structure. We 
also document clear evidence that there is inter-industry variation in debt maturity structures 
of our sample firms. In terms of cross-country variations, we find evidence that: (i) there is 
cross-country variation in debt maturity structure; (ii) a country’s income group, in addition 
to its direct impact, indirectly influences debt maturity structure of firms by enhancing or 
mitigating the impact of firm-specific factors on debt maturity structure; (iii) while 
shareholder and creditor rights protection, stock market size and size of overall economy 
positively influence debt maturity, economic growth, taxation and relative size of banking 
sector have a negative influence. 
The remainder of the chapter proceeds as follows: section 2 presents a brief review of 
the literature on debt maturity structure. Section 3 develops the empirical setup for the 
analysis. Section 4 presents the results and discussions and section 5 concludes.  
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4.2 Literature Review 
 
4.2.1 Debt maturity structure theories 
 
The foundation for the theoretical literature on debt maturity, as in basic capital structure, 
was implied in the breakthrough work of MM (1958) although a more formalized explanation 
was only provided in Stiglitz (1974). Stiglitz extends the argument of MM to a multiperiod 
model to show that a firm’s value, under certain conditions, is independent of its choice of 
debt maturity structure. Subsequent research efforts by relaxing Stiglitz’s conditions conclude 
that firm value depends on its debt maturity structure. This subsequent body of research 
forwards a number of explanations for debt maturity structure of a firm. The main criticism 
that can be made about these explanations is that there has not been a universal theory that 
explains debt maturity structure of a firm. Rather, there are only a set of partial explanations 
that have not been unified into a single theory (e.g., Terra 2011).  
We may summarize the main theories of debt maturity as follows. The first one is based 
on tax hypothesis which examines whether the amount of tax benefits differ between short-
term and long-term debt. The explanations suggested by Brick and Ravid (1985; 1991) and 
Ravid (1996) are perhaps the best known works along the lines of this hypothesis. The second 
is based on agency hypothesis which posits that firms choose debt maturity structure to 
reduce agency costs arising from asset substitution and underinvestment (e.g., Jensen and 
Meckling 1976; Myers 1977; Barnea et al. 1980; Myers and Majluf 1984; Jensen 1986; Fama 
1990; Harris and Raviv 1990). The third strand deals with signalling hypothesis which 
conjectures that a firm uses its debt maturity decision to convey information regarding its 
quality (e.g., Flannery 1986; Kale and Noe 1990; Mitchell 1991). The fourth theory is based 
on liquidity risk hypothesis which argues that the optimal debt maturity structure is a result of 
a trade-off between the benefits (e.g., reduced interest costs and enhanced reputation) and the 
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costs (e.g., liquidity risk) of issuing short-term debt (e.g., Diamond 1991). Finally, maturity-
matching hypothesis suggests that firms match their debt maturity to their asset maturity (e.g., 
Hart and Moore 1994; Graham and Harvey 2001).   
Based on these theories, the literature identifies a number of firm, industry and country 
level factors that determine debt maturity structure of a firm. However, neither theoretical 
predictions nor empirical results are uniform. Table 4.1 presents a summary of the theoretical 
predictions and empirical results. 
 
(Insert table 4.1 about here) 
 
4.2.2 Measuring debt maturity structure 
 
As in the competing theories, there has not been one universally accepted measure of 
debt maturity structure. Empirical literature focused on either the term-to-maturity of debt 
issues or measures of the proportions of short- and long-term debt of a firm to measure debt 
maturity structure (e.g., Stohs and Mauer 1996). While the first approach enables measuring 
the actual number of years to maturity of a firm’s debt, the latter approach provides a 
measure of monetary value of those debts maturing within the short-term relative to those 
maturing over the long-term. We adopt the latter approach mainly due to the difficulty of 
obtaining data on term-to-maturity of debt for our sample firms. Major studies such as 
Barclay and Smith Jr. (1995), Antoniou et al. (2006) and Deesomsak, Paudyal and Pescetto 
(2009) used a similar approach. 
However, again, there is no universal definition of long- or short-term debt. Some studies 
use the one-year mark following accounting conventions (e.g., Scherr and Hulburt 2001; 
Antoniou et al. 2006) while others use a three-year mark (e.g., Barclay and Smith Jr 1995), or 
a five-year mark (e.g., Schiantarelli and Sembenelli 1997) to delineate between short- and 
long-term debt. We use the one-year mark to delineate between the two categories of debt, 
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again, because of data availability. Thus, we defined debt maturity structure as the ratio of 
non-current liabilities to total liabilities. 
 
4.2.3 Firm characteristics and debt maturity structure 
 
The debt maturity theory considers firm characteristics as proxies for tax advantages, 
costs of agency, risk of liquidation and degree of information asymmetry and analyses their 
role in the determination of a firm’s debt maturity structure. Consistent with the literature, we 
include a set of firm level variables known to impact on debt maturity structure including 
firm size, profitability, growth opportunities, asset maturity, earnings volatility, non-debt-
related tax-shield, dividend payout and leverage.  
The literature commonly considers firm size as an inverse proxy for agency costs, degree 
of information asymmetry, and contracting and transaction costs. According to agency 
hypothesis, smaller firms are more likely to experience conflicts between shareholders and 
debtholders, leading to problems such as risk shifting, asset substitution and claim dilution. 
Further, the signalling role of debt is more important in smaller firms, as smaller firms might 
communicate less information to outsiders leading to more informational asymmetries 
because of economies of scale in information production and distribution (e.g., Deesomsak et 
al. 2009). Hence, both tax and signalling hypotheses suggests that larger firms tend to choose 
longer maturity than smaller ones.  
Past profitability of a firm has been under scrutiny in debt maturity structure research. 
The tax hypothesis suggests that a firm’s profitability should be directly related with debt 
maturity as profitable firms have higher taxable income, and thus receive greater tax benefits 
from long-term debt. This is because long-term debt can create a tax timing option to 
repurchase and re-issue debt (e.g., Kim, Mauer and Stohs 1995; Scherr and Hulburt 2001; 
Deesomsak et al. 2009). On the other hand, Flannery’s (1986) signalling theory contends that 
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short-term debt issuance is perceived by the market as good news that cannot be imitated by 
firms of bad quality. Hence, it is only firms with higher profit that could choose to issue 
short-term debts because they believe in their ability to refinance in opportune times. Thus, 
according to this theory, debt maturity is a decreasing function of a firm’s profitability.  
Theoretical prediction regarding the influence of growth opportunities on debt maturity 
is indeterminate as growth opportunities of a firm could be taken as a proxy for a host of 
attributes including agency costs, information asymmetry and liquidity risk. Agency 
hypothesis suggests that the agency cost of debt is likely to be higher for high growth firms 
which have more flexibility in their choice of future investments (e.g., Titman and Wessels 
1988). Informational asymmetries also tend to increase with growth opportunities. Hence, 
according to both hypotheses, abundance of growth opportunities shortens debt maturity 
(e.g., Myers 1977; Deesomsak et al. 2009). Liquidity hypothesis, on the other hand, predicts 
that firms with long-term investment opportunities – requiring ongoing managerial discretion 
– prefer hedge against liquidity risk by issuing long-term debts (e.g., Diamond 1991). Thus, 
based on liquidity risk reasoning, abundance of growth opportunities lengthens debt maturity.  
Stohs and Mauer (1996) and Morris (1975) argue that a firm can face the risk of not 
having sufficient cash in situations where the maturity of debt does not match that of assets. 
Similarly, Myers (1977) argues that maturity matching could partially serve as a tool for 
mitigation of underinvestment problems. Based on these arguments, we expect a direct 
relationship between asset maturity and debt maturity structure.  
The literature views earnings volatility as a proxy for the probability of financial distress, 
which leads to high bankruptcy risk. Studies as early as Kane, Marcus and McDonald (1985), 
using an option valuation model, show that the volatility of asset returns is inversely related 
to debt maturity. Flannery (1986) derives a separating equilibrium with positive transaction 
costs in which riskier borrowers are not able to cover cost of rolling short-term debt and 
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prefer long-term debt, while low-risk borrowers stick to short-term debt. Kale and Neo 
(1990) suggest that similar separating equilibrium is possible even in a framework without 
transaction costs. Sarkar (1999) also documents a negative relationship between debt maturity 
and earnings volatility.  
In an influential piece of work, DeAngelo and Masulis (1980) argue that non-debt-
related tax-shields are substitutes for debt-related tax-shields. The size of tax-shield benefit 
that a firm would receive by issuing long-term debt depends on the size of its non-debt-
related tax-deductible items such depreciation, amortization, tax credits, etc.; the higher the 
size of these items, the lesser the taxable income, and hence higher tax benefit that accrues to 
a firm from its use of long-term debt. Thus, we conjecture that debt maturity structure is a 
decreasing function of non-debt-related tax-shield.  
Reasoning based on agency and signalling hypotheses suggests that dividend payout 
ratio is inversely related to debt maturity structure as such firms tend to have lesser agency 
and information asymmetry related problems (e.g., Bhattacharya 1979; Miller and Rock 
1985; Terra 2011). This theoretical argument is supported empirically by Ferreira, Laureano 
and Custodio (2011) who find that U.S. firms that do not pay dividends are more likely to be 
financially constrained and less likely to be able to issue long-term debt.                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                    
The liquidity hypothesis predicts that a firm lengthens its debt maturity as leverage 
increases in order to offset the higher probability of liquidity crises, and thus delay exposure 
to bankruptcy risk (e.g., Stohs and Mauer 1996). On the other hand, Myers (1977) suggests 
that the agency cost of under-investment can be mitigated by reducing leverage, or by 
shortening debt maturity. If firms reduce debt to mitigate the under-investment problem, there 
is less need to shorten their debt maturity.  
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4.2.4 Industry characteristics and debt maturity structure 
 
The extant literature presents ample evidence on inter-industry variation in debt 
maturity structure. For instance, Barclay and Smith (1995) recognize the role of industry 
effects in debt maturity decisions by suggesting that firms in regulated industries choose less 
short-term debt because the agency costs of managerial discretion are lower in such 
industries. In a study of debt maturity structures of Chinese companies, Cai et al. (2008) note 
generally similar results with regard to the determinants of debt maturity structures across 
different industries. Likewise, Guedes and Opler (1996) examined the determinants of the 
maturity of corporate debt issues of 7 369 bonds and notes, and found that firms in utilities 
industry, on average, issue relatively long-term debt. The literature identifies that the driving 
forces behind these variation are managerial incentives, asset structure, operating flexibility, 
economies of scale in borrowing and operations, level of financial market access and level of 
asymmetry between managers and lenders (e.g., Guedes and Opler 1996; Scherr and Hulburt 
2001). In the present chapter, as in the previous chapters, we employ ten industry 
classifications following the work of Song and Philippatos (2004). The financial industry is 
excluded because its debt maturity structure is strongly affected by a different set of 
regulatory requirements.  
 
4.2.5 Institutions and debt maturity structure 
 
Recent literature points out that debt maturity decisions of a firm can hardly be 
understood in isolation from the legal and financial institutions that epitomize the country in 
which the firm operates. This is because different institutional environments influence the 
relationship between managers, shareholders and creditors (e.g., Antoniou et al. 2006; Fan et 
al. 2008; Deesomsak et al. 2009). In this section, we explore how these institutions effect on 
debt maturity decisions of a firm.  
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4.2.5.1 Legal institutions 
 
Recent literature accentuates the critical role of legal institutions in understanding 
patterns of corporate finance in different countries (e.g., La Porta et al. 1998). Debt maturity 
structure theory suggests that a major factor in a firm’s choice of debt maturity structure is 
the existence of agency costs. And, the legal environment in which contracting takes place 
affects the extent of agency problem that exists between corporate insiders and outsiders, and 
thus, influences outsiders’ confidence in the markets and consequently their development 
(e.g., Djankov et al. 2008; Fan et al. 2008). Prior empirical works indicate that there are 
varying degrees of disparities between the laws in the books and laws in action. This 
phenomenon is particularly conspicuous when one considers the African continent as all 
African countries had adopted (or “transplanted”) laws from Western origin (e.g., Berkowitz 
et al. 2003). We consider the legal tradition on which a country’s legal system is based to 
investigate cross-country disparities in debt maturity structures. We further consider variables 
that are known to more-narrowly-define the legal institutions in a country: shareholder rights 
protection; creditor rights protection; and quality of law enforcement.  
Firms in countries with stronger shareholder rights protection tend to use more long-
term debt than short-term debt as the need to use short-term debt to mitigate agency problems 
is reduced. On the other hand, according to Diamond (1991), stronger creditor rights 
protection incentivizes lenders who engage in monitoring activities to make short-term loans. 
Hence, firms in such countries will use more short-term debt than long-term debt. 
Furthermore, since short-term debt makes it more difficult for borrowers to expropriate 
creditors, firms in countries with poor law enforcement are likely to issue more short-term 
debt than long-term debt (e.g., Hart and Moore 1995; Diamond 2004).  
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4.2.5.2 Financial institutions 
 
The debt maturity research also considers financial institutions as factors that 
determine debt maturity structure of firms. Based on extant literature, we identify three 
proxies that define the development of financial institutions in a given country: stock market 
size, stock market liquidity and relative size of banking sector
41
.  
In countries where the weight of banking sector is heavier
42
, we observe more 
screening, monitoring and controlling of firms by banks as bankers have economies of scale 
in obtaining information (e.g., Diamond 1991). Such systems reduce creditor’s costs related 
with information asymmetry, agency and bankruptcy (e.g., Demirgüç-Kunt and Maksimovic 
1999; Levine 2002; Antoniou et al. 2008). Thus, the relative size of banking sector of a 
country is expected to be inversely related with debt maturity, because short-term debt 
enables banks to use their comparative advantage in monitoring lenders (e.g, Fan et al. 2008).  
The conjectures on the influence of stock market development on debt maturity are 
difficult to discern. On the one hand, Grossman (1976) shows that market prices partially 
transmit information and hence reduce information asymmetry problems making lending to 
quoted firms less risky. Thus, an active stock market may increase a firm’s ability to obtain 
long-term debt. On the other hand, both Deesomsak et al. (2009) and Demirgüç-Kunt and 
Maksimovic (1999) contend that there is an incentive for firms in countries with developed 
stock market to switch from long-term debt to equity, as the additional liquidity of the stock 
market encourages risk taking behaviour from well-informed investors. This could lead to 
stock market development to be negatively related with debt maturity. Which of these 
scenarios prevail in the context of African firms is an empirical matter.  
                                                          
41
 These variables are the most commonly used variables in prior empirical efforts. Hence, we decided to use 
similar variables to enhance comparability. Otherwise, there are a host of variables that other literature uses to 
measure financial development. For an extensive discussion on measures of financial development, see Beck, 
T., et al. (2000), Demetriads, P. and Luintel, K. (1996) and Demirgüç-Kunt, A and R. Levine (1996).  
42
 Such countries are referred to as “bank-centred systems” in the literature. 
140 
 
4.2.6 Macroeconomic conditions and debt maturity structure 
 
The notion that macro-economic conditions of a country influence debt maturity 
structure of a firm is not new. We consider three variables that define macro-economic 
conditions of a country: economic development, inflation, and taxation.  
 
4.2.6.1 Economic development 
 
Firms can be expected to use more short-term debts in lower-income countries as it is 
difficult in such countries both to sell shares of stock and to enforce contracts (e.g., Caprio Jr 
and Demirgug-Kunt 1998). Furthermore, Demirgüç-Kunt and Maksimovic (1999) attribute 
the increased reliance on long-term debt of firms in more developed countries to maturity 
matching exercises as firms in developed countries tend to own more fixed assets. Similarly, 
in a more recent study, Fan et al. (2008) and Deesomsak et al. (2009) suggest that firms in 
less developed countries tend to use far less long-term debt than their counterparts in 
developed countries. We examine the influence of development on debt maturity by 
trifurcating our sample countries into three categories: upper-middle-income, lower-middle-
income (LMI) and low-income (LI) group countries
43
.  
We further examine the role of economic development in the determination of a 
firm’s debt maturity by introducing more specific variables: size of overall economy and its 
growth rate. The maturity matching hypothesis predicts that GDP per capita should be 
positively related with debt maturity structure. On the other hand, the fact that agency 
problem would tend to be exacerbated during times of recession or down turns increase the 
likelihood that firms would use more short-term debt at times of recession or downturn (e.g., 
De Haas and Peeters 2006).  
                                                          
43
 Classification of countries as “developed” and “developing/emerging” is a contentious issue and surrounded 
by fierce debate. Different institutions (e.g., the World Bank, IMF, The Economist, CIA, etc) use different 
criteria for classifying countries. We used World Bank’s classification of countries into income groups.  
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4.2.6.2  Taxation 
 
According to Kane et al. (1985), debt maturity is negatively associated with tax 
advantage of debt. Notwithstanding the attention that taxation and tax institution have 
received in debt maturity structure research, there has not been one easy way of measuring 
them
44
. We employ highest marginal corporate tax rate as a proxy to measure differences in 
taxation systems across countries.  
 
4.2.6.3  Inflation 
 
Inflation is usually considered as a proxy for government’s ability to manage the 
economy and it provides information about the stability of a currency in long-term 
contracting (e.g., Demirgüç-Kunt and Maksimovic 1999; Wanzenried 2006). Debt contracts 
are generally based on nominal terms and thus high inflation which generally increases the 
interest rate risk faced by firms may tilt lenders away from long-term debt. Hence, inflation 
should be inversely related with debt maturity (e.g., Demirgüç-Kunt and Maksimovic 1999; 
Fan et al. 2008; Deesomsak et al. 2009).  
The noticeable commonality between most of the determinants
45
 of basic capital and 
debt maturity structures and that capital structure as measured by leverage ratio is one of the 
determinants of debt maturity structure reinforces the view that the two financing decisions 
are rather intertwined and, perhaps, jointly determined. That is, in addition to the direct 
influence that determinants of debt maturity structure have on the latter, they also influence 
the latter through their influence on capital structure (Barclay, Marx and Smith 2001).  
                                                          
44
 See the discussion on Chapter 2 for an elaborate discussion on alternative proxies of the tax variable. 
45
 Except for asset maturity and a measure of leverage, we note that the firm-specific determinants of debt 
maturity structure are also determinants of basic capital structure.  
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4.3 The Empirical Framework 
 
With a view to determine which set of factors – firm, industry, or country factors – are 
more important determinants of debt maturity, Fan et al. (2008) employ a sequential approach 
to modelling debt maturity structure. We used a similar approach in this chapter. Firstly, we 
analyze the data using a baseline model (Model 1) that defines debt maturity as a linear 
function of firm characteristics       
   that have been used in past cross-sectional studies46. 
The model can be written as:  
 
                
                       (1) 
 
where       denotes debt maturity structure,  
     
 
 is a vector of firm characteristics,     is a 
column vector containing the corresponding coefficients.  
Secondly, we control for industry effects by introducing dummies      
   for each 
industry to examine if the industry in which a firm operates matter in debt maturity decisions 
of a firm (Model 2). The model is written as: 
 
           
     
      ∑         
               (2) 
 
where     
  is a dummy variable for industry classification to which firm i belongs and     is 
the corresponding coefficient. To avoid a dummy variable trap problem
47
, we used the 
manufacturing industry as a reference industry
48
. Thus, the coefficient     is interpreted as 
                                                          
46
 The reader is reminded to note that the notation used to represent firm-specific determinants of debt maturity 
structure -    
   
    – is different from the notation used to represent firm-specific determinants of basic capital 
structure which is     
  . So     is different from   . Similar notation patterns were used for other factors in the 
equations. 
47
 ‘Dummy variable trap’ refers to a situation where we experience perfect (multi)collinearity among 
independent variables due to inclusion of dummy variables for all of the groups while the model has an overall 
intercept. Hence, since we opted to have an overall intercept in our model, the number of dummy variables 
introduced must be one less than the categories of that variable to avoid this problem. 
48
 Prof. Kalu Ojah of the Wits Business School was of the view that it would be of interest to see how results 
would look like if one was to use the agriculture sector as a reference sector as it is still the main stay of most 
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the significance of debt maturity structure of an industry relative to firms in the 
manufacturing industries. 
Thirdly, we further control for cross-country variations by introducing country 
dummies to see if the country in which a firm operates matter in debt maturity decisions of a 
firm (Model 3). The model is written as: 
 
                
      ∑         
  ∑        
 
             (3) 
 
where     
  is a country-dummy and     is the corresponding coefficient. Again, to avoid a 
dummy variable trap problem, we use South Africa as a reference group. South Africa was 
considered as a reference group since it arguably has the most advanced institutional and 
macroeconomic infrastructure among sample countries (e.g., Gwatidzo and Ojah 2009).  
Fourthly, we introduce legal, market, and macroeconomic variables that broadly 
define cross-country differences in institutions and macroeconomic characteristics (Model 4). 
At this stage, we particularly introduce dummy variables for origin of legal systems      
   - 
that is, 1 for English common law based legal systems, and 0 for French civil law based legal 
systems - and economic development      
 
  - that is, upper middle income groups, lower 
middle income group, and low income group. We also include the interaction variables 
between country and firm characteristics to examine how cross-sectional determinants of debt 
maturity structure vary from country to country. The model is as follows: 
 
                
     ∑        
 
    ∑         
   ∑ ∑           
 
     
         (4) 
 
where     
  is a dummy variable for legal group to which firm i belongs and     is a column 
vector containing the corresponding coefficients;     
 
  is a dummy variable for income group 
to which firm i belongs and     is a column vector containing the corresponding coefficients.  
                                                                                                                                                                                    
African economies. However, we could not heed his suggestions as we didn’t have enough number of listed 
firms from the agriculture sector in all the countries we considered. 
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Finally, in Model 5, we replace legal and macroeconomic variables that broadly 
define country characteristics by more specific legal, market and macroeconomic variables 
         
 
 . The model is written as follows: 
 
          
 
   
 
    ∑         
       
                (5) 
 
where      
 
 is a vector of institutional and macroeconomic variables that are known to effect 
on debt maturity structure and     is a column vector containing the corresponding 
coefficients. 
 
4.4 Results and Discussion49  
 
4.4.1 Descriptive statistics 
 
The debt maturity of African firms had evolved over the sample period. We present 
descriptive statistics of the dependent and independent variables in Table 4.2. The overall 
mean of debt maturity of all firms included in the sample is 22.5 per cent; while it varied 
from a high of 19.7 per cent in 2003 to a high of 27.0 per cent in 2008. 
  
(Insert Table 4.2 about here) 
 
We note two salient patterns in the maturity choices of African firms. Firstly, we 
observe that debt maturity was varying over time. This is considered as an early indication 
that African firms might be attempting to adjust their debt maturity structure toward a target. 
Secondly, especially in the latter half of the sample period, we note a general upward trend in 
debt maturity structure. Specifically, it went from a low of 19.7 per cent in 2003 to a high of 
27.0 per cent in 2008. As theory suggests, this trend could be attributed to the confluence of 
expansion in the economies and stock markets of our sample countries. It could also be due to 
                                                          
49
 We used the same dataset, except for data on additional variables and variables which were not relevant, as in 
Chapter 2. 
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the steady increase observed in profitability, growth opportunities, firm size, asset maturity 
and leverage experienced by firms in sample countries. 
 
(Insert Table 4.3 about here) 
 
We probe the descriptive statistics to see if there are inter-industry variations in debt 
maturity structures (Table 4.3 - Panel A). An inspection of the results pertaining to industry 
means of debt maturities indicates that the average debt maturities of industries are rather 
heterogeneous. For instance, firms in Oil and Gas and Regulated industries have the longest 
debt maturities while those in Health and Business Equipment have the shortest debt 
maturities. This could be a reflection of inter-industry variations in agency costs, information 
asymmetries, liquidity, and asset structure. 
One of the goals of this chapter is to examine if country characteristics have any 
effect on debt maturity structure of a firm. As a first pass at this issue, we consider how debt 
maturity ratios vary across countries, legal origin, and income groups. In Table 4.3 -Panel B, 
we observe that the debt maturity ratios vary considerably across countries ranging from a 
high of 41 per cent for firms in Kenya to a low 11.2 per cent for those in Ghana. Furthermore, 
firms in civil law countries seem to have shorter average debt maturities - 17.3 per cent - than 
those in common law countries - 30.7 per cent (Table 4.3 - Panel C). Similarly, we note 
variations in the ratio across income groups. Upper-middle-income countries have the longest 
debt maturities while those in lower-middle-income countries have the shortest debt 
maturities. This variation in debt maturity structure of sub-samples is an early indication of 
potential heterogeneity in underlying factors that determine debt maturity.  
Previous cross-country studies on debt maturity structure report that firms in 
developing countries exhibit shorter maturity periods than those in the developed world (e.g., 
Demirgüç-Kunt and Maksimovic 1999; Fan et al. 2008). Along similar lines, we assess 
whether the debt maturity ratios in our sample countries are comparable to those found in 
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countries considered in Terra (2011) and Antoniou et al. (2006). Although the average debt 
maturity ratio of firms in our sample countries are closer to those in Latin American countries 
reported in Terra (2011), it is lower than those reported for firms in USA, France, UK, and 
Germany indicating a higher dependence on short-term financing (Table 4.4). This seems to 
be consistent with Deesomsak et al. (2009), Fan et al. (2008) and Demirgüç-Kunt and 
Maksimovic (1999) who suggest that firms in developing countries tend to use far less long-
term debt than those in developed countries.  
 
(Insert Table 4.4 about here) 
 
Earlier in this chapter, we indicated that most of the firm-specific determinants of debt 
maturity structure (i.e., except for asset maturity and leverage variables) are also determinants 
of basic capital structure. Also, somewhere in Chapter 3, we reported existence of inter-
temporal, inter-industry and cross-country variations in those variables for the sample firms. 
Furthermore, again elsewhere in Chapter 3, we indicated similar variations in the three 
measures of leverage. In an unreported result, we note that firms in Mauritius and Kenya had 
assets with the longest maturity while those in South Africa and Morocco had assets with the 
shortest maturity. Overall, these observations affirm the view that firm characteristics exhibit 
inter-temporal, inter-firm, inter-industry and cross-country variations. We conjecture that 
these differences might have resulted in differences in maturity structure of firms.  
We also note that the country-specific determinants of debt maturity structure are also 
determinants of basic capital structure. Chapter 3 presented a detailed description of the inter-
temporal and cross-country variation in those variables. As in basic capital structure, we 
conjecture that the variation in the institutional and macroeconomic conditions of the sample 
countries might have resulted in cross-country disparity in access to external finance and 
diversification opportunities available to firms which in turn might have caused the observed 
cross-country variation in debt maturity structure. 
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We present correlation coefficients of variables along with their statistical 
significances in Table 4.5. A perusal of this table indicates that asset maturity, non-debt-
related tax-shield, earnings volatility and growth opportunities are positively and significantly 
correlated with debt maturity while we observe a significantly inverse association between 
profitability and dividend payout and debt maturity.  
 
(Insert table 4.5 about here) 
 
In terms of country characteristics, our results indicate a positive association between 
GDP per capita and its growth rate; size and liquidity of stock market; shareholder and 
creditor rights protection and rule of law; and debt maturity. On the other hand, size of 
banking sector variable is inversely correlated with debt maturity.   
 
4.4.2 Regression analyses 
 
In this section, we report regression results and their interpretation for Equations 1 up 
to 5. A battery of estimation procedures were considered to examine if results are robust to 
econometric procedures. 
 
4.4.2.1 Firm characteristics 
 
We begin our regression analysis with a perusal of results of the baseline regression 
model (Model 1) which specifies only firm specific factors as the independent variables. 
Table 4.6 presents the parameter estimates and their statistical significance (or lack of it) for a 
range of estimation procedures. 
 
(Insert table 4.6 about here) 
 
Our results indicate a broadly positive and significant relationship between earnings 
volatility and debt maturity variables corroborating Flannery’s (1986) argument that riskier 
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borrowers are not able to cover cost of rolling short-term debt and prefer long-term debt, 
while low-risk borrowers stick to short-term debt. However, it is in disagreement with Kane 
et al. (1985) and Sarkar (1999) who argue that low variability in firm value inspires the 
managers to issue long-term debt rather than short-term debt since such managers may want 
to avoid potential risk of bankruptcy.  
 Table 4.6 also shows that firm profitability and dividend payout ratio and debt 
maturity structure are inversely related providing support for the view that short-term debt 
issuance is perceived by the market as good news that cannot be imitated by firms with bad 
quality, and hence, debt maturity should be a decreasing function of profitability and 
dividend payout (e.g., Flannery 1986). In a study of US industrial firms, Ferreira et al. (2011) 
report that firms that do not pay dividends are more likely to be financially constrained and 
less likely to be able to issue long-term debt. 
We also note that the relationship between asset maturity and debt maturity is 
positive, although not robust to econometric procedures proffering a partial support to  
maturity-matching hypothesis and results reported in Hart and Moore (1994), Stohs and 
Mauer  (1996), Graham and Harvey  (2001), Körner (2006), Cai et al. (2008) and Correia 
(2008). Similarly, the results show that non-debt-related tax-shield has a direct influence on 
debt maturity structure.   
We observe a robust and significantly positive relationship between the level of a 
firm’s leverage and its debt maturity structure confirming the notion by Stohs and Mauer 
(1996) that a firm lengthens its debt maturity as leverage increases in order to offset the 
higher probability of liquidity crises and thus delay exposure to bankruptcy risk. However, it 
is in contrast with the argument by Myers (1977) that firms may use leverage and debt 
maturity to mitigate the agency problems of under-investment. Our findings are similar with 
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those reported in Barclay and Smith Jr. (1995), Stohs and Mauer (1996), Antoniou et al. 
(2006), Körner (2006) and Deesomsak et al. (2009).  
 
4.4.2.2 Industry characteristics 
 
Table 4.7 presents parameter estimates for Model 2 using a range of estimation 
procedures. 
 
(Insert table 4.7 about here) 
 
Our results indicate that firms in Oil & Gas, Regulated and Service industries tend to 
have longer debt maturity structures relative to those in Manufacturing industries. On the 
other hand, firms in Durables, Chemical and Construction, Business Equipment, Wholesale 
and Retail and Health industries tend to have shorter debt maturity structures relative to those 
in Manufacturing industries. These findings support the view that industry characteristics 
such as technologies and assets employed in industries and regulations to which industries are 
subjected to influence financing decisions of firms in those industries (e.g., Frank and Goyal 
2007). It would be interesting to examine what specific industry-characteristics influence debt 
maturity structure. However, such an exercise is beyond the scope of the present study.  
 
4.4.2.3 Country characteristics 
 
The literature on debt maturity structure presents a strong case for the possibility that 
a country’s institutional and macro-economic factors could decisively affect a firm’s debt 
maturity structure (e.g., Demirgüç-Kunt and Maksimovic 1999). Table 4.8 presents the 
results of estimating Model 3 using various estimation procedures.  
 
(Insert table 4.8 about here) 
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The coefficients of Egypt, Ghana, Morocco, Nigeria and Tunisia are negative and 
significant indicating the fact that firms in these countries tend to have shorter debt maturity 
than those in South Africa (Table 4.8). This could be attributed to the relatively well-
developed stock market and superior shareholder protection that epitomize South Africa. 
Table 4.9 presents the estimates of Model 4 using a battery of econometric 
procedures. 
 
(Insert table 4.9 about here) 
 
The results of Model 4 indicate that the coefficient of DEV3 is negative and 
significant implying that firms in low-income countries tend to issue less long-term debt 
relative to those in upper-middle-income countries upholding findings reported in Deesomsak 
et al. (2009), Fan et al. (2008) and Demirgüç-Kunt and Maksimovic (1999).  
Model 4 also includes interaction variables to examine if firm characteristics affect 
debt maturity structure differently in countries with different institutional and macroeconomic 
characteristics (Table 4.9). We observe that the negative influence of profitability on debt 
maturity is stronger in lower-middle-income and common law countries. We further note that 
the positive effect of asset maturity is mitigated in lower-middle-income and common law 
countries; in contrast, it is enhanced in low-income countries. The results also show that the 
positive effect of non-debt-related tax-shield is deterred in low-income countries whereas the 
inverse effect of dividend payout is deterred in lower-middle-income countries. Our 
interpretation of these results is that country characteristics, in addition to their direct impact 
on debt maturity structure, indirectly influence debt maturity structure by enhancing or 
mitigating the impact of firm-specific factors on debt maturity structure. This interpretation is 
consistent with Fan et al. (2008) who indicate that the relationship between firm-specific 
variables and debt maturity structure tends to vary across countries. 
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We further refine our definition of macroeconomic and institutional factors that 
characterize a given country in Model 5. In this model, we include 10 variables that more-
narrowly-define country characteristics. Because of multicollinearity between variables, we 
could not include all variables in a single regression. Rather, we estimate separate regressions 
for a group of variables which do not have multicollinearity problems. For reasons of brevity, 
we present regression results of only seemingly unrelated regression (SUR) procedure in 
Table 4.10. 
 
(Insert table 4.10 about here) 
 
Our results show that growth rate of the real GDP per capita variable is negatively 
related with debt maturity structure. This finding does not support De Haas and Peters (2006) 
who argue that a firm is likely to use more long-term debt at times of economic growth. 
Perhaps, the prevalence of relatively short asset maturity of firms in high-growth countries 
might have overwhelmed the expected positive effect of economic growth on debt maturity. 
We also find that the influence of taxation variable on debt maturity structure is negative 
which is in line with the argument by Kane et al. (1985). Also evident from our results is that 
the relative size of banking sector of the country in which a firm operates negatively 
influences the firm’s debt maturity confirming the argument by Demirgüç-Kunt and 
Maksimovic (1999) and Antoniou et al. (2006) that developed banking sector reduces 
creditor’s costs related with information asymmetry, agency and bankruptcy.  
Consistent with the argument that legal institutions determine debt maturity structure, 
we find that the provisions of the law with regard to investor (i.e., both shareholder and 
creditor) protection influence debt maturity structure of a firm directly and highly 
significantly. Although the positive relationship between shareholders rights protection 
variable and debt maturity corroborates conjectures based on agency theory, the similar 
relationship that we observe between creditor rights protection and debt maturity contradicts 
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hypothesis based on the same theory. The latter relationship could be due to the relatively 
small banking sector that characterized countries with high creditor rights protection index 
(i.e., Botswana, Nigeria, and Kenya) in our sample.  
Our results also indicate that size of stock market in a given country positively and 
significantly influences debt maturity, as Giannetti (2003) also find. This finding supports the 
view that developed stock markets reduce information asymmetry problems and hence 
increase a firm’s ability to obtain long-term debt. We further observe that the size of the 
overall economy variable is also positively and significantly related to debt maturity 
structure. This particular finding finds itself in sync with the argument forwarded in most of 
the literature (e.g., Caprio Jr and Demirgug-Kunt 1998; Demirgüç-Kunt and Maksimovic 
1999; Fan et al. 2008; Deesomsak et al. 2009). 
Our results also reveal an interesting resemblance between the determinants of basic 
capital structure (discussed in chapter 3) and those of debt maturity structure. We note that 
firm- and country-level characteristics that determine the two financing decisions, in most of 
the cases, are identical. Given that leverage itself is one of the determinants of debt maturity, 
the determinants of debt maturity have both direct and indirect effects on maturity. That is, in 
addition to their direct influence, these variables indirectly impact on maturity through their 
effect on leverage. This evidence reinforces the view that leverage and maturity are jointly 
determined (Barclay et al. 2001).  
 
4.5 Conclusions 
 
This chapter went beyond issues pertinent to basic capital structure and, to a certain 
extent, tackled matters pertaining to debt maturity structure. We contended that debt maturity 
structure of firms in our sample is determined by a host of “conventional” factors including 
firm, industrial, institutional, and macroeconomic factors. The data was examined using a 
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battery of models to identify the significance of different factors. A range of standard 
estimation procedures were used for checking the robustness of results.  
At firm level, we observe that such factors as earnings volatility, asset maturity and 
leverage have a positive influence on the debt maturity structure of firms in our sample. This 
implies that liquidity risk pressure, maturity matching and bankruptcy risk are important 
factors in debt maturity structure decisions of firms in our sample. On the other hand, we also 
document that firm profitability and dividend payout ratio inversely influence debt maturity 
decisions of our sample firms; this signifies the signalling role of debt maturity structure.  
We also note inter-industry heterogeneity in debt maturity structure of firms in our 
sample countries. Specifically, firms in Oil & Gas, Regulated and Service industries incline 
to have longer debt maturities while those in Durables, Chemical and Construction, Business 
Equipment, Wholesale and Retail and Health industries incline to have shorter debt maturity. 
This implies that industry characteristics such as industry-specific technologies, risks, and 
regulations influence debt maturity decisions of firms in our sample countries. 
In terms of macroeconomic variables, the chapter established that firms in low-
income countries tend to issue less long-term debt relative to those in upper-middle-income 
countries. This was further cemented by our observation that the size of overall economy and 
debt maturity structure were positively related. Contrary to our expectation, the chapter also 
documents that growth rate of real GDP per capita variable is negatively related with debt 
maturity structure. This, perhaps, is due to the prevalence of relatively shorter asset maturities 
that epitomize firms in high-growth countries. Also, we found that the influence of taxation 
variable on debt maturity structure is negative as expected. These findings underscore the role 
that quality of law enforcement, access to external finance, maturity matching, agency 
problems and debt-related tax-shield play in the financing decisions of a firm. 
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We also note that financial deepening had a role to play in the debt maturity structure 
decisions of firms in our sample countries. Unlike, stock market development variables, 
banking sector development variables were negatively related with debt maturity structure of 
our sample firms. With regard to legal institutions, we found that the provisions of the law 
with regard to investor (i.e., both shareholder and creditor) protection influences debt 
maturity structure of a firm directly and highly significantly. Although the positive 
relationship between shareholders rights protection variable and debt maturity corroborates 
conjectures based on agency theory, the similar relationship that we observe between creditor 
rights protection and debt maturity contradicts hypothesis based on the same theory. The 
latter relationship could be due to the relatively small banking sector that characterized 
countries with high creditor rights protection index (i.e., Botswana, Nigeria, and Kenya) in 
our sample. Put together, the evidences suggest that agency and bankruptcy costs and 
information asymmetry problems do matter in the determination of debt maturity structure of 
a firm in our sample countries. 
In addition to the direct effects, we observe that broadly defined macroeconomic and 
institutional variables had an indirect effect by either mitigating or enhancing the influence of 
firm-specific factors. For instance, in lower-middle income countries, the effect of 
profitability is enhanced whist that of asset maturity and dividend payout is mitigated. 
Furthermore, in low-income countries, while the influence of asset maturity is enhanced that 
of non-debt-related tax-shield is deterred. Similarly, in common law countries, the effect of 
profitability on debt maturity structure is enhanced while the effect of asset maturity is 
mitigated. The fact that we observe some commonality between the determinants of basic 
capital structure and debt maturity reinforces the view that the two financing decisions are 
highly intertwined and, perhaps, jointly determined.  
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Inspired by the literature on basic capital structure, lately, the literature on debt 
maturity structure has witnessed endeavours that attempt to examine if firms engage in the act 
of rebalancing debt maturity structure toward a target. In an effort to raise the debt maturity 
structure debate to where it is elsewhere, in Chapter 5, the thesis examines whether the 
sample firms adjust their debt maturity structures toward a target, and if so, attempts to 
identify the factors that effect on the adjustment speed toward the target. 
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Table 4.1: Determinants of debt maturity structure, theoretical predictions, and empirical findings 
Notes: When a theory is silent or when there is significant ambiguity regarding the appropriate interpretation, the cell is left blank. The (+/-) sign is put in a cell if plausible arguments could be 
made for a positive as well as a negative relationship using a given theory. ± denotes the sensitivity of empirical results either to the way the dependent variable is defined or country variations 0 
denotes that there were studies which reported support for no relationship between the variable indicated and financing decisions.  
 
Panel A: Institutional and macroeconomic characteristics and debt maturity structure 
 
 
 
S. No 
 
 
 
Variables 
Theoretical Predictions  Summary of Empirical Results 
Tax 
bankruptcy 
trade-off Agency 
Matching 
Hypothesis 
 
Positive Influence on debt 
maturity structure 
Negative influence on 
debt maturity structure 
± 
No influence on debt 
maturity structure 
1. Shareholder Rights 
 
 +   Deesomsak et al. (2009)    
2. Rule of Law 
 
 
 
 
 +   Deesomsak et al. (2009) 
Fan et al. (2008) 
Demirguc-Kunt & 
Maksimovic (1999) 
   
3. Creditor Rights 
 
 -    Deesomsak et al. (2009)   
4. Taxation 
 
-    Scherr & Hulburt (2001)  Antoniou et al. (2006) Guedes & Opler (1996) 
5. Inflation 
 
 
  -   Demirguc-Kunt & 
Maksimovic (1999) 
 Fan et al. (2008) 
6. Size of economy  
 
 
  +  Fan et al. (2008) 
 
Deesomsak et al. (2009)   
7. Economic Growth 
 
 
 -    Demirguc-Kunt & 
Maksimovic (1999) 
  
8. Market Capitalization  +/-     Deesomsak et al. (2009) 
Demirguc-Kunt & 
Maksimovic (1999) 
 
9. Stock Market Turnover  +/-     Deesomsak et al. (2009) 
Demirguc-Kunt & 
Maksimovic (1999) 
 
10 Size of Banking Sector  -     Deesomsak et al. (2009) 
Demirguc-Kunt & 
Maksimovic (1999) 
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Panel B: Firm characteristics and debt maturity structure 
 
 
S. No 
 
 
Variables 
Theoretical Predictions  Summary of Empirical Results 
TBT Agency  MH LH ST* 
 Positive influence on debt 
maturity structure 
Negative influence on debt 
maturity structure  
± 
No influence on debt 
maturity structure 
1. Firm size  +   + 
 Singh(2009), Deesomsak et al. 
(2009), Ozkan (2002), Morris 
(2009), Fan et al. (2008), Korner 
(2006), Demiruc-Kunt and 
Maksimovic (1999) 
 
Barclay and Smith Jr. (1995), 
Guedes & Opler (1996), Scherr 
& Hulburt (2001), Heyman et 
al. (2003) 
Antoniou et al. 
(2006) 
 
2. Profitability  +    - 
 Scherr & Hulburt (2001), Fan et 
al. (2008) 
 
 
Deesomsak et al. 
(2009), 
 
3. 
Growth 
opportunities  
- -  +  
 Körner (2006), Stohs & Mauer 
(1996), Garcia-Teruel & 
Martinez-Solano (2007), Cai et 
al. (2008). 
 
Barclay & Smith Jr (1995), 
Goyal et al. (2002), Johnson 
(2003) 
 Korner (2006) 
4. Asset maturity   + +   
 Correia (2008), Cai et al. (2008), 
Hart and Moore (1994), Stohs & 
Mauer (1996), Graham & Harvey 
(2001), Körner  (2006) 
 
 
Fan et al. (2008), 
Deesomsak et al., 
(2009), Antoniou et 
al. (2006) 
 
5. 
Earnings 
volatility 
- -   +/- 
 
 
Guedes & Opler (1996), Stohs 
& Mauer (1996), Scherr & 
Hulburt (2001), Ozkan (2002), 
Stephane et al. (2011) 
 
Deesomsak et al. 
(2009), Antoniou et 
al. (2006), Terra 
(2011) 
Korner (2006) 
6. Tax shield -     
  
 
 
 
 
 
  
7. Dividend policy  -   - 
  
 
 
 
 
Ferreira (2010)  
  
8. Leverage  -  +  
 Antoniou et al. (2006), Korner 
(2006), Stohs & Mauer (1996), 
Barclays and Smith Jr (1995), 
Deesomsak et al. (2009) 
  
 
Note: TBT denotes tax/bankruptcy trade-off theory; MH denotes Matching Hypothesis; LH denotes Liquidity Hypothesis; ST denotes Signalling Theory. 
158 
 
Table 4.2; Evolution of firm and country characteristics   
 
Panel A: Descriptive statistics of firm characteristics 
Year 
Firm  
Size 
Earnings  
Volatility Profitability 
Growth  
Opportunities 
Asset  
Maturity 
Dividend  
Payout 
Tax  
shield 
Total 
Leverage 
Debt 
Maturity 
1999 5.221 0.244 0.274 0.024 9.815 0.293 0.031 0.413 0.243 
2000 5.108 0.270 0.059 0.034 7.153 0.634 0.030 0.448 0.236 
2001 5.150 0.274 0.124 0.058 11.870 0.553 0.038 0.488 0.258 
2002 4.968 0.216 0.086 0.029 18.121 0.675 0.036 0.501 0.214 
2003 4.961 0.235 0.094 0.056 16.793 0.687 0.036 0.500 0.197 
2004 4.973 0.219 0.106 0.053 12.167 0.632 0.034 0.500 0.201 
2005 5.067 0.234 0.118 0.035 14.204 0.584 0.033 0.499 0.218 
2006 5.170 0.208 0.114 0.078 10.002 0.601 0.031 0.498 0.223 
2007 5.321 0.225 0.130 0.086 8.288 0.614 0.031 0.490 0.250 
2008 5.417 0.209 0.122 0.075 14.322 0.613 0.033 0.476 0.270 
Overall 5.116 0.224 0.112 0.059 12.970 0.619 0.034 0.493 0.225 
 
Panel B:  Descriptive statistics of institutional and macroeconomics characteristics 
Year Taxation Inflation 
Size of 
Economy 
Growth 
of 
Economy 
Size of 
Stock 
Market 
Liquidity 
of 
Stock 
Market 
Size of  
Banking 
Sector 
Creditor 
Rights 
Shareholder 
Rights 
Rule 
of 
Law 
1999 35.108 4.098 3.188 2.332 73.484 26.960 0.660 2.384 3.550          . 
2000 34.985 4.213 3.199 2.621 58.206 28.824 0.657 2.384 3.550 -0.077 
2001 34.985 4.821 3.206 1.677 46.577 18.948 0.691 2.384 3.550       . 
2002 34.985 5.363 3.210 1.034 61.606 30.713 0.702 2.384 3.550 -0.102 
2003 34.863 5.797 3.220 2.206 62.971 20.428 0.699 2.384 3.550 -0.125 
2004 34.863 8.252 3.233 3.202 85.285 23.278 0.705 2.384 3.550 -0.036 
2005 34.863 5.530 3.246 2.980 112.525 35.167 0.709 2.384 3.550 -0.030 
2006 34.531 7.001 3.266 4.609 125.792 44.854 0.691 2.384 3.550 -0.099 
2007 23.404 8.021 3.285 4.592 144.504 42.829 0.679 2.384 3.550 -0.119 
2008 23.404 NA NA NA NA 51.166 . 2.384 3.550 -0.100 
Overall 32.599 5.899 3.228 2.806 85.661 32.317 0.688 2.384 3.550 
-
0.086 
 
Notes: Debt maturity refers to the average of the ratio of a firm’s non-current liabilities to total liabilities. The 
exact definition of the other variables is as indicated in Table 2.3 in chapter 2. 
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Table 4.3:  Summary statistics of debt maturity structure by sub-samples  
 Panel A: By industry    Panel A: By country   Panel B: By legal Origin  
 Mean SD* Obs#   Mean SD* Obs#   Mean SD* Obs# 
Non-durables  0.209 0.240 1 019  Egypt  0.153 0.231 2 706  Common law 0.307 0.249 2 138 
Durables  0.181 0.193 167  South Africa  0.310 0.242 1 669  Civil law 0.173 0.233 3 344 
Manufacturing  0.222 0.238 926  Botswana 0.332 0.295 74      
Oil & Gas 0.394 0.285 386  Ghana  0.112 0.156 53      
Chem. & Construction 0.185 0.236 523  Kenya 0.416 0.276 151  Panel C: By income group 
Business Equipment 0.162 0.184 347  Mauritius  0.393 0.204 173   Mean SD* Obs# 
Regulated  0.301 0.271 306  Morocco  0.159 0.182 289  Upper middle income countries  0.318 0.242 1 916 
Wholesale & Retail 0.182 0.216 711  Nigeria  0.239 0.244 191  Lower middle income countries 0.161 0.228 3 171 
Health 0.140 0.214 278  Tunisia  0.292 0.214 176  Low income countries  0.289 0.269 395 
Service & Others 0.270 0.268 810           
Notes: * denotes standard deviation; # denotes number of observations. The exact definition of the variables is as presented in Tables 2.2 and 2.4 in chapter 2. 
 
 
Table 4.4:  Debt maturity ratios reported in prior empirical studies 
Panel A: Average Debt Maturity Ratios Reported in Antonio et al. (2006) 
Country  Mean Std. dev Obs. 
France 0.590 0.270 3160 
Germany  0.530 0.310 5882 
UK 0.460 0.340 32 339 
    
Panel B: Average Debt Maturity Ratios Reported in Terra (2011) 
Country  Mean Std. dev Obs. 
Argentina 0.337 0.259 621 
Brazil  0.379 0.263 4 100 
Chile  0.408 0.287 1 770 
Colombia  0.375 0.255 283 
Mexico  0.433 0.265 1 411 
Peru 0.279 0.371 1 032 
Venezuela 0.396 0.222 175 
USA 0.525 0.267 5 028 
 
Source: Antonio et al. (2006) "The determinants of debt maturity structure: evidence from France, Germany and the UK." European Financial Management 12(2): 161-194. 
and Terra (2011) "Determinants of corporate debt maturity in Latin America." European Business Review 23(1): 45-70.
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Table 4.5: Pairwise Correlation Matrix 
 
Debt  
Maturity 
[1] 
Firm Size 
[2] 
Earnings 
Volatility 
[3] 
Profit. 
[4] 
Growth 
Opprt. 
[5] 
Asset 
Maturity 
[6] 
Div. 
Pay 
[7] 
Tax 
Shield 
[8] 
Taxation 
[9] 
Inflation 
[10] 
Size of 
Economy 
[11] 
Grwth of 
Economy 
[12] 
Size of 
Stk Mkt 
[13] 
Liq. of 
Stk Mkt 
[14] 
Size of 
Bnk'g 
[15] 
Creditor 
Rights 
[16] 
Shareholder 
Rights 
[17] 
Rule of 
Law 
[18] 
[1] 1.000 *** 
                                 
[2] 0.016  1.000 *** 
                               
[3] 0.052 *** -0.044 *** 1.000 *** 
                             
[4] -0.031 ** 0.077 *** -0.011 
 
1.000 *** 
                           
[5] 0.046 *** 0.111 *** 0.077 *** 0.124 *** 1.000 *** 
                         
[6] 0.071 *** -0.077 *** 0.016 
 
-0.019 
 
0.004 
 
1.000 *** 
                       
[7] -0.079 *** -0.031 
 
0.134 *** -0.040 ** -0.121 *** 0.057 ** 1.000 *** 
                     
[8] 0.116 *** 0.029 ** -0.020 
 
-0.010 
 
0.003 
 
-0.107 *** 0.045 ** 1.000 *** 
                   
[9]   -0.186 *** 0.006 
 
-0.050 *** -0.039 *** 0.031 ** 0.090 *** -0.005 
 
1.000 *** 
                 
[10] -0.022  0.023 * -0.011 
 
0.034 ** 0.048 *** -0.005 
 
-0.115 *** -0.117 *** -0.394 *** 1.000 *** 
               
[11] 0.143 *** 0.034 ** 0.022 
 
-0.031 ** 0.018 
 
-0.024 
 
0.127 *** 0.128 *** -0.070 *** -0.398 *** 1.000 *** 
             
[12] 0.052 *** 0.081 *** -0.024 
 
0.008 
 
0.041 *** -0.044 *** -0.008 
 
0.006 
 
-0.235 *** 0.150 *** 0.106 *** 1.000 *** 
           
[13] 0.176 *** 0.145 *** 0.041 ** 0.029 ** 0.057 *** -0.042 *** -0.019 
 
0.023 
 
-0.347 *** -0.051 *** 0.649 *** 0.161 *** 1.000 *** 
         
[14] 0.062 *** 0.092 *** 0.022 
 
0.008 
 
0.029 ** -0.022 
 
0.034 * 0.010 
 
-0.213 *** -0.026 ** 0.513 *** 0.363 *** 0.696 *** 1.000 *** 
       
[15] -0.106 *** -0.096 *** 0.011 
 
-0.068 *** 0.001 
 
0.045 *** 0.157 *** 0.042 *** 0.533 *** -0.475 *** 0.669 *** -0.053 *** 0.245 *** 0.330 *** 1.000 *** 
     
[16] 0.201 *** 0.178 *** 0.034 ** 0.061 *** 0.026 * -0.019 
 
-0.124 *** -0.101 *** -0.384 *** 0.350 *** -0.200 *** -0.135 *** 0.325 *** 0.062 *** -0.532 *** 1.000 *** 
   
[17] 0.206 *** 0.127 *** 0.052 *** 0.033 ** 0.044 *** -0.039 ** -0.111 *** 0.028 ** -0.346 *** 0.125 *** 0.435 *** -0.041 *** 0.747 *** 0.388 *** -0.073 *** 0.515 *** 1.000 *** 
 
[18] 0.057 *** -0.035 ** 0.021 
 
-0.011 
 
0.005 
 
0.003 
 
0.097 *** 0.096 *** 0.129 *** -0.457 *** 0.852 *** -0.080 *** 0.338 *** 0.217 *** 0.769 *** -0.516 *** 0.144 *** 1.000 *** 
Notes: The table reports the Pairwise correlation coefficients between the independent variables. Correlation coefficients that are significantly different from zero at the 1%, 5%, and 10% 
level are marked with ***, **, and *, respectively. The exact definition of the variables is as presented in Tables 4.2 in chapter 4 and 2.3 in chapter 2.
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Table 4.6: Firm characteristics and debt maturity structure 
Dependent Variable: 
NCL_TL  OLS   
Random  
Effects  
Fixed  
Effects  GMM  SUR 
Earnings Volatility 0.091 ** 0.033 * 0.021 
 
0.016 * 0.101 *** 
Firm Size 0.003 
 
0.006 
 
0.041 
 
0.014  -0.006   
Profitability -0.106 
 
-0.150 *** -0.136 ** 0.022  -0.174 *** 
Growth Opportunities 0.034 
 
0.001 
 
-0.024 
 
-0.070  0.029   
Asset Maturity 0.001 *** -0.001 ** -0.001 ** 0.005 * 0.001 ** 
Dividend Payout -0.022 ** -0.009 
 
-0.007 
 
-0.033 * -0.022 *** 
Tax Shield 1.350 *** 0.667 *** 0.282 
 
-1.202  1.450 *** 
Leverage 0.212 *** 0.244 *** 0.276 *** 0.629 *** 0.211 *** 
Constant 0.047   0.063   -0.133   0.005  0.152 *** 
F-statistic 7.980 *** - 
 
3.590 ***     - 
 Chi2  - 
 
13893.5 *** - 
 
 127.82 ***  189.10 *** 
Hausman Test - 
 
59.970 *** 59.970 ***     - 
 N 1600 
 
1600 
 
1600 
 
 1576   1600 
 Notes: The table reports the regression results for debt maturity structure using Ordinary Least Square, Random 
Effects, Fixed Effects, Generalized Method of Moments and Seemingly Unrelated Regression. The parameter 
estimates that are significantly different from zero at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level are marked with ***, **, and 
*, respectively. The exact definition of the variables is as presented in Table 2.3.  
 
 
Table 4.7: Firm characteristics, industry classification and debt maturity structure 
Dependent Variable: 
NCL_TL  OLS  
Random  
Effects  
Fixed  
Effects  GMM  SUR 
Earnings Volatility 0.082 ** 0.033 * 0.021 
 
0.009  0.092 *** 
Firm Size 0.010 
 
0.012 
 
0.041 
 
0.021  0.001 
 Profitability -0.134 * -0.155 *** -0.136 ** -0.023 * -0.202 *** 
Growth Opportunities 0.034 
 
-0.002 
 
-0.024 
 
-0.058  0.028 
 Asset Maturity 0.001 ** -0.001 ** -0.001 ** -0.001  0.001 ** 
Dividend Payout -0.020 * -0.009 
 
-0.007 
 
-0.033 * -0.020 *** 
Tax Shield 1.050 *** 0.543 ** 0.282 
 
-1.011  1.160 *** 
Leverage 0.223 *** 0.248 *** 0.276 *** -0.614 *** 0.222 *** 
Non-durables  -0.010   0.002   -   -0.041  -0.008   
Durables  -0.067 
 
-0.032 
 
- 
 
-0.127  -0.068 ** 
Oil and Gas  0.116 ** 0.132 ** - 
 
0.047  0.119 *** 
Chem. & Construction  -0.053 
 
-0.045 
 
- 
 
0.037  -0.054 *** 
Business Equipment  -0.095 ** -0.100 *** - 
 
-0.112  -0.101 *** 
Regulated  0.105 ** 0.106 ** - 
 
0.005  0.097 *** 
Wholesale and Retail -0.069 ** -0.067 ** - 
 
-0.025  -0.068 *** 
Health -0.048 
 
-0.047 
 
- 
 
-0.005  -0.048 ** 
Service & etc. 0.053 
 
0.064 * - 
 
-0.017  0.042 ** 
Constant 0.026 
 
0.030 
 
-0.133 
 
-0.013  0.126 *** 
F-statistic 6.360 *** - 
 
3.590 ***   - 
 Chi2  - 
 
14809.3 *** - 
 
154.97 *** 308 *** 
Hausman Test - 
 
17.480 
 
17.48 
 
  - 
 N 1600   1600   1600   1576  1600   
 
Notes: The table reports the regression results for debt maturity structure using Ordinary Least Square, Random Effects, 
Fixed Effects, Generalized Method of Moments and Seemingly Unrelated Regression. The parameter estimates that 
are significantly different from zero at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level are marked with ***, **, and *, respectively. The 
exact definition of the variables is as presented in Table 2.3.  
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Table 4.8: Firm, industry and country dummies and debt maturity structure 
Dependent Variable: 
NCL_TL  OLS  
Random  
Effects  
Fixed  
Effects  
 
GMM SUR 
Earnings Volatility 0.080 ** 0.031 * 0.021 
 
0.041  0.086 *** 
Firm Size -0.002 
 
-0.004 
 
0.041 
 
0.027  -0.009 
 Profitability -0.163 ** -0.164 *** -0.136 ** 0.099  -0.209 *** 
Growth Opportunities 0.031 
 
0.005 
 
-0.024 
 
-0.098 * 0.029 
 Asset Maturity 0.001 ** -0.001 ** -0.001 ** -0.001  0.001 ** 
Dividend Payout -0.014 
 
-0.008 
 
-0.007 
 
0.028  -0.014 ** 
Tax Shield 0.840 ** 0.489 ** 0.282 
 
-1.172  0.926 *** 
Leverage 0.171 *** 0.220 *** 0.276 *** 0.555 *** 0.172 *** 
Non-durables  -0.024   -0.007   -   -0.060  -0.022   
Durables  -0.092 ** -0.056 
 
- 
 
-0.087  -0.091 *** 
Oil and Gas  0.038 
 
0.059 
 
- 
 
-0.044  0.044 
 Chem. & Construction  -0.046 
 
-0.042 
 
- 
 
0.028  -0.047 ** 
Business Equipment  -0.151 *** -0.161 *** - 
 
-0.252 * -0.151 *** 
Regulated  0.068 
 
0.057 
 
- 
 
0.017  0.063 *** 
Wholesale & Retail -0.120 *** -0.118 *** - 
 
-0.080  -0.118 *** 
Health -0.049 
 
-0.044 
 
- 
 
-0.145  -0.048 ** 
Service & etc. 0.022 
 
0.038 
 
- 
 
-0.164  0.015 
 Egypt -0.186 *** -0.179 *** -   -0.130 * -0.174 *** 
Botswana 0.064 
 
0.031 
 
- 
 
0.624  0.066 
 Ghana -0.157 * -0.193 *** - 
 
0.065  -0.166 *** 
Kenya -0.011 
 
-0.027 
 
- 
 
0.124  -0.007 
 Mauritius 0.055 
 
0.079 
 
- 
 
0.119  0.063 * 
Morocco -0.172 *** -0.137 *** - 
 
-0.260 ** -0.152 *** 
Nigeria -0.096 * -0.095 * - 
 
0.033  -0.082 *** 
Tunisia -0.080 * -0.075 * - 
 
-0.114  -0.081 *** 
Constant 0.281 *** 0.280 *** -0.133 
 
0.131  0.342 *** 
F-statistic 9.61 *** - 
 
3.590 ***   - 
 Chi2  - 
 
14935.66 *** - 
 
213.70 *** 503.900 *** 
Hausman Test - 
 
24.75 * 24.750 *   - 
 N 1600   1600   1600   1576  1600   
Notes: The table reports the regression results for debt maturity structure using Ordinary Least Square, Random 
Effects, Fixed Effects, Generalized Method of Moments and Seemingly Unrelated Regression. The 
parameter estimates that are significantly different from zero at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level are marked 
with ***, **, and *, respectively. The exact definition of the variables is as presented in Table 2.3.  
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Table 4.9: Firm, industry, institutional and macroeconomic dummies and debt maturity structure 
Dependent Variable: NCL_TL  OLS  
Random  
Effects  
Fixed  
Effects  GMM SUR 
Earnings Volatility 0.062 
 
0.0016 
 
-0.070 ** -0.380 
 
0.079 
 Firm Size 0.012 
 
0.0012 
 
-0.124 * -0.017 
 
0.007 
 Profitability -1.540 * 0.0407 
 
0.288 
 
1.510 
 
-1.791 ** 
Growth Opportunities -0.464 
 
0.0217 
 
0.257 
 
-0.943 
 
-0.352 
 Asset Maturity 0.013 ** 0.0024 
 
0.001 
 
1.131 
 
0.013 *** 
Dividend Payout 0.021 
 
0.0280 ** 0.015 
 
0.021 
 
0.022 
 
Tax Shield 0.861 
 
-2.0642 
 
0.630 
 
0.237 
 
1.118 
 Leverage 0.170 *** 0.2114 *** 0.271 *** 0.530 ***  0.172 *** 
Non-durables  -0.014 
 
-0.003 
 
- 
 
 -0.067 
 
-0.012 
 
Durables  -0.061 
 
-0.037 
 
- 
 
-0.126 
 
-0.062 ** 
Oil and Gas  0.043 
 
0.063 
 
- 
 
-0.096 
 
0.049 * 
Chem. & Construction  -0.032 
 
-0.035 
 
- 
 
-0.122 
 
-0.035 * 
Business Equipment  -0.113 *** -0.138 *** - 
 
-0.155 
 
-0.114 *** 
Regulated  0.058 
 
0.070 
 
- 
 
0.052 
 
0.052 ** 
Wholesale and Retail -0.090 *** -0.104 *** - 
 
-0.200 
 
-0.088 *** 
Health -0.041 
 
-0.041 
 
- 
 
-0.095 
 
-0.040 * 
Service & etc. 0.045  0.049  -  -0.046   0.037 ** 
Common 0.138 
 
-0.042 
 
- 
 
-1.616 
 
0.100 
 
Dev2 -0.249 
 
-0.316 
 
- 
 
-0.818 
 
-0.240 
 
Dev3 -0.301 
 
-0.050 
 
- 
 
-0.478 
 
-0.282 * 
Common*Profitability 1.350 
 
-0.082 
 
-0.157 
 
0.856 
 
1.598 ** 
Common*Asset Maturity -0.011 ** -0.002 
 
0.001 
 
0.385 
 
-0.011 *** 
Common*Tax Shield 0.687 
 
3.956 ** 1.797 
 
-0.007 
 
0.663 
 
Common*Growth Opport. 0.362 
 
-0.067 
 
-0.397 ** 0.413 
 
0.235 
 
Common*Earnings Vol. 0.097 
 
0.061 
 
0.083 
 
-0.047 
 
0.084 
 
Common*Firm Size -0.047 
 
-0.028 
 
0.229 ** -0.023 
 
-0.044 
 
Dev2*Earnings Vol. -0.017 
 
0.029 
 
0.100 *** -0.059 * -0.025 
 
Dev3*Earnings Vol.  -0.070 
 
0.036 
 
0.009 
 
0.899 
 
-0.057 
 
Dev2*Div. Payout -0.042 ** -0.038 *** -0.024 
 
0.110 
 
-0.043 ** 
DEV3*Div. Payout -0.025 
 
-0.049 *** -0.029 
 
0.037 
 
-0.030 
 
DEV2*Growth Opport. 0.508 
 
-0.024 
 
-0.279 
 
0.026 
 
0.396 
 
DEV3*Growth Opport. -0.001 
 
0.057 
 
0.162 
 
-1.597 
 
0.026 
 
DEV2*Firm Size 0.001 
 
0.009 
 
0.160 ** 0.131 
 
-0.001 
 
DEV3*Firm Size 0.023 
 
0.005 
 
-0.136 
 
-1.071 
 
0.023 
 
DEV2*Profitability 1.380 
 
-0.256 
 
-0.506 * -0.107 
 
1.571 ** 
DEV3*Profitability 0.132 
 
-0.111 
 
-0.298 
 
-0.906 
 
0.118 
 
DEV2*Asset Maturity -0.013 ** -0.003 
 
-0.001 
 
-0.464 
 
-0.013 *** 
DEV3*Asset Maturity 0.038 *** 0.004 
 
-0.026 
 
0.594 
 
0.039 *** 
DEV2*Tax Shield 0.241 
 
2.557 
 
-0.515 
 
0.333 
 
0.041 
 
DEV3*Tax Shield -1.700 
 
-1.552 
 
-2.559 * -0.093 
 
-1.897 * 
Constant 0.264 
 
0.358 
 
-0.089 
 
-0.318 
 
0.333 * 
F-statistic 29.52 *** - 
 
7.150 *** 
  
- 
 
Chi2  - 
 
13487.54 *** - 
 
469.64 *** 1069.350 *** 
Hausman Test - 
 
80.480 *** 80.480 *** - 
 
- 
 N 1600  1600   1600   1670   1600  
Notes: The table reports the regression results for debt maturity structure using Ordinary Least Square, Random Effects, 
Fixed Effects, Generalized Method of Moments and Seemingly Unrelated Regression. The parameter estimates that 
are significantly different from zero at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level are marked with ***, **, and *, respectively. The 
exact definition of the variables is as presented in Table 2.3.  
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Table 4.10: Firm, industry, institutional & macroeconomic factors & maturity structure 
Dependent Variable:          
 NCL_TL Model A Model B Model C Model D Model E 
Earnings Volatility 0.0655 * 0.1100 ** 0.0681 ** 0.0725 ** 0.0636 * 
Firm Size 0.0005 
 
0.0148 
 
-0.0021 
 
0.0008 
 
-0.0062 
 Profitability -0.2130 ** -0.2810 *** -0.2170 ** -0.2270 *** -0.2390 ** 
Growth Opt. 0.0453 
 
0.0239 
 
0.0335 
 
0.0320 
 
0.0308 
 Asset Maturity 0.0002 
 
0.0003 
 
0.0002 
 
0.0002 
 
0.0002 
 Dividend Payout -0.0234 ** -0.0225 * -0.0165 
 
-0.0171 * -0.0165 * 
Tax Shield 1.2300 *** 1.3700 *** 1.3100 *** 1.1400 *** 1.3600 *** 
Leverage 0.1990 *** 0.2150 *** 0.2140 *** 0.1830 *** 0.1960 *** 
Non-durables  -0.0049 
 
-0.0180 
 
-0.0073 
 
-0.0132 
 
-0.0117   
Durables  -0.0750 * -0.0885 
 
-0.0743 
 
-0.0750 
 
-0.0731 
 Oil and Gas  0.0882 * 0.1140 ** 0.0894 * 0.0811 
 
0.0807 
 Chem. & Construction -0.0529 
 
-0.0756 * -0.0542 
 
-0.0496 
 
-0.0510 
 Business Equipment  -0.1100 *** -0.1170 *** -0.1060 ** -0.1120 *** -0.0966 ** 
Regulated  0.1100 * 0.0806 
 
0.1070 * 0.1100 * 0.0989 * 
Whole & Retail -0.0656 ** -0.1110 *** -0.0576 * -0.0850 *** -0.0655 ** 
Health -0.0515 
 
-0.0258 
 
-0.0490 
 
-0.0507 
 
-0.0450 
 Service & etc. 0.0148   0.0203   0.0209   0.0163   0.0117   
Economic Growth -0.0044   -0.0443 *** -0.0028   -0.0118 *   
 Shareholder Rights 0.0355 *** 
   
0.0392 *** 
 Rule of Law -0.0179 
         Taxation 
  
-0.0071 ** 
      Stock Market Liq. 
  
0.0728 
       Inflation 
    
0.0045 
     Stock Market Size 
    
0.0420 *** 
   Banking Sector Size 
      
-0.1690 ** 
  Creditor Rights 
        
0.0554 *** 
Size of Economy 
        
0.1010 ** 
Constant  0.0000   0.0000   -0.0722   0.0089   0.0000 
 F-statistic - 
 
- 
 
- 
 
- 
 
- 
 Chi2  1274.5 *** 715.81 *** 258.05 *** 293.81 *** 1344.17 *** 
Hausman Test - 
 
- 
 
- 
 
- 
 
- 
 N 1343   528   1371   1367   1371   
Notes: The table reports the regression results for debt maturity structure using Ordinary Least Square, Random 
Effects, Fixed Effects, Generalized Method of Moments and Seemingly Unrelated Regression. The 
parameter estimates that are significantly different from zero at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level are marked 
with ***, **, and *, respectively. The exact definition of the variables is as presented in Table 2.3.  
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CHAPTER 5 
 
WHAT DETERMINES THE ADJUSTMENT SPEED OF DEBT MATURITY 
STRUCTURE OF FIRMS TOWARD A TARGET? 
 
 
5.1 Introduction 
 
The finance literature, although only lately, has made strides in explaining the debt 
maturity structure decisions of firms. In Chapter 4, the thesis attempted to explore the main 
strands of debt maturity structure theories and related empirical works to identify firm, 
industry, institutional and macroeconomic variables that determine debt maturity structure. It 
presented additional insight into the debt maturity structure debate by empirically 
investigating the vital role that institutions, macroeconomic conditions, industry 
characteristics and firm level factors play in the determination of debt maturity structure in 
the African setting. Increasingly, the focus in the literature has been moving beyond a mere 
examination of determinants of debt maturity structure to the investigation of the extent to 
which, and the rate at which, firms adjust their debt maturity structure towards a target level 
(see Jun and Jen 2003; Antoniou et al. 2006; Cai et al. 2008; Dang 2008; Deesomsak et al. 
2009; Terra 2011, among others). In this chapter, the thesis attempts to bring additional 
insight about the debt maturity structure decisions of firms in Africa by examining whether 
they rebalance their debt maturity structure, and if so, what factors enhance and/or impede the 
rate at which they adjust towards a target.  
As in Chapter 4, most prior studies on debt maturity structure investigate the influence 
of firm-, industry-, and country-characteristics on debt maturity choices of firms (e.g.,Barclay 
and Smith Jr 1995; Demirguc-Kunt and Maksimovic 1996; Guedes and Opler 1996; Stohs 
and Mauer 1996; Ozkan 2002; Fan et al. 2008). Although such studies enhance our 
166 
 
understanding of the complexities involved in a firm’s debt maturity decisions, they exhibit 
three shortcomings. Firstly, they employ static econometric modelling which does not 
account for changes in debt maturity structure of firms due to changes in the underlying 
factors including firm- and country-specific variables. However, we know from recently 
emerging studies (e.g., Jun and Jen 2003; Antoniou, Guney et al. 2006; Cai, Fairchild et al. 
2008; Dang 2011; Deesomsak, Paudyal et al. 2009; Terra 2011) that there is a substantial 
dynamic component in the determination of a firm’s debt maturity structure. Secondly, they 
largely focus on developed countries and, at best, on non-African countries. Except for the 
work by Gwatidzo (2009:149-222) on debt [source] choice of five selected countries in sub-
Saharan Africa, there is no work that examines the speed of adjustment of debt maturity 
structures within the context of African countries. Thirdly, although debt maturity decisions 
not only reflect the level of the target maturity structure but also the costs and/or benefits of 
adjusting towards that target, we are yet to see a study that focuses on the examination of 
factors determining the adjustment speed of debt maturity structure. The thesis, in this 
chapter, aims to address these shortcomings by investigating debt maturity structure 
adjustment speed and its determinants within the African setting. 
The contribution of this chapter to the literature is manifold. Firstly, although there 
has been an increasing trend towards the investigation of whether firms in advanced 
economies adjust their debt maturity structure toward a target; an empirical endeavour to 
investigate this matter within the African milieu is virtually non-existent. Hence, the work in 
this chapter provides an ‘out of sample test’ for the theories and stylized facts developed 
within the context of advanced economies. Secondly, although we note that the adjustment 
speeds reported in various studies vary widely, we are yet to see any published work (even 
within the context of developed countries) which attempts to explain such a variation. The 
thesis, in this chapter, presents a first attempt to explain the variation in debt maturity 
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structure adjustment speed of firms using data drawn from firms operating in selected African 
countries. Thirdly, the study presented in this chapter would help identify the institutions and 
macroeconomic conditions that enhance and/or mitigate the rebalancing activities of firms as 
far as their debt maturity structure is concerned. This, in turn, would help governments, 
policymakers and other stakeholders in crafting policies and legislations suitable for 
enhancing firms’ rebalancing decisions.  
The empirical analyses focus on 986 non-financial firms drawn from nine African 
economies which have functioning stock exchanges. The study covers a period of 10 years 
(1999 – 2008). We use system Generalized Method of Moment (GMM) estimator proposed 
by Blundell and Bond (1998) which takes care of problems of endogeneity and dynamic 
adjustment. Consistent with Terra (2011) and Deesomsak et al. (2009), we document the 
presence of a costly but non-instantaneous adjustment towards target maturity structure by 
the sample firms.  
In addition to proffering evidence that firms in our sample do temporarily deviate 
from and partially adjust to an optimal debt maturity structure, we document that: (i) 
adjustment speed of debt maturity structure is positively affected by firm size and growth 
opportunities, and inversely affected by the gap between observed and optimal debt maturity 
structure; (ii) there are inter-industry and cross-country variation in adjustment speed of debt 
maturity structure confirming that industry and country characteristics matter in adjustment 
speed dynamics; (iii) firms based in the English common law legal systems adjust faster than 
those in the French civil law system; (v) stronger protection of investor’s rights and efficient 
law enforcement positively affects adjustment speed of debt maturity structure; and (vi) firms 
in richer and fast-growing countries tend to adjust their debt maturity structure more quickly 
than those in poorer and slow-growing countries.  
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The remainder of the chapter proceeds as follows: Section 2 presents a brief review of 
prior studies on debt maturity structure dynamics. Section 3 develops a dynamic debt 
maturity structure model to measure the adjustment speed of debt maturity structure and 
determine the factors which determine the speed of adjustment. Section 4 presents the 
empirical results and discussions. Finally, section 5 concludes.  
 
5.2 Literature Review 
 
Traditionally, empirical research on debt maturity structure focused on the 
determinants of observed debt maturity ratio using static econometric models. The more 
recent literature, however, saw a blitz of studies that focus on the dynamic adjustment of debt 
maturity structure towards a target (see Ozkan 2000; Antoniou et al. 2006; Dang 2011; 
López-Gracia and Mestre-Barberá 2011; Terra 2011, among others). In what follows, the 
chapter presents a brief survey of theoretical and empirical studies that document the 
presence of target behaviour in debt maturity decisions of firms and also attempts to present a 
framework for analyzing the nexus between firm, institutional, and macroeconomic variables 
and adjustment speed of debt maturity structure of firms. 
 
5.2.1 On the existence of adjustment toward a target debt maturity structure 
 
Mainstream debt maturity structure theories, except for signalling theory, suggest that 
that a firm’s debt maturity structure is a result of a firm’s attempt to strike a trade-off between 
costs and/or benefits of holding varying maturities of debt. Thus, they suggest existence of 
target (or optimal) debt maturity structure by a firm. The literature further notes that there are 
inter-firm, inter-industry, cross-country and inter-temporal variations in the underlying 
factors that determine the optimal debt maturity structure of firms. So, it is fair to conjecture 
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that there is a substantial dynamic component in the determination of target maturity 
structure.   
Researches subsequent to MM’s (1958) ‘irrelevance’ work suggest that debt maturity 
structure does have a role on firm value, and thus, a firm does have an incentive to take steps 
to offset deviations away from target maturity structure. Further, recent empirical literature 
suggests not only that firms adjust their debt maturity structure toward a target but also that 
the adjustment is non-instantaneous. This view was shared by Ozkan (2000) who studied 429 
non-financial firms in the UK and concluded that firms have long-term target ratios and they 
adjust to the target ratio relatively fast. They report an adjustment speed hovering around 44 
per cent which indicates that the costs of being away from target ratios are considerable for 
firms. In their paper on the dynamics of debt maturity structures of firms in three European 
countries, Antoniou et al. (2006) found the presence of costly and non-instantaneous 
adjustments towards target maturity structure by firms in all of the three countries included in 
their sample. The authors report adjustment speeds ranging from 34 to 55 per cent using 
various model specifications.  
Likewise, López-Gracia and Mestre-Barberá (2011) who examined the effect of tax 
on the debt maturity structure of Spanish SMEs conclude that SMEs adjust their debt 
maturity structure at a speed of circa 37 per cent per annum towards the target. More recently, 
in a study that examines the potential interactions of corporate financing and investment 
decisions, Dang (2011) report that the lagged debt maturity has a significant and positive 
influence on the debt maturity structure.  The author reports adjustment speeds ranging from 
60 to 62 per cent using various model specifications and estimation procedures. Similarly, 
Terra (2011) in a paper that examined debt maturity dynamics in seven Latin American 
economies, observes the existence of a substantial dynamic component in the determination 
of a firm’s debt maturity structure. He estimates a rate of adjustment speed to the optimal 
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maturaty structure ranging from 46 per cent to 68 per cent. Overall, recent literature strongly 
suggests that firms actively adjust their debt maturity structure towards a target debt maturity 
structure.  
 
5.2.2 Determinants  of adjustment speed of debt maturity structure 
 
It is evident from the foregoing discussion that firms exhibit target behaviour as far as 
their debt maturity structure is concerned and that the pace at which they adjust varied from 
study to study. Part of this dissention could be attributed to econometric and sample related 
issues and part of it could be ascribed to disparities in costs and/or benefits of adjusting 
toward the target maturity structure. This triggers us to pose the question that what factors 
determine the costs and/or benefits of adjusting toward a target maturity structure? In what 
follows, the chapter presents a synthesis of firm-specific and country-level variables that 
influence the rate at which a firm rebalances its maturity structure toward a target. 
 
5.2.2.1 Firm specific determinants of adjustment speed of debt maturity structure 
 
In Chapter 4, based on a synthesis of the extant literature, we modelled the optimal 
debt maturity structure as a function of firm, industry, and country characteristics. Thus, here, 
taking cue from Flannery and Hankins (2007), we hypothesize that if the optimal debt 
maturity structure varies across firms, industries, and countries, so might the cost of adjusting 
the maturity structure and the value of maintaining the target. To the extent that adjustment 
costs and/or benefits matter for a firm’s debt maturity structure decisions, variations in these 
factors will affect the speed of adjustment. 
Liquidity hypothesis suggests that a firm’s debt maturity structure is a result of its 
continued attempt to strike a balance between the benefits and costs of short-term debt. 
Hence, according to this hypothesis, the further a firm’s maturity structure is from the 
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optimal, the costlier it gets for the firm to stay away from the target. Hence, we posit a 
straight forward proposition that adjustment speed should be a positive function of the 
distance between observed and target debt maturity structures. On the other hand, Loof  
(2004) suggests that the further a firm is from its optimal capital structure, the more likely 
that its adjustment speed would be slower because larger adjustments require new issues of 
securities which tend to be costlier than smaller adjustments which can be achieved as part of 
a firm’s normal operation. Hence, based on this argument, we expect that the distance 
variable is negatively related with adjustment speed of debt maturity structure. Which of 
these predictions will prevail is an empirical matter.  
More profitable firms face less refinancing risk as they are likely to have more 
financial flexibility than the un-profitable firms (e.g., Jun and Jen 2003). Hence we expect, 
based on liquidity hypothesis, that less profitable firms should adjust more quickly toward 
their optimal debt maturity structure than the more profitable ones. The literature suggests 
that growing firms tend to have: (i) higher agency costs as they have more flexibility in their 
choice of future investment (e.g.,Titman and Wessels 1988); and (ii) increased cost of 
financial distress (e.g., Myers 1984; Myers and Majluf 1984) both of which exacerbate cost 
of deviating from the optimal debt maturity structure. We, therefore, anticipate that growing 
firms should adjust more quickly to their optimal debt maturity structure than no-growth 
firms.  
Parallel works on basic capital structure suggest that cost of adjusting toward an 
optimal structure depends on financial constraints that a firm experiences (e.g., Flannery and 
Hankins 2007). Due to better transparency and more stable base, we expect larger firms to 
have lesser agency costs and financing expenses and hence more relaxed with their target 
adjustment decisions (e.g., Titman and Wessels 1988; Titman and Tsyplakov 2007). Hence, 
according to liquidity risk hypothesis, small firms need to be relatively more concerned if 
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they stay away from their optimal debt maturity structure, thus having to move faster to these 
levels. On the other hand, based on agency hypothesis, one might argue that the lesser agency 
costs and the resulting lower financing expenses that characterize larger firms may make 
adjustment a cheaper affair than their smaller counterparts.  
 
5.2.2.2 Inter-industry heterogeneity in adjustment speed of debt maturity structure 
 
The extant literature presents ample evidence on inter-industry variation in debt 
maturity structure. For instance, Barclay and Smith (1995) recognize the role of industry 
effects in debt maturity decisions by suggesting that firms in regulated industries choose less 
short-term debt because the agency costs of managerial discretion are lower in such 
industries. In a study of debt maturity structures of Chinese companies, Cai et al. (2008) note 
generally similar results with regard to the determinants of debt maturity structure across 
different industries. Likewise, Guedes and Opler (1996) examined the determinants of the 
maturity of corporate debt issues of 7 369 bonds and notes, and found that firms in utilities 
industry, on average, issue relatively long-term debt.   
No prior empirical research has explicitly examined inter-industry heterogeneity in 
adjustment speed of debt maturity structures. However, in as much as industry characteristics 
influence a firm’s debt maturity structures, so might they influence the costs and/or benefits 
of adjusting to (or deviating from) an optimal debt maturity structure. Following prior works 
on basic capital structure (e.g., Roberts 2002; Stoja and Tucker 2007; Smith et al. 2010), we 
conjecture that such characteristics as the nature of operation, assets and technologies, and 
risk and growth characteristics of the industry in which a firm operates are the underlying 
factors explaining inter-industry variations in  adjustment speed of debt maturity structure.  
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5.2.2.3 Cross-country heterogeneity in adjustment speed of debt maturity structure 
 
Unlike the adjustment speed of basic capital structure of firms toward a target, quite a 
few studies examine the adjustment speed of debt maturity structures in an international 
setting. A closer look at the adjustment speeds reported in debt maturity structure studies 
indicated that the speeds vary from country-to-country and region-to-region. For instance, 
Antoniou et al. (2006) report that French firms adjust their debt maturity structure at a faster 
pace (i.e., 55 per cent) than their German (i.e., 52 per cent) and British (i.e., 34 per cent) 
counterparts. Likewise, Deesomsak et al. (2009) observe that Australian firms have the 
highest adjustment speed (i.e., 71 per cent), while Malaysian firms show a relatively slow 
adjustment (48 per cent). We also note that Terra (2011) reports a debt maturity structure 
adjustment speed of 46 per cent and 68 per cent for firms drawn from seven countries in 
Latin America and the US, respectively. These and other disparities in adjustment speed 
observed elsewhere in this chapter signify the presence of country-wide factors that impact 
adjustment speed of debt maturity structure.  
Another interesting dimension observed in maturity structure studies in the literature 
is the presence of inter-temporal variation in the rate at which firms adjust their debt maturity 
structure. Along this line, Antonio et al. (2006) note the speed of adjustment has been 
increasing in France and the UK while it has been declining in Germany during the sample 
period considered for their study. In the same way, Deesomsak et al. (2009) report varying 
adjustment rates for their sample countries during the pre- and post-1997 Asian financial 
crises. These evidences trigger a conjecture that country-level characteristics such as legal 
and financial institutions and macroeconomic conditions could be the underlying factors in 
explaining the observed cross-country variation in maturity structure adjustment speeds. As 
there is no published work yet which examines the role of country-wide variables on the rate 
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at which firms rebalance their debt maturity structure, this chapter provides additional insight 
in the debt maturity structure literature.  
The law-and-finance literature is replete with theoretical and empirical endeavours 
that attempt to show that a country’s legal institutions are important determinants of the 
complexity and terms of financial contracts between agents. At the core of the nexus between 
legal institutions and financial contracting is the protection afforded by legal systems to 
mitigate agency problems between insiders and outsiders. The law-and-finance literature 
further suggests that firms in countries with legal systems based on the English common law 
tend to have lesser agency-associated problems compared to those in countries with legal 
systems based on the French civil law. Therefore, we expect firms in the first group of 
countries to more quickly adjust their maturity structure to the optimal than those in the latter 
group. In a rather more direct examination of the influence of quality of the law on 
adjustment speed of debt maturity structure, we examine the effect of a set of more narrowly 
defined legal variable (i.e., shareholder rights protection, creditor rights protection, and rule 
of law).  
Analysing cross-country variations in debt maturity structure by examining the 
influence of market institutions is rather a customary practice. According to Demirgüç-Kunt 
and Maksimovic (1998), a developed stock market and banking sector makes it easier for 
firms to raise long-term capital. The likely smaller transaction costs and reduced agency costs 
associated with developed stock markets and banking sector would mean that firms find it 
easier to adjust their maturity structure to the optimal. However, firms operating in countries 
with developed stock markets and banking sector are also likely to have more financial 
flexibility than those operating in countries with less developed financial sectors. Hence, we 
expect that firms operating in countries with developed financial sectors might not face the 
pressure of liquidity risk and hence adjust more slowly. Which of these predictions will 
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prevail in Africa is an empirical matter. We consider variables which measure financial 
development (i.e., stock market size, stock market liquidity, and size of banking sector) to see 
the influence of such variables on speed of adjustment.  
Sizeable literature documents that macroeconomic conditions explain a substantial 
amount of cross-country variations in debt maturity decisions (see Demirgüç-Kunt and 
Maksimovic 1999; Deesomsak et al. 2009, among others). Accordingly, we hypothesize that 
if macroeconomic conditions affect the optimal debt maturity structure, so might they affect 
the cost of adjusting to and deviating from the optimal maturity structure. As in the legal 
institutions, we examine the effect of macroeconomic conditions on the speed of adjustment 
in two stages. We first examine if there are variation in adjustment speeds across broadly 
defined income groups (i.e., upper-middle-income; lower middle income, and low income 
countries) to which the country belongs. Second, we examine the effect of more narrowly 
defined macroeconomic variables (i.e., taxation, inflation, size of economy, and growth rate 
of GDP) on adjustment speed. 
 
5.3 The Empirical Framework 
 
Most prior studies on the subject of debt maturity structure use static econometric 
modelling which imposes an implicit, but unrealistic, assumption that firms are always at 
their optimal debt maturity level (e.g., Barclay and Smith Jr 1995; Guedes and Opler 1996; 
Demirgüç-Kunt and Maksimovic 1999; Jun and Jen 2003). In an imperfect environment 
where there are a set of adjustment costs and benefits, a firm’s debt maturity level may not 
necessarily be at the optimal state. In an effort to properly account for the dynamic nature of 
debt maturity structure, recent literature adopts a dynamic partial adjustment debt maturity 
structure models which allow target debt maturity structure to vary across firms and over time 
(e.g., Schiantarelli and Sembenelli 1999; Antoniou et al. 2006; Cai et al. 2008; Dang 2011; 
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López-Gracia and Mestre-Barberá 2011; Terra 2011). In this chapter, our prime interest is to 
examine the pace at which firms adjust their debt maturity structure towards a target. Again, 
the literature on basic capital structure presents plenty of evidence that adjustment speed 
estimation is very sensitive to econometric design and poses interesting econometric 
challenges (e.g., Zhao and Susmel 2008). In line with Flannery and Regan (2006), we adopt 
the integrated dynamic debt maturity structure model which allows us to jointly determine the 
adjustment speed along with its determinants
50
.    
In line with prior literature, we define the optimal debt maturity structure as a debt 
maturity level that a firm would desire to have in a frictionless environment. Let the optimal 
debt maturity structure of firm i in period t, labelled as      
  be a linear function of a set of N 
explanatory variables,         (where j = 1,2, 3, ....N) that have been used in past cross-
sectional studies of debt maturity structure:  
 
      
   ∑           
 
         (1) 
 
where     denotes a column vector containing the coefficients of explanatory variables. 
Since factors that determine a firm’s optimal debt maturity may vary across firms and 
change over time, it is likely that the optimal debt maturity itself may vary across firms and 
change over time. Hence, the dynamic set up in Equation (1) allows optimal debt maturity 
structure to vary across firms and over time.  
In a perfect environment where there are no adjustment costs and benefits, observed 
debt maturity structure         is expected to be the same as optimal debt maturity 
structure      
  . Hence, in such a setting, the difference between the current and the 
previous periods’ observed maturity levels should be the same as the difference between the 
optimal and pervious period’s maturity structures. That is,               should be equal 
                                                          
50
 For a detailed discussion of the advantages of employing the integrated dynamic panel adjustment model over 
the two-stage dynamic panel adjustment model see Flannery and Regan (2006) and Cook and Tang (2010). 
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to      
         . However, in an imperfect environment where there are all sorts of 
adjustment costs and benefits,       is not necessarily the same as      
 . That is, firms may 
not fully adjust their debt maturity level to the optimal; they may rather adjust partially. Thus, 
the equality is disrupted and a more realistic partial adjustment model may be specified as:  
 
                             
                 , where   |     |       (2) 
 
where       denotes the adjustment parameter representing the magnitude of adjustment 
towards an optimal maturity structure between two consecutive periods,         represents 
maturity structure of firm i, in period t-1, and       denotes the idiosyncratic error term. 
Rearranging the terms in Equation (2), we obtain: 
 
                                   
         , where   |     |    (3) 
 
The adjustment parameter is computed by subtracting the estimated coefficient of         
from 1. 
The model follows Terra (2011) and Drobetz and Wanzenried (2006), where firms 
adjust their debt maturity structure to an endogenously determined debt maturity strucure as 
specificed in Equation (1). Following prior empirical work on basic capital structure (e.g., 
Drobetz and Wanzenried 2006; Flannery and Rangan 2006; Cook and Tang 2010), we 
specify adjustment speed of maturity structure         as a linear function of factors that affect 
costs and benefits of adjustment (     ) and the unobserved firm-specific effects as follows: 
 
                                     (4) 
 
When firm-specific variables are used to explain the speed of adjustment,       has 
both time and cross-sectional dimensions. In contrast, in the case of macroeconomic 
variables,       has only time dimension as macroeconomic variables do not vary across firms. 
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Substituting Equation (4) and Equation (1) in Equation (3), we obtain: 
 
                                 
 
   
 
        ∑    
 
                     (5) 
 
Partly multiplying Equation (5) out, we obtain: 
 
                      
 
                 ∑           
 
       ∑           
 
             (6) 
 
When Equation (6) is estimated, interest is mainly in     which is the coefficient of 
the interaction term between the determinant variable of adjustment speed,      , and the 
lagged debt maturity structure,        . We formulate the null hypothesis that      , i.e., 
the speed of adjustment is independent from firm-, industry-, and/or country-characteristics. 
However, this does not mean that firms do not adjust their debt ratios at all over time; this 
would only be the case if         was estimated to be insignificant. 
 
5.4 Results and Discussions51 
 
5.4.1 Descriptive statistics 
 
It is to be recalled that the thesis, in Chapter 4, had identified two important features that 
epitomized debt maturity structure of the sample firms during the 10 years period considered 
in this study. For the sake of convenience, Table 5.1 reproduces the summary statistics which 
we presented in Table 4.2. We noted that the debt maturity structures of the sample firms 
were varying during the period under study. We also observed, especially in the latter half of 
the sample period, that firms in the sample exhibited generally upward trend in their debt 
maturity structure; debt maturity ratio increased from 19.7 per cent in 2003 to 27.0 per cent in 
2008. This phenomenon could be due to the confluence of expansion in the economies and 
stock markets of our sample countries. It may also be due to the steady increase observed in 
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 The same dataset as in Chapter 4 was used for the analysis in this chapter. 
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profitability, growth opportunities, firm size, asset maturity and leverage experienced by 
firms in sample countries. More broadly speaking, these trends might be indicative of 
rebalancing exercise by the sample firms. 
 
(Insert table 5.1 about here) 
 
In terms of correlational relations, the results presented in Chapter 4 showed that the 
correlations between firm- and country-level variables and debt maturity structure were 
consistent with the major debt maturity structure theories. They were also in sync with 
findings reported in other similar empirical studies. The relatively high correlation that 
existed between the country-level variables suggests that care must be exercised in modelling 
debt maturity structure as we could be trapped in multicollinearity problems. Hence, we 
develop somewhat different specifications of Equation (6) by not including the severely 
correlated variables in a model.
52
 
As also pointed out in Chapter 3 for basic capital structure, the estimation of the 
dynamic model in Equation (6) largely depends on an accurate specification of the model for 
optimal debt maturity structure. A perusal of Tables 4.6, 4.7, 4.8, 4.9 and 4.10 shows that the 
observed relationship between the firm- and country-level variables and debt maturity 
structure is generally in line with predictions of mainstream debt maturity structure 
hypotheses and all the models were fit.  The discussions presented in Chapter 4 also showed 
that our results were consistent with evidence presented in other similar studies. More 
broadly speaking, our results are comparable with other similar studies and indicate that the 
independent variables are appropriate to model time varying debt maturity ratios in a 
dynamic adjustment model.  
   
                                                          
52
 The reader is kindly reminded that an extended discussion on the correlation between the firm- and country-
level variables and firm’s debt maturity structure is available in Chapter 4. 
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5.4.2 Determinants of adjustment speed of debt maturity structure 
 
In what follows, we present dynamic panel estimation results from Equation (6). We 
began our analysis by perusing the results for our baseline regression model (Model 1) which 
specifies debt maturity structure as a function of only firm-specific factors. Table 5.2 presents 
the system GMM estimate of Model 1.  
 
(Insert table 5.2 about here) 
 
As in Chapter 3, our focus is on the estimates of         and    . While         
shows the movement of debt maturity to its optimal,     indicates whether the speed of 
adjustment is independent of firm- and country-specific characteristics. The estimates of 
        was 0.433 which implies that firms in our sample countries close by 56.7 per cent 
(1-0.433) the gap between current and optimal debt maturity structure within one year. This 
means a firm takes less than two years to reach its optimal debt maturity structure. Such a 
rapid adjustment towards an optimal debt maturity structure suggests the existence of 
dynamic adjustment of the debt maturity structure of firms in our sample to an optimal debt 
maturity structure.  
Our finding supports theories that suggest dynamic trade-off theory and rules out the 
dominance of signalling theory in firms’ debt maturity structure decisions in our sample 
countries. Hence, it suggests the presence of costly and non-instantaneous adjustment 
towards the optimal debt maturity structure. This result is broadly consistent with the 
relatively faster adjustment speeds reported in Deesomsak et al. (2009) for firms in the Asia 
Pacific region, Ozkan (2000) for firms in the UK, and Antoniou et al. (2006) for firms in 
France, Germany, and the UK. 
 
181 
 
5.4.2.1 Firm-specific determinants of adjustment speed of debt maturity structure 
 
We observe from Table 5.2 that the relationship between the distance variable (Disti,t) 
and speed of adjustment is negative implying that the further the observed debt maturity ratio 
from the optimal, the slower the speed of adjustment
53
. This result supports the notion that 
larger adjustments required when a firm is further from its optimal debt maturity structure 
entail engaging in new issues of securities or retiring existing ones unlike smaller adjustments 
required when a firm is close to its optimal debt maturity which can be achieved through the 
normal operations of a firm (e.g., Loof 2004). However, this result does not support the 
liquidity risk hypothesis which conjectures a positive relationship between the two variables.  
The size variable which we had suggested as a determinant of adjustment speed has 
proved to be one of the important variables explaining speed of adjustment in debt maturity 
structure of firms in our sample. We note that the parameter estimate of the interaction term 
between firm size and maturity is negative implying that the adjustment speed of larger firms 
is faster than their smaller counterparts. As discussed earlier, this result support the prediction 
based on agency hypothesis and contrasts with that posited by liquidity hypothesis.  
After controlling for country specific factors (Model 2), we observe that the parameter 
estimate for the interaction term between growth opportunities and debt maturity structure is 
negative implying that the adjustment speed of growing firms is faster than no-growth firms. 
This result is consistent with the increased cost of financial distress that characterizes 
growing firms. 
 
                                                          
53
 Note that Equation (6) specifies a negative sign on   , and therefore the signs of the estimated coefficients on 
the respective interaction terms must be interpreted accordingly. 
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5.4.2.2 Inter-industry heterogeneity of adjustment speed of debt maturity structure 
 
We examine if the adjustment speeds shown in Table 5.2 persist when we estimate 
Model 1 on an industry-by-industry basis. System GMM regression estimation results for 
each industry are reported in Table 5.3 - Panel A
54
.  
 
(Insert table 5.3 about here) 
 
Industry-by-industry comparison of adjustment speeds of the ten industries considered 
in the study confirms existence of inter-industry variations in adjustment speeds (Table 5.3 - 
Panel A). We specifically note that firms within the Service industry move towards their 
target debt maturity structure relatively rapidly, in comparison to those in other industries. 
The adjustment speed of debt maturity structure for firms in Service industry was 60.04 per 
cent (1 – 0.396) per year. We also observe that firms in this industry generally tend to have 
relatively high levels of long-term leverage (Table 5.3 - Panel B), which may indicate that 
they are paying comparatively higher price for capital as cost of debt generally tends to be 
higher for long-term debts than short-term debts.  
One possible interpretation of the above observation is that when firms in this 
industry deviate from their optimal debt maturity structure, in particular take on additional 
long-term debt, they may increase their cost of debt even further. Consequently, they may try 
to adjust back towards their optimal debt maturity structure faster than firms in industries 
which borrow relatively short-term. Another possible interpretation of this phenomenon is 
along the lines of what Stoja and Tucker (2007) call “old economy” versus “new economy” 
taxonomy. According to Stoja and Tucker (2007), industries which fall in the “old economy” 
category include, inter alia, oil and mining, construction, textiles and real estate whereas 
those in the “new economy” group include biotechnology, IT and leisure. As firms in the “old 
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 For reasons of brevity, we report only coefficients of lagged debt maturity ratio along with the corresponding 
robust standard errors and number of observations. 
183 
 
economy” tend to be fixed asset intensive while those in “new economy” group tend to be 
R&D intensive, Stoja and Tucker (2007) argue that the cost of deviating from the optimum 
may be higher in the “new economy” industries than “old economy” industries. The fact that 
we observe faster adjustment speed for firms in Service industry is also consistent with Stoja 
and Tucker’s argument.  
In contrast, firms within the Durable and Oil and Gas industries adjust their debt 
maturity structure relatively slowly towards their optimum (Table 5.3 - Panel A). The 
adjustment speeds of debt maturity structure for firms in these industries is 4.6 per cent (1 – 
0.954) and 25.4 per cent (1 – 0.746) per year, respectively. We also note that firms in these 
industries tend to have a generally low short-term leverage (Table 5.3 - Panel B), which may 
indicate that firms in these industries might be experiencing lesser pressure of liquidity risk. 
According to Flannery and Hankins (2007), firms which are in a less distressful situation 
have a different incentive to adjust than those in more distressful situations. Hence, when 
firms in these industries deviate from their optimal debt maturity structure, they may feel less 
pressure to adjust back to the optimal quickly. This finding is also consistent with Stoja and 
Tucker’s (2007) “old economy” versus “new economy” taxonomy as both Durable and Oil & 
Gas industries fall within what they call “old economy” industries.  
 
5.4.2.3 Cross-country heterogeneity of adjustment speed of debt maturity structure 
 
For the purpose of evaluating cross-country variation in adjustment speeds, we 
estimate Model 1 using system GMM for each of the countries included in our sample. We 
report only coefficients of lagged debt maturity ratios and robust standard errors in Table 5.4.  
 
(Insert table 5.4 about here) 
 
Our results show that firms in Nigeria adjust at the fastest rate (1 - 0.493 = 0.507) 
while those in Morocco adjust at the slowest rate (1 – 0.872 = 0.128). Overall, as in the inter-
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industry analysis, a comparison of country-by-country results (Table 5.4) for seven countries 
indicate that there is a cross-country variation in adjustment speeds of debt maturity 
structures of firms in our sample
55
. These cross-country variations in adjustment speeds 
suggest that certain country-level variables might explain debt maturity dynamics beyond 
those explained by firm- and industry-specific characteristics.  
Based on our earlier hypothesis that legal institutions should determine the adjustment 
speed of debt maturity structure, we examine adjustment speeds by splitting our sample into 
firms from countries with common law and civil law traditions. Table 5.5 reports system 
GMM estimates of adjustment speeds of firms in each sub-sample. We report only 
coefficients of lagged debt maturity ratios.  
 
(Insert table 5.5 about here) 
 
Based on the law-and-finance literature, we expect that adjustment costs should be 
lower (and/or adjustment benefits should be higher) for firms operating in legal systems 
based on English common law compared to those operating in legal system based on French 
civil law. In line with this expectation, we observe that firms operating in countries with legal 
systems based on the English common law adjust to optimal debt maturity structures at a 
relatively faster speed – 69.7 per cent – than those operating in countries with legal systems 
based on the French civil law – 51.5 per cent (Table 5.5). This observation corroborates the 
hypothesis that legal institutions influence the adjustment costs and/or benefits, and hence, 
the adjustment speed of debt maturity structure of firms. 
Table 5.6 presents system-GMM estimation results for debt maturity structure 
adjustment speeds and its determinants by splitting the sample into sub-samples of income 
groups. Consistent with our expectation that the level of development has influence on debt 
maturity structure adjustment speed, our results show that adjustment speeds vary across 
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 The results for Botswana and Ghana were not reported owing to sample size limitations. 
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income groups. Specifically, we observe that firms in lower-middle-income countries tend to 
have a faster adjustment speed than their counterparts in upper-middle and low-income 
countries.  
 
(Insert table 5.6 about here) 
 
These differences in speeds of adjustment are consistent with the view that the 
relative costs and/or benefits of deviating from optimum debt maturity structure varies across 
income levels. Hence, the (net) adjustment cost, based on Table 5.6, is highest for lower-
middle-income countries, followed by upper-middle- and low-income countries. We couldn’t 
however see a clear positive (or negative) association between income level of a country and 
the adjustment speed of a firm’s debt maturity structure. The relationship is rather a complex 
one. A clearer picture could be seen when we examine the role of more narrowly defined set 
of macroeconomic variables (Model 2) on adjustment speed of debt maturity structure. 
The results of analysis of the influence of a set of more specific legal (i.e., creditor 
and shareholder rights protection and rule of law), financial (i.e., stock market size, stock 
market liquidity, and size of banking sector), and macroeconomic (i.e., overall economy, 
growth rate of the economy, corporate tax rate, and inflation) variables on adjustment speed 
of debt maturity structure is reported in Table 5.7. As alluded to earlier in this chapter and 
also in Chapter 3, we develop variants of Model 2 (i.e., Model 2a, Model 2b, . . . ., Model 2g) 
each of which encompass only less correlated independent variables. Table 5.7 presents the 
parameter estimates and related test statistic using system GMM.  
 
(Insert table 5.7 about here) 
 
We observe that the parameter estimates for the interaction between all the variables 
defining legal institutions (i.e., shareholder and creditor rights protection and the rule of law) 
and debt maturity ratio are negative implying the adjustment speed of debt maturity of firms 
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in countries with stronger investor protection and law enforcement is faster than of those in 
weaker investor protection and law enforcement. This is consistent with the view that firms in 
countries with legal systems which provide better investor protection and law enforcement 
should more quickly adjust their debt maturity structure to the optimal than those in countries 
which provide weaker investor protection and law enforcement.  
Our results also show that the parameter estimates for the interaction term between 
overall size of economy and its growth rate and debt maturity ratio are negative implying that 
adjustment speed of debt maturity of firms in richer and fast-growth countries is faster than of 
those in poorer and slow-growth economies. Our interpretation of this result is that the 
financial flexibility that firms in richer and fast growing economies enjoy due to the more 
developed financial markets that exist in these countries (see Table 4.5) permits such firms to 
adjust their debt maturity structure more quickly than their counterparts in poorer and slow-
growth economies. 
 
5.5 Conclusions  
 
This chapter extended the debate on debt maturity structure by disentangling matters 
pertaining to adjustment of debt maturity structure of a firm within the context of African 
countries. We argued that debt maturity structure of firms in Africa displays target behaviour 
and the pace at which they adjust their debt maturity structure to a target is a function of not 
only firm characteristics but also of industry, institutional and macroeconomic factors. We 
examined the data using system-GMM panel data estimator which is robust to firm 
heterogeneity and data endogeneity problems.  
The chapter presented ample evidence that firms in our sample not only adjust their 
debt maturity structure toward a target but also that they experience varying degrees of costs 
and/or benefits of adjustment. This implies, as in basic capital structure, that hypotheses 
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grouped under dynamic trade-off theory explain debt maturity structure and that signalling 
hypothesis is not the dominant theory that explains debt maturity structure of sample firms. 
The chapter also presented evidence that the extent of adjustment costs and/benefits of 
firms in our sample is inversely related to firm size, growth opportunities and the distance 
between observed and target debt maturity structure. This signifies the role that agency, 
transaction, and financial distress costs play in aggravating or mitigating adjustment costs 
and/or benefits.  
At industry level, the thesis documents that firms within the Service industry move 
towards their target debt maturity structure relatively rapidly than is the case in other 
industries. In contrast, firms within the Durable and Oil & Gas industries adjust their debt 
maturity structure relatively slowly towards their optimum. The chapter also remarks that 
those firms in the Service industry do generally tend to have relatively high levels of long-
term leverage whilst those in Durable and Oil & Gas tend to have lower levels of short-term 
leverage. These observations suggest that liquidity pressure, cost of debt, and agency costs 
are at the centre of the determination of costs and/or benefits of adjustment.  
In line with our expectation, the chapter documents that firms in common law 
countries adjust more rapidly to the optimal debt maturity structure compared to those in civil 
law countries. We also document that firms in countries with stronger shareholder and 
creditor rights protection and efficient law enforcement tend to adjust their debt maturity 
structure more speedily than those in countries with weaker shareholder and creditor rights 
protection and poorer law enforcement. These evidences highlight the importance of agency 
costs related with the protection of investors and law enforcement in aggravating or 
mitigating costs and/or benefits of adjustment speed.  
The chapter also proffers evidence that the overall size of a country’s economy and its 
growth rate have positive influence on the adjustment speed of a firm’s debt maturity 
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structure. This signifies the importance of financial flexibility that firms in richer and fast 
growing economies enjoy due to the more developed financial markets that exist in these 
countries. 
In summary, the study presented in this chapter was an attempt to push the frontiers of 
debate on firms’ debt maturity structure decisions one step further by examining the role that 
firm-, industry- and country-level factors play in the determination of the rate at which firms 
operating in Africa adjust their debt maturity structure toward a target. The final chapter that 
follows aims to conclude the study. It summarizes the study, outlines major findings 
presented in the hitherto chapters, draws main conclusions of the study, and discusses 
implications of results.  
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Table 5.1:  Evaluation of firm and country characteristics  
 
Panel A: Descriptive statistics of firm characteristics 
Year 
Debt 
Maturity 
Distance 
- Maturity 
Firm  
Size 
Earnings  
Volatility Profitability 
Growth  
Opportunities 
Asset  
Maturity 
Dividend  
Payout 
Tax  
shield 
1999 0.243 - 5.221 0.244 0.274 0.024 9.815 0.293 0.031 
2000 0.236 0.008 5.108 0.270 0.059 0.034 7.153 0.634 0.030 
2001 0.258 0.016 5.150 0.274 0.124 0.058 11.870 0.553 0.038 
2002 0.214 0.026 4.968 0.216 0.086 0.029 18.121 0.675 0.036 
2003 0.197 0.031 4.961 0.235 0.094 0.056 16.793 0.687 0.036 
2004 0.201 0.031 4.973 0.219 0.106 0.053 12.167 0.632 0.034 
2005 0.218 0.032 5.067 0.234 0.118 0.035 14.204 0.584 0.033 
2006 0.223 0.036 5.170 0.208 0.114 0.078 10.002 0.601 0.031 
2007 0.250 0.039 5.321 0.225 0.130 0.086 8.288 0.614 0.031 
2008 0.270 0.037 5.417 0.209 0.122 0.075 14.322 0.613 0.033 
Overall 0.225 0.028 5.116 0.224 0.112 0.059 12.970 0.619 0.034 
 
Panel B: Descriptive statistics of institutional and macroeconomics characteristics 
Year Taxation Inflation 
Size of 
Economy 
Growth 
of 
Economy 
Size of 
Stock 
Market 
Liquidity 
of Stock 
Market 
Size of  
Banking 
Sector 
Creditor 
Rights 
Shareholder 
Rights 
Rule of 
Law 
1999 35.108 4.098 3.188 2.332 73.484 26.960 0.660 2.384 3.550          . 
2000 34.985 4.213 3.199 2.621 58.206 28.824 0.657 2.384 3.550 -0.077 
2001 34.985 4.821 3.206 1.677 46.577 18.948 0.691 2.384 3.550       . 
2002 34.985 5.363 3.210 1.034 61.606 30.713 0.702 2.384 3.550 -0.102 
2003 34.863 5.797 3.220 2.206 62.971 20.428 0.699 2.384 3.550 -0.125 
2004 34.863 8.252 3.233 3.202 85.285 23.278 0.705 2.384 3.550 -0.036 
2005 34.863 5.530 3.246 2.980 112.525 35.167 0.709 2.384 3.550 -0.030 
2006 34.531 7.001 3.266 4.609 125.792 44.854 0.691 2.384 3.550 -0.099 
2007 23.404 8.021 3.285 4.592 144.504 42.829 0.679 2.384 3.550 -0.119 
2008 23.404 NA NA NA NA 51.166 . 2.384 3.550 -0.100 
Overall 32.599 5.899 3.228 2.806 85.661 32.317 0.688 2.384 3.550 -0.086 
 
Notes: Dist-Maturity refers to the difference between the observed debt maturity structure and the fitted value 
from a fixed effects (two way error component) regression of the debt maturity structure on the seven 
maturity structure determinants. The definition of all the other variables is as presented in Table 2.3 in 
chapter 2. 
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Table 5.2:  Firm-specific Factors and Debt Maturity Adjustment Speed – Model 1  
Dependent Variable Debt Maturity 
Maturi,t-1 0.433 *** 
 
(0.096)  
Maturi,t-1 x Sizei,t  -0.100 * 
 
(0.059)  
Maturi,t-1 x Profiti,t  0.304  
 
(0.946)  
Maturi,t-1 x Grwthti,t -0.617  
 
(0.530)  
Maturi,t-1 x Disti,t  4.433 *** 
 
(0.931)  
Constant 0.050  
  (0.053)  
Wald Test 172.83 
(6)  
Z2 1.148  
Sargan Test 95.649 
(107)  
N 992  
Notes: The table reports the results for the whole sample of estimating Equation (6) using system GMM estimator 
proposed by Blundell and Bond (1998). Variations in sample size are due to data limitations. The table 
shows the coefficients on the lagged maturity ratio and on the interaction term of the determinant of 
adjustment speed with the lagged maturity ratio. Coefficients significantly different from zero at 1%, 5%, 
and 10% level are marked ***, **, and *, respectively. Robust standard errors are in brackets.  The Wald 
test statistic refers to the null hypothesis that all coefficients on the determinants of target maturity ratio 
are jointly equal to zero. The test statistic Z2 tests the null hypothesis of no second order correlation in the 
residuals. The Sargan test statistic refers to the null hypothesis that the overidentifying restrictions are 
valid and uses the Blundell and Bond (1998) system GMM estimator. In parenthesis are the chi-squares. 
The exact definition of the variables is as presented in Table 2.3 of chapter 2. 
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Table 5.3  Debt maturity structure and its adjustment speed by industry 
 
Panel A: Inter-industry Heterogeneity in Adjustment Speeds 
Dependent Variable Debt Maturity  
Non-durable Industry 0.790 *** 
 
(0.105)  
 
205  
Durable Industry 0.954 *** 
 
(0.274)  
 
28  
Manufacturing Industry  0.633 *** 
 
(0.164)  
 
188  
Oil and Gas Industry  0.746 *** 
 
(0.142)  
 
45  
Chemicals & Construction Industry 0.643 *** 
 
(0.134)  
 
117  
Business Equipment Industry 0.178  
 
(1.541)  
38  
Regulated Industry  0.229  
 (0.418)  
 76  
Wholesale & Retail Industry 0.760  
 (0.801)  
 109  
Health Industry 0.524  
 (10.164)  
 83  
Service Industry  0.396 *** 
 (0.080)  
 125  
Notes:  The table reports the parameter estimates of the one-period lagged dependent variable and the corresponding robust 
standard errors and number of observations. Equation (6) was estimated using system GMM estimator proposed by 
Blundell and Bond (1998) for each industry in the sample. For reasons of brevity, we do not report parameter estimates 
and related details of firm-specific variables included in the model. Coefficients significantly different from zero at 1%, 
5%, and 10% level are marked ***, **, and *, respectively. Robust standard errors are in brackets.  And the figure in a 
third raw is the number of observations. The exact definition of the variables is as presented in Table 2.3 of chapter 2. 
 
 
Panel B: Summary statistics of measures of capital structure by industry 
 
Short-term leverage 
 
Long-term leverage 
 
Total leverage 
 
Mean SD* Obs# 
 
Mean SD* Obs# 
 
Mean SD* Obs# 
Non-durables 0.345 0.209 1006 
 
0.109 0.159 1055 
 
0.467 0.288 1011 
Durables 0.342 0.178 167 
 
0.088 0.115 170 
 
0.432 0.212 167 
Manufacturing  0.357 0.194 921 
 
0.124 0.176 958 
 
0.482 0.245 922 
Oil & Gas 0.265 0.233 385 
 
0.197 0.206 383 
 
0.477 0.321 386 
Chem. & Construction 0.445 0.224 523 
 
0.108 0.164 536 
 
0.555 0.230 523 
Business  Equipment 0.429 0.243 346 
 
0.078 0.105 350 
 
0.526 0.316 346 
Regulated  0.367 0.200 304 
 
0.182 0.194 310 
 
0.546 0.226 305 
Wholesale & Retail 0.428 0.229 697 
 
0.095 0.119 748 
 
0.545 0.309 705 
Health 0.352 0.189 283 
 
0.074 0.138 294 
 
0.435 0.232 283 
Service & Others 0.318 0.226 814 
 
0.132 0.160 862 
 
0.462 0.293 814 
*  SD = standard deviation; # Obs = number of observations. 
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Table 5.4: Cross-country Heterogeneity in Adjustment Speed 
Dependent Variable Debt Maturity  
Egypt 0.506 *** 
 
(0.096)  
 
718  
 
  
South Africa 0.459  
 
(3.531)  
 
79  
 
  
Kenya  0.116  
 
(0.805)  
 
37  
 
  
Mauritius -0.177  
 
(1.100)  
 
19  
 
  
Morocco  0.872 *** 
 
(0.119)  
 
64  
 
  
Nigeria 0.493 * 
 
(0.325)  
 
44  
 
  
Tunisia 0.175  
 
(0.282)  
 
38  
Notes: The table reports parameter estimates of the one-period lagged dependent variable and the 
corresponding robust standard errors and number of observations. Equation (6) was estimated using 
system GMM estimator proposed by Blundell and Bond (1998) for each country in the sample. The 
results for Botswana and Ghana were not included owing to sample size issues. For reasons of 
brevity, we do not report parameter estimates and related details of firm-specific variables included 
in the model. Coefficients significantly different from zero at 1%, 5%, and 10% level are marked 
***, **, and *, respectively. Robust standard errors are in brackets. And the figure in a third raw is 
the number of observations.  
 
 
Table 5.5: Heterogeneity in Adjustment Speeds across Legal Origin 
Dependent Variable Debt Maturity  
Common Law 0.303 *** 
 
(0.111)  
 
175  
 
  
French Law 0.485 *** 
 
(0.099)  
 
839  
Notes: The table reports parameter estimates of the one-period lagged dependent variable and the 
corresponding robust standard errors and number of observations. Equation (6) was estimated using 
system GMM estimator proposed by Blundell and Bond (1998) for each legal family. For reasons of 
brevity, we do not report parameter estimates and related details of firm-specific variables included 
in the model. Coefficients significantly different from zero at 1%, 5%, and 10% level are marked 
***, **, and *, respectively. Robust standard errors are in brackets. And the figure in a third raw is 
the number of observations.  
 
193 
 
Table 5.6: Heterogeneity in Adjustment Speeds across Income Groups 
Dependent Variable Debt Maturity  
Upper middle income countries 0.412  
 
(5.257)  
 
107  
Lower middle income countries 0.487 *** 
 
(0.098)  
 
820  
Low income countries 0.270  
 (0.486)  
 87  
Notes:  The table reports parameter estimates of the one-period lagged dependent variable and the corresponding robust standard errors and 
number of observations. Equation (6) was estimated using system GMM estimator proposed by Blundell and Bond (1998) for each 
income group family. For reasons of brevity, we do not report parameter estimates and related details of firm-specific variables 
included in the model. Coefficients significantly different from zero at 1%, 5%, and 10% level are marked ***, **, and *, 
respectively. Robust standard errors are in brackets. And the figure in a third raw is the number of observations.  
 
 
Table 5.7: Determinants of adjustment speed of debt maturity structure - Model 2 
Dependent Variable: 
Debt Maturity Model 2 (a) Model 2 (b) Model 2 (c) Model 2 (d) Model 2 (e) Model 2 (f) Model 2 (g) 
LVi,t-1 
 
0.442 
(0.130) 
*** 
 
0.444 
(0.101) 
*** 0.452 
(0.106) 
*** 
 
0.440 
(0.117) 
*** 0.477 
(0.128) 
*** 
 
0.467 
(0.114) 
*** 0.477 
(0.109) 
*** 
LVi,t-1 x Profiti,t  
 
-0.163 
(1.065)  
0.193 
(0.965) 
 -0.655 
(1.195)  
0.061 
(1.832) 
 -0.276 
(0.934)  
-0.125 
(1.135) 
 -0.351 
(0.974) 
 
LVi,t-1 x Grwthti,t 
 
-0.267 
(0.772) 
* 
 
-0.872 
(0.624) 
 -1.223 
(0.775) 
* 
 
-0.971 
(0.748) 
 -1.034 
(0.602) 
* 
 
-1.182 
(0.738) 
* -1.145 
(0.622) 
* 
LVi,t-1 x Disti,t  
 
3.264 
(0.937) 
*** 
 
3.854 
(0.884) 
*** 3.474 
(0.939) 
*** 
 
4.016 
(1.063) 
*** 4.573 
(1.082) 
*** 
 
3.580 
(1.110) 
*** 4.135 
(0.900) 
*** 
LVi,t-1 x GDPGi,t  
 
-0.045 
(0.024) 
* 
 
  
  
  
  
    
LVi,t-1 x SRi,t  
   
  
  
  
  
  -0.103 
(0.164) 
* 
LVi,t-1 x RULi,t  
 
-0.493 
(0.264) 
* 
 
  
  
  0.043 
(0.266)  
  -0.093 
(0.251) 
 
LVi,t-1 x TAXi,t  
   
-0.003 
(0.004) 
 
  
  
  
    
LVi,t-1 x STKLIQi,t  
   
  
  
  
  
-0.281 
(0.244) 
   
LVi,t-1 x INFLi,t  
   
  -0.003 
(0.014)  
  
  
-0.001 
(0.013) 
   
LVi,t-1 x STKSIZi,t  
   
  -0.051 
(0.102) 
   
  
    
LVi,t-1 x BNKSIZi,t  
   
  
  
-0.341 
(0.778) 
 
  
    
LVi,t-1 x CRi,t 
   
  
  
-0.064 
(0.123) 
* 
  
    
LVi,t-1 x LOGGDPi,t 
   
  
  
  -0.222 
(0.138) 
* 
 
    
Constant 0.024 
(0.035) 
 -0.003 
(0.036) 
 0.022 
(0.037) 
 0.041 
(0.143) 
 0.078 
(0.069) 
 0.002 
(0.040) 
 0.030 
(0.093) 
 
Wald Test 84.18 
(6) 
*** 198.61 
(6) 
 96.96 
(6) 
*** 91.49 
(6) 
*** 98.01 
(7) 
*** 106.43 
(7) 
*** 169.06 
(7) 
*** 
Z2 -1.137  -1.528  -1.254  -1.351  -1.448  -1.243    
Sargan Test 78.938 
(93)  
104.169 
(109) 
 85.961 
(99)  
90.229 
(99) 
 84.140 
(93)  
83.285 
(98) 
 107.996 
(116) 
 
N 818  992  826  824  797  805  984  
Notes: The table reports the results of estimating Equation (6) using system GMM estimator proposed by Blundell and Bond (1998). Variations in sample size 
are due to data limitations. Disti,t is constructed as the fitted values from a fixed effects (two way error component) regression of the debt maturity ratio 
on the eight debt maturity structure determinants. The exact definitions of all the other variables are presented in Annex A. The table shows the 
coefficients on the lagged maturity ratio and on the interaction term of the determinant of adjustment speed with the lagged debt maturity ratio. 
Coefficients significantly different from zero at 1%, 5%, and 10% level are marked ***, **, and *, respectively. Robust standard errors are in brackets.  
The Wald test statistic refers to the null hypothesis that all coefficients on the determinants of target maturity ratio are jointly equal to zero. The test 
statistic Z2 tests the null hypothesis of no second order correlation in the residuals. The Sargan test statistic refers to the null hypothesis that the 
overidentifying restrictions are valid and uses the Blundell and Bond (1998) system GMM estimator. 
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CHAPTER 6 
 
CONCLUSIONS AND DIRECTIONS FOR FUTURE RESEARCH 
 
6.1 Introduction 
 
The extant literature has travelled a long way in terms of advancing our understanding 
of the financing decisions of a firm over the last five decades. It has moved from the initial 
“irrelevance” proposition forwarded by MM (1958) to a host of competing theories favouring 
the “relevance” of financing decisions to firm value. However, neither the theoretical nor the 
empirical endeavours could reach at a consensus even on the basic issues surrounding firm 
finance (e.g., Elsas and Florysiak 2008). After roughly three decades since Myers’ (1984) 
presidential address to the American Finance Association, the literature is far from providing 
an exact answer to the question: how do firms decide on their capital structure and, by 
extension, their debt maturity structure?  
Despite the lack of consensus, the finance literature has made considerable inroads 
towards enhancing our understanding of financing decisions of a firm. Two important 
“stylized facts” are noticeable in the hitherto literature. First, there is a substantial dynamic 
component in the determination of both basic capital structure as well as debt maturity 
structure of a firm (see Antoniou et al. 2006; Flannery and Rangan 2006; Antoniou et al. 
2008; Dang 2011; Deesomsak et al. 2009; Terra 2011, among others). Second, a firm’s 
financing decisions are a function of not only firm-specific factors but also of industry, 
macroeconomic, and institutional factors (see Rajan and Zingales 1995; Demirguc-Kunt and 
Maksimovic 1996; De Jong et al. 2008, among others).  
In spite of the recognition that firm-, industry- and country-level characteristics are 
important factors in understanding a firm’s financing decisions, the extant empirical literature 
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has several shortcomings. Most prior empirical works
56
 are either single-country studies or, if 
they involve cross-country setup, focus on advanced or non-African economies. This 
drawback is even more acute when it comes to studies on debt maturity structure. We, 
however, know that not only country-level factors such as legal and financial institutions and 
macroeconomic conditions are important determinants of financing decisions of a firm but 
also that these factors in Africa are different from those in the advanced world. Further, 
notwithstanding the recognition in the recent literature that there is a substantial dynamic 
component in a firm’s financing decisions and that the dynamism is a function of firm-, 
industry- and country-level variables, the subject is virtually unstudied within the African 
milieu.  
In trying to fill this gap, this thesis has: 
 
 examined basic capital structure of firms in selected African countries to identify 
the influence of firm- industry-, institutional-, and macroeconomic-factors on a 
firm’s basic capital structure decisions;   
 investigated debt maturity structure of firms in selected African countries to 
identify the effect of firm-, industry-, institutional-, and macroeconomic -factors 
on a firm’s debt maturity structure decisions; 
 assessed the role of institutional-, macroeconomic-, industry-, and firm-
characteristics on the adjustment speed of basic capital structure within the 
context of selected African countries; and  
 examined the role of institutional-, macroeconomic-, industry-, and firm-
characteristics on the adjustment speed of corporate debt maturity structure within 
the context of selected African countries. 
                                                          
56
 The notable exceptions to the disturbing dearth of cross-country studies in the context of African counties 
were the recent works by Gwatidzo and Ojah (2009) and Gwatidzo (2009:149-222). The reader is kindly 
referred to Chapter 1 for a brief critique on these works. 
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To address the above closely intertwined issues in corporate finance, the study 
examined 10-year (between 1999 and 2008) financial statement data related to 986 non-
financial firms drawn from nine African countries including Botswana, Egypt, Ghana, Kenya, 
Mauritius, Morocco, Nigeria, South Africa and Tunisia. The financial statement data were 
used to capture “conventional” firm-characteristics that were known to effect on financing 
decisions of a firm. We classified firms into 10 industries using the US SIC (4-digist) 
following Song and Philippatos (2004). Publications by the World Bank, Berkowitz et al. 
(2003), Kaufmann et al. (2009), and Andrei Shelifer’s personal web page were used to obtain 
data on institutional and macroeconomic variables. These data were subjected to a series of 
econometric models. The analyses were done primarily within the panel data framework in 
which various types of panel data estimation techniques ranging from simple pooled OLS to 
system-GMM were carried out. The following sections present a summary of the main 
findings, the policy implications of the findings and directions for future research.  
 
6.2 Summary of Findings 
 
6.2.1 Determinants of basic capital structure of a firm 
 
Based on mainstream capital structure theory, the thesis argued that basic capital 
structure of a firm is a function of not only firm characteristics but also of industry, 
institutional and macroeconomic characteristics. We interrogated the data by employing a 
sequence of models to show the role of different factors and checked robustness of results 
through [all] available econometric procedures. The study documents a number of findings 
from the analyses.  
Differences in basic capital structure of firms attributable to firm-specific 
characteristics were observed. Leverage, for all the three measures used, tends to be higher in 
larger firms whilst it is likely to be lower in smaller firms. Also, asset tangibility is observed 
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to have a positive influence on long-term leverage while it has an inverse influence on short-
term leverage. As we alluded to in Chapter 2, the literature usually considers firm size and 
asset tangibility as proxies for probability of default, adverse selection, and agency costs. 
Hence, our confirmations imply that firms in our sample consider probability of default, 
adverse selection and agency costs as important factors in the determination of its basic 
capital structure. On the other hand, the evidence that more profitable firms tend to have less 
leverage while less profitable firms tend to have more leverage signifies the role that 
transaction costs and information asymmetry problems play in the determination of basic 
capital structure of firms in our sample. Furthermore, the study establishes that non-debt-
related tax-shield is positively related to long-term leverage while [it] is negatively related 
short-term leverage. This evidence partially corroborates the argument that the higher the 
non-debt-related tax-shields such as depreciation, net operating loss carry forwards and tax 
credits, the lower the tax advantage that arises from interest deduction. Finally, we showed 
that the dividend payout variable negatively influences long-term leverage. Dividend policy 
is conjectured to reflect a firm’s need (or lack of it) for additional financing or information 
asymmetry and agency problems faced by the firm. Hence, this finding proffers further 
evidence that firms in our sample consider agency costs and information asymmetry issues in 
basic capital structure decisions.  
The industry in which a firm operates also seems to have an influence on the basic 
capital structure decisions of a firm. We observe that the inter-industry differences appear to 
be a function of how capital structure is defined. We particularly note that short-term and 
total leverage of firms in the Wholesale and Retail and Chemical and Construction industries 
are significantly higher than those of firms in the Manufacturing industry. On the other hand, 
long-term leverage of firms in Regulated industries tend to be higher than those of firms in 
the Manufacturing industries. The literature generally suggests that inter-industry differences 
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in capital structure are related to differences in operating characteristics (including the nature 
of assets and technologies used) and industry specific regulations. As such, our evidence 
signifies the important role that industry specific technologies and regulations play in firm’s 
capital structure decisions.   
In terms of macroeconomic conditions, we observe that firms in richer countries tend 
to have more long-term and less short-term leverage than is the case in poorer countries. In 
contrast, the rate of economic growth is indirectly related with long-term and total leverage. 
Also, a firm in our sample is likely to issue more debt under inflationary environment. In 
addition to direct influences, we observe that the negative influence of profitability on short-
term leverage is stronger in lower-middle-income countries than is the case in other income 
group countries. Similarly, the positive influence of dividend payout ratio on long-term and 
total leverage is stronger in low-income countries than is the case in the other two groups. As 
noted in Chapter 2, the level of the overall economy and its growth rate are usually 
considered in the literature as proxies for access to finance, firm’s investment opportunity set 
and financing needs, probability of bankruptcy, agency costs and market timing. Similarly, 
inflation reflects government’s ability to manage its country’s economy. Thus, the evidence 
summarized in the above paragraph signifies the role the above factors play in basic capital 
structure of decision of firms in our sample countries. 
At institutional level, our findings indicated that there is: (i) a direct relationship 
between investor (both shareholders and creditors) rights protection and a firm’s leverage; (ii) 
an inverse relationship between the rule of law variable, size of banking sector and leverage; 
and (iii) a “definitionally-sensitive” relationship between development of stock markets and 
leverage. These evidences suggest that agency and contract enforcement costs are among the 
consideration in basic capital structure decisions of firms in the sample. 
 
199 
 
6.2.2 Capital structure adjustment speed and its determinants 
 
In the second part of the thesis, we further extended the debate on basic capital 
structure decisions of firms in Africa along the lines of empirical endeavours elsewhere. We 
contended that capital structure of firms in Africa displays target behaviour and the pace at 
which they adjust their capital structure to a target is a function of not only firm 
characteristics but also of industrial, institutional and macroeconomic factors. We examine 
the data using system-GMM panel data estimator which is robust to firm heterogeneity and 
data endogeneity problems.  
The thesis presents evidence that capital structure of firms in Africa not only 
converges to a target but also that it faces varying degrees of adjustment costs and/or benefits 
in doing so. This suggests not only that dynamic trade-off theory explains capital structure 
decisions of firms in our sample but also rules out the dominance of information asymmetry 
based theories within the context of firms in Africa. 
Also, the thesis established that the extent of costs and/or benefits of adjustment that 
firms in Africa face is determined, inter alia, by firm-specific factors such as firm 
profitability, size, growth opportunities, and the gap between observed and target capital 
structure. Furthermore, except for firm profitability which positively influences adjustment 
speed, we observe that the nature of influence that firm-specific characteristics exert on 
adjustment costs and/or benefits is a function of how leverage is defined. As could be noted 
from the discussions in Chapter 3, the adjustment speed literature customarily considers the 
above firm-specific characteristics as proxies for financing costs, financial flexibility, access 
to finance, the potential cost of distress and value of debt-related tax-shield. As such, the role 
that firm-specific characteristics play in the determination of adjustment speed suggests that 
the above issues are at play in aggravating or mitigating adjustment costs and/or benefits. 
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In terms of inter-industry differences in adjustment costs and/or benefits, we note that 
the relationships are sensitive to how one defines capital structure. On a short-term leverage 
basis, firms within the Durables and Chemicals & Construction industries move towards their 
target capital structures relatively rapidly than is the case in other industries. In contrast, on a 
long-term leverage basis, firms within the Health, Oil & Gas, and Regulated industries move 
towards their target capital structures relatively rapidly than is the case in other industries. A 
further investigation shows that firms in riskier industries were observed to adjust faster than 
those in less risky ones implying that probability of bankruptcy has important place in 
determining adjustment costs and/or benefits of a firm in our sample countries.   
In addition, consistent with the view that adjustment costs should be lower and /or 
adjustment benefits should be higher in common law origin countries; we observe that firms 
in countries with common law tradition tend to more rapidly adjust their capital structure than 
is the case in countries with civil law system. In terms of more-narrowly-defined institutional 
variables, we observe that shareholder rights protection and rule of law, in contrast to creditor 
rights protection, have positive influence on capital structure adjustment speed of firms. The 
implication of these findings is that investor protection and contract enforceability are 
important matters in the determination of adjustment costs and/or benefits of firms in our 
sample. 
The thesis also proffers evidence that more developed banking sector and stock 
markets negatively influence speed of adjustment of short-term and total leverage. Contrary 
to our expectation, adjustment speeds of short-term and long-term leverages are slower in 
richer countries than is the case in poorer countries. Furthermore, firms in countries which 
have higher marginal corporate tax rate and inflation tend to have faster adjustment speed. 
Put together, the evidences again suggest that access to external finance and tax issues are 
central to the determination of adjustment costs and/or benefits of firms in our sample.  
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6.2.3 Determinants of debt maturity structure of a firm 
 
The third part of the thesis went beyond issues pertinent to basic capital structure and, 
to a certain extent, tackled matters pertaining to debt maturity structure. We contended that 
debt maturity structure of firms in our sample is determined by a host of “conventional” 
factors including firm, industrial, institutional and macroeconomic characteristics. The data 
was examined using a battery of models to identify the significance of different factors. A 
range of standard estimation procedures were used for checking the robustness of results.  
At firm level, we observe that such factors as earnings volatility, asset maturity and 
leverage have positive influences on the debt maturity structure of firms in our sample. This 
implies that liquidity risk pressure, maturity matching and bankruptcy risk are important 
factors in debt maturity structure decisions of firms in our sample. On the other hand, we also 
document that firm profitability and dividend payout ratio inversely influence debt maturity 
decisions of our sample firms which signifies the signalling role of debt maturity structure.  
We also note inter-industry heterogeneity in debt maturity structure of firms in our 
sample. Specifically, firms in Oil & Gas, Regulated and Service industries incline to have 
longer debt maturities while those in Durables, Chemical and Construction, Business 
Equipment, Wholesale and Retail and Health industries incline to have shorter debt maturity. 
This implies that industry characteristics such as industry-specific technologies, risks, and 
regulations influence debt maturity decisions of firms in our sample countries. 
In terms of macroeconomic variables, the thesis establishes that firms in low-income 
countries tend to issue less long-term debt relative to those in upper-middle-income countries. 
This was further cemented by our observation that the size of overall economy and debt 
maturity structure were positively related. Contrary to our expectation, the thesis also 
documents that growth rate of real GDP per capita variable is negatively related with debt 
maturity structure. This, perhaps, is due to the prevalence of relatively shorter asset maturities 
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that epitomize firms in high-growth countries. Also, we found that the influence of taxation 
variable on debt maturity structure is negative as expected. Chapter 4 notes that the above 
economy-wide factors are usually taken as proxies for quality of law enforcement, access to 
external finance, maturity matching, agency problems and debt-related tax shields. Thus, the 
findings in the thesis underscore the importance of the above issues in debt maturity structure 
decisions of firms in our sample. 
We also note that financial deepening had a role to play in the debt maturity structure 
decisions of firms in our sample. Unlike, stock market development variables, banking sector 
development variables were negatively related with debt maturity structure of our sample. 
With regard to legal institutions, we found that the provisions of the law with regard to 
investor protection influences debt maturity structure of firms directly and highly 
significantly. Although the positive relationship between shareholders rights protection 
variable and debt maturity corroborates conjectures based on agency theory, the similar 
relationship that we observe between creditor rights protection and debt maturity contradicts 
hypothesis based on the same theory. The latter relationship could be due to the relatively 
small banking sector that characterized countries with high creditor rights protection index 
(i.e., Botswana, Nigeria, and Kenya) in our sample. Put together, the evidences suggest that 
agency and bankruptcy costs and information asymmetry problems do matter in the 
determination of debt maturity structure of firms in our sample. 
In addition to the direct effects, we observe that broadly defined macroeconomic and 
institutional variables had an indirect effect by either mitigating or enhancing the influence of 
firm-specific factors. For instance, in lower-middle-income countries, the effect of 
profitability is enhanced whilst that of asset maturity and dividend payout is mitigated. 
Furthermore, in low-income countries, while the influence of asset maturity is enhanced that 
of non-debt-related tax-shield is deterred. Similarly, in common law countries, the effect of 
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profitability on debt maturity structure is enhanced while the effect of asset maturity is 
mitigated. The fact that we observe some commonality between the determinants of basic 
capital structure and debt maturity reinforces the view that the two financing decisions are 
highly intertwined and, perhaps, jointly determined. 
 
6.2.4 Debt maturity adjustment speed and its determinants 
 
Lastly, the study extended the debate on debt maturity structure by disentangling 
matters pertaining to adjustment of debt maturity structure of a firm within the context of 
African countries. We argued that debt maturity structure of firms in Africa displays target 
behaviour and the pace at which it adjusts to a target is a function of not only firm 
characteristics but also of industrial, institutional and macroeconomic factors. We examine 
the data using system-GMM panel data estimator which is robust to firm heterogeneity and 
data endogeneity problems.  
The study proffers ample evidence that firms in our sample countries not only adjust 
their debt maturity structure toward a target but also that they experience varying degrees of 
costs and/or benefits of adjustment. This implies, as in basic capital structure, that hypotheses 
grouped under trade-off theory explain debt maturity structure and that signalling hypothesis 
is not the dominant theory that explains debt maturity structure of sample firms. 
The study also presents evidence that the extent of adjustment costs and/benefits of 
firms in our sample is inversely related to firm size, growth opportunities and the distance 
between observed and target debt maturity structure. This signifies the role that agency, 
transaction, and financial distress costs play in aggravating or mitigating adjustment costs 
and/or benefits.  
At industry level, the thesis documents that firms within the Service industry move 
towards their target debt maturity structure relatively rapidly than is the case in other 
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industries. In contrast, firms within the Durable and Oil & Gas industries adjust their debt 
maturity structure relatively slowly towards their optimum. The thesis also remarks that firms 
in the Service industry tend to have relatively high levels of long-term leverage whilst those 
in Durable and Oil & Gas tend to have lower levels of short-term leverage. These 
observations suggest that liquidity pressure, cost of debt, and agency costs are at the centre of 
the determination of costs and/or benefits of adjustment.  
In line with our expectation, the study documents that firms in common law countries 
adjust more rapidly to the optimal debt maturity structure compared to those in civil law 
countries. We also document that firms in countries with stronger shareholder and creditor 
rights protection and efficient law enforcement tend to adjust their debt maturity structure 
more speedily than those in countries with weaker shareholder and creditor rights protection 
and weaker law enforcement. These evidences highlight the importance of agency costs 
related to protection of investors and law enforcement in aggravating or mitigating costs 
and/or benefits of adjustment speed.  
The study also proffers evidence that the overall size of a country’s economy and its 
growth rate have positive influence on the adjustment speed of firm’s debt maturity structure. 
This signifies the importance of financial flexibility that firms in richer and fast growing 
economies enjoy due to the more developed financial markets that exist in these countries. 
  
6.3 Policy Implications of the Findings 
 
Several useful policy implications emerge from the study. Firstly, the prevalent 
agency and information asymmetry problems that we identified, virtually in all of the 
analyses, means that there is a need for governments, policymakers and other stakeholders in 
the sample countries to institute mechanisms to mitigate these problems. The “law-and-
finance” literature examined in the present study documents that legal institutions could be 
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used to minimize agency conflicts that in turn, affect various issues in finance. Specifically, 
the law and the quality of its enforcement are important determinants of the extent to which 
firms are willing to borrow, creditors are willing to lend or shareholders are willing to invest. 
The literature also suggests that one of the important functions of financial markets is that 
they facilitate information acquisition and the more developed the financial markets of a 
country are the more convenient and cheaper it gets for participants in the markets to acquire 
information and investors that have better information about firms can make better 
investment decisions. Thus, by considering legislations, policies and directives that enhance 
protection of investor’s rights, policymakers, governments and other stakeholders would be 
able to enhance the development of financial markets and also mitigate both the agency and 
information asymmetry problems. 
Secondly, the inadequacy of access to external finances observed in our sample 
signifies the need for establishing policies that enhance financial deepening in sample 
countries since financial deepening reduces financing constraints. As alluded to in the above 
paragraph, one way to enhance financial deepening is through the promulgation of 
legislations, policies and directives conducive for the development of financial markets. The 
literature also suggests that macroeconomic policies such as interest rate restraints and 
reserve and liquidity requirements may as well be used to enhance financial deepening (see 
Levine 1999; Beck, Demirguc-Kunt and Levine 2005, among others). 
Finally, we observe clear evidence that there are inter-industry differences in basic 
capital and debt maturity structure and also the corresponding adjustment speeds. Therefore, 
although it is worthwhile for governments, policymakers and other stakeholders to attempt to 
solve the problems we alluded to above, it is crucial that these policy interventions be crafted 
with great care. That is, a “one size fits all” type of policy intervention may not be effective 
for all the industries in a country.  
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6.4 Limitations of the Study 
 
Notwithstanding the contributions that this study attempts to make, some 
circumspection is essential in interpreting the results. As in most empirical studies on the 
subject, this study uses firms listed in stock exchanges as units of analysis. Our decision to 
consider only listed firms was guided by two factors. First, financial reports of listed firms 
tend to be more credible than those of non-listed firms as the latter group, in most of the 
cases, might not have to adhere to the strict financial reporting requirements and standards 
that the listed group will have to adhere to. Secondly, lack of data availability on non-listed 
firms meant that we restrict out analyses to listed-firms. Nonetheless, listed firms tend to be 
larger and also likely to have relatively better access to finance and hence their corporate 
finance decisions are less subject to the institutional constraints compared to non-listed firms. 
Thus, the results presented in the thesis may be biased towards large firms.  
The study sought to extend the debate on basic capital and debt maturity structure by 
examining the relationship between “conventional” legal and financial institutions and capital 
and debt maturity structures of a firm within the context of African firms. However, very 
recent literature points to the role of “national culture” capital structure decisions of a firm 
(Li, Griffin, Yue, and Zhao 2011). In a study that investigates the influence of national 
cultural dimensions on dividend payouts, Shao, Kwok and Guedhami (2010) document 
support for the hypothesis that culture does have a role in financing decisions of a firm. 
Although the models that control for country differences in the present study are meant to 
minimize the bias that may stem from the non-inclusion of national culture variables, the 
present study does not tell us much about the influence of culture on firm finance.  
There is virtually no prior study which attempted to investigate inter-industry 
variations in financing decisions of a firm within the context of African firms. In all of the 
hitherto chapters, this study attempted to fill this gap in the literature. We are mindful of the 
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fact that this approach does not tell us how industry factors affect a firm’s financial decisions. 
Future research should consider investigating how industry factors such as industry 
competition and concentration, technology and risk influence financial decisions of a firm.  
Research endeavours also document that adjustment speed of debt maturity structure 
is affected by financial crises (e.g., Deesomsak et al. 2009). Due to lack of sufficient data in 
the post-2008 financial crises period, we could not investigate the influence of financial crises 
on the financial decisions of firms in African countries.  
In a study of corporate capital structure of five sub-Saharan economies, Gwatidzo 
(2009:90-148) underscores the importance of examining the role of heterodox variables on 
firms’ capital structure decisions. Data availability meant that we either include fewer 
countries in our sample or exclude some of the heterodox variables identified in Gwatidzo. 
We chose to investigate the influence of “conventional’ variables to gain adequate variability 
in the sample countries.  
 
6.5 Directions for Future Research 
 
Despite the fact that there has been a proliferation of theoretical and empirical efforts 
to advance our understanding of the dynamics pertaining to both basic capital and debt 
maturity structures, there has not been a universal theory that explains these important issues 
in modern corporate finance. Nor does this study claim to provide a conclusive answer 
regarding the topical questions underpinning capital and debt maturity structure decisions of a 
firm; far from that! There are a number of issues that this study does not address and we 
would like to encourage further research to address these issues. We identify the following 
particular avenues for future research: 
 
1. The present study uses financial data drawn from firms listed in stock exchanges of 
nine countries considered in the sample. Gwatidzo (2009:223-240) notes that only few 
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firms are listed in African stock exchanges which often represent only a minor share 
of the GDP of a country. Relatively smaller firms which contribute significantly to the 
overall GDP of a country are not listed in African stock exchanges. In light of this, 
our results may be biased towards large listed companies. Although deep data sets that 
include listed and unlisted firms are still rare, testing the findings here with a dataset 
that includes both groups of firms would be appealing and worthwhile. 
 
2. The thesis documents clear evidence that there is inter-industry variation in the 
dynamics pertaining to basic capital as well as debt maturity structure of firms in 
sample countries. Yet, MacKay and Phillips (2005) argue that this approach does not 
tell us how industry-specific factors determine firm financial structure, nor why 
financial structures vary so widely across firms within a given industry. The authors, 
in a study that covered 3074 firms in the US, identify such factors as a firm’s position 
within an industry; a firm’s natural hedge; the actions of other firms in the industry; a 
firm’s status as entrant, incumbent, or exiting firm; and concentration in the industry 
as important industry characteristics the determine the financial structure of a firm. 
Future research should investigate the role of such and other industry-specific factors 
on a firm’s financing decisions as it would deepen our understanding of the dynamics 
surrounding a firm’s financing decisions. Such research would also proffer crucial 
information to governments and policymakers in their effort to craft industry-specific 
policy interventions. 
 
3. In a series of papers which focused on the influence of the East Asian financial crises 
of 1997 on financing decisions of firms in Asia Pacific region, Deesomsak et al. 
(2004; 2009) proffer evidence that the crises had significant but diverse impact on 
firm’s capital and debt maturity structure decisions. The present work does not 
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venture into investigating the effect of the 2008 ‘credit-crunch’ on the financing 
behaviour of African firms due to data limitations. Thus, as adequate data for the post-
crises period trickles in, studies that examine how the 2008 global financial crises 
affected the financing decisions of African firms could be another premising avenue 
for future research.   
 
4. This study belongs to ‘a club of many other efforts’ that were directed at 
understanding cross-country differences in financing practices of firms. To this end, 
we attempted to explain cross-country differences in financing decisions of firms in 
Africa by considering a range of formal institutions and macroeconomic factors. 
However, in a twist from conventional wisdom, Gleason, Mathur and Mathur (2000) 
point to the possibility that managers in different cultures may be conditioned to opt 
for firm-specific strategies that are culturally oriented, which may result in capital 
structures unique to the cultures. In a further rebuke to the entrenched practice in 
capital structure research, Chui, Lloyd and Kwok (2002) argue that differences in 
formal institutions provide only a partial answer to capital structure “puzzle”. In a 
study that covered 5591 firms drawn from 22 countries, the authors provide evidence 
that national culture is a missing piece in explaining the “puzzle’. Very recently, we 
note that Li et al. (2011) document evidence that national culture affects leverage 
decisions of foreign joint ventures in China. Although we could not consider national 
culture variable in the current study due to data [un]availability, it would be appealing 
and worthwhile to test the findings here after controlling for culture variables.  
 
5. Lately, the literature in financial economics witnessed an avalanche of efforts that 
examine the role of corporate ownership patterns in financing decisions of firms (e.g., 
Moh'd, Pery and Rimbey 1998; La Porta et al. 1999; Mahrt-Smith 2005). Although 
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within a single-country context, we note that the literature on firms in Africa has 
witnessed efforts that investigate the nexus between the corporate ownership structure 
and capital structure (e.g., Boateng 2004; Abor 2008; Bokpin and Arko 2009; Ezeoha 
and Okafor 2009). This thesis did not venture into the investigation of the relationship 
between corporate ownership patterns and its financing decisions. However, a cross-
country study that models the relationship between ownership structure variables and 
financing decisions, within the context of Africa, would contribute to global 
knowledge. 
 
6. It is now fairly established that corporate governance correlates with the financing 
decisions of firms (e.g., Graham and Harvey 2001; Abor 2007). The current study 
could not examine the role of corporate governance factors on financing decisions 
mainly due to lack of data. However, a cross-country study that examines how 
corporate governance variables such as board structure influences financing decisions 
of firms, especially within the context of Africa, is another promising area for future 
research.  
  
7. A study of similar nature could have been carried out using survey-based analysis as 
in Graham and Harvey (2001). However, survey based researches are also criticized 
owing to the fact that they do measure opinions and “impressions” of the respondent 
than necessarily reflecting the actual financing decisions of a firm. Further, one may 
hardly obtain data on as much number of firms as could be obtained through analysis 
of financial statements. But, it is evident that survey-based analysis may augment 
findings reported in this study. Thus, testing the findings reported in this thesis using 
survey-based analysis would be interesting and valuable. 
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